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Abstract: 
This book analyses the integration of financial market supervision at the 
international level, particularly focusing on EU law and the actual processes 
taking place in this area (system). Currently legislative action at the EU level 
has a significant impact on legislation in the Czech Republic, with which 
this work is also of concerned together with where the integration of 
supervision takes place. This book seeks among other things to find the 
causes increasingly ongoing process of integration of financial market 
supervision and determine whether the direction in which the international 
integration is going, is the right way. The main objective of this book is to 
determine, whether the process of integration increases itself the efficiency 
of financial market supervision, while simultaneously reducing systemic risk 
to financial market stability. The research in this book also seeks to 
determine whether the functional of regulation of the financial market has 
been significantly integrated into the financial market supervision and has 
become to a certain extent preventive - primary supervision. 
Key words: Integration; supervision; financial market; Banking Union; 





This book aims to introduce, analyse and investigate the integration of 
supervision of financial markets, particularly from the European and global 
perspective, whilst a comparison with the situation in the Czech Republic is 
offered, too. This topic has been hotly debated for a considerable amount 
of time now as the process of integration has intensified in the past few 
years. The word integration refers to unification, assimilation, amalgamation, 
or synthesis into a whole of a higher order. 1 The collocation the integration of 
supervision includes integration of regulation for there is no supervision 
without regulation, and vice versa (supervision itself includes regulation); 
that is the reason why this book also deals with integration of regulation 
together with integration of supervision of financial markets. In my opinion, 
regulation is in fact preventive (primary) supervision and that is why 
supervisory authorities are not ‘solely’ supervisory any more—they are 
regulatory at the same time. In this respect I approach, to a certain extent, 
integration of supervision from the functional point of view—the function 
of regulation has been integrated into that of supervision (though not 
exclusively since the crucial role of a regulator is performed by the 
legislative body).   
Integration of supervision of financial markets can be approached from 
two angles. The first sees it as the unification of supervision into one 
institution (or sometimes two)—that is how the term is understood in EU 
member countries, for instance the Czech Republic or Slovakia, where 
supervision has been integrated into only one institution (institutional 
integration). The second views it as the harmonisation of supervisory 
practice and cooperation at a supranational level—that is the usual meaning 
applied to integration internationally, e.g. the EU (functional integration). 
This work covers both angles but I personally prefer the latter view as I 
interpret the term integration of supervision of financial markets as the unification 
of supervisory practice across international borders and mutual cooperation 
among the countries involved. It seems that this interpretation of the term 
is a more comprehensive one and also a more widely accepted one.   
The integration of supervision itself may take various forms and may 
involve various processes and it is thus vital to study not only the 
possibilities offered and the current state of integration itself but, above all, 
 




to delineate the integration of supervision as such in order to leave as little 
doubt as possible as to the accepted interpretation of the term here. In this 
book, as the title suggests, I am concerned with institutional integration and 
the integration of other areas of regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions, in particular the unification of diverse ways of supervision—my 
approach is therefore functional.   
Integration of supervision is an ongoing process which, from the 
international point of view, has been under way for thirty years2; in fact the 
process of integration has been going deeper and deeper. There are a 
number of reasons for integration: the chief one appears to be the very 
nature of a financial market and its liberalisation as well as changes in its 
structure, its functioning and, more generally, in the overall development of 
economy. Furthermore, the appearance of big national and international 
groups of financial institutions has played its role, as has the subsequent 
need for the harmonisation of entrepreneurial rules for these financial 
institutions. These basic theses are a prerequisite for supervision of financial 
markets, and they also offer the reason for its existence. The basis of 
regulation itself lies in individual national financial systems and it reveals a 
determined effort to ensure the stability of a financial system and financial 
institutions alike. To put it simply, regulation of supervision exists with the 
primary aim of setting such rules for the establishment and functioning of 
financial institutions as to minimise the threat of weakening their stability.   
It is, beyond doubt, impossible for legal norms concerning financial 
market regulation and supervision to cover fully financial markets in all 
their complexities. As financial markets develop, new problems arise and, 
in order to find a solution it may be necessary to redefine existing norms 
and to add something to reach the desired regulatory aims. What is 
crucially important is the protection of consumers together with the 
persecution of illegal practices and the maintenance of financial markets 
and their effectiveness. 3   
 
2 The first country that integrated supervisory mechanisms was Singapore (1984), then 
followed by Norway (1986), Denmark (1988), Malta (1988), Sweden (1991), Great Britain 
(1997/98), Japan (1998), Iceland (1999), South Korea (1999), Hungary (2000), Estonia 
(2001), Lithuania (2001), Germany (2002), Austria (2002), Ireland (2003), Belgium (2004), 
Lichtenstein (2005), Slovakia (2006), the Czech Republic (2006), Poland (2008), Switzerland 
(2009), Finland (2009). Source: MOSS, N. Integrated supervision in Norway: 
Organisational structure, history and experience. Presentation of Finanstilsynet, the 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway at a conference in Sofia, 3rd May 2010. p. 29. 
3 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 51. 
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In this book I would like to find, among other things, the causes of the 
ongoing supervisory integration of financial markets. Moreover, I would like 
to determine whether international integration is going in the right direction 
or not.  
De lege ferenda proposals are of considerable importance as well, for I 
intend to use them to discover a way of financial market supervision that is 
as good as possible and, at the same time, reasonably practical to 
implement. The ultimate goal is to create a truly unified financial market 
that is also easily understandable for those involved in it.   
It is still rather questionable, however, whether it is feasible to create such 
a strongly unified system of supervision anchored in one clearly laid-out 
legal norm and one supervisory body. Or is a hybrid model more realistic? 
Is integration like this a step in the right direction at all? I firmly believe that 
answers to these questions can be found by means of a theoretical analysis 
of foreign financial systems where integration has been under way for some 
time. Moreover, it appears worthwhile to analyse any deficiencies the 
process of integration has been hampered by there.  
For an academic piece of work such as this it is, needless to say, vital to 
opt for methods and methodology that ensure that the work meets the 
expected standard. Methods are understood here as objective and proper 
ways of finding and clarifying pieces of information, principles and patterns 
that lead to a more comprehensive understanding of the matter under 
investigation. Methods need to be described thoroughly so that the findings 
can then be verified. The methods used in this work vary considerably on 
the basis of the given part.  
Analysis, description and synthesis are the most common methods 
applied here. In addition, various methods of induction and deduction are 
present. With regard to the selected topic and its international focus I also 
apply a comparative method while analysing existent legal bases in a number 
of countries. 
The method of analysis leads to a general understanding of the issues 
within the field, in particular the current legal basis, not only in the Czech 
Republic but also in foreign countries (in the EU, above all). Basic notions 
that analysis discovers enable a description of the issues under investigation, 
while these are also compared. Having acquired a sufficient amount of 
theoretical information about the issues, I attempt to offer conclusions by 
means of synthesis.    
The analytical method is also applied when studying the current legal 
basis, including the historical development which preceded it. The current 
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legal basis is assessed in connection with its implementation into practice 
and, further, I interpret a selected set of legal norms within the field, which 
I later apply by means of logical, teleological and systematic methods of 
doctrinal statutory interpretation. 
Induction is reasoning that derives general principles from specific 
observations. It thus enables to get to the very basis of a phenomenon and 
to determine its principles and patterns. A conclusion based on inductive 
reasoning may be considered a hypothesis, since it offers one explanation 
even though in reality there might be a number of them. Such conclusions 
are always influenced by subjective reasoning (experience, knowledge) and 
are therefore of limited validity. The core of induction is a statistical analysis 
of the gathered data which then form the basis of newly-formulated general 
principles. Deduction is a reverse process: one moves from the less general 
to the more general. It is a process by means of which it is tested whether 
the promulgated hypothesis is able to explain the given fact. Induction and 
deduction are intertwined—induction helps to reach theoretical 
generalisations based on the analysis of real phenomena and deduction 
enables to verify the theoretical conclusions in reality. 4 
Thanks to the aforementioned methods it is possible to reach valid 
findings and conclusions, which is exactly what I set out to do in this work. 
I am convinced that via the right application and combination of these 
methods I can achieve my aim. 
The text combines an original theoretical essay, a qualified essay and a 
treatise.  
Important sources of information include academic papers and essays but 
my aim is to create an original piece of work as required for a dissertation 
(an original theoretical treatise, as defined by Šanderová5). It is in full 
accordance with academic practice to quote existing publications if needed 
for argumentation and the creation of hypotheses. 
In my book I combine the German and Anglo-Saxon styles of writing. 
My work focuses on (though not exclusively) the legal basis of the field in 
question, which is later supported by a theoretical analysis and an overview 
mixed with a considerable amount of real-life experience connected with 
the latest development. By means of abstraction I attempt to transform 
specific observations into universally applicable findings. My research 
4 LORENC, M. Závěrečná práce – metodika. [online]. Lorenc info [qtd. 14th November 
2016]. Available at http://lorenc.info/zaverecne-prace/metodika.htm. 
5 ŠANDEROVÁ, J. Jak číst a psát odborný text ve společenských vědách : několik zásad pro 
začátečníky. 1st ed. Praha: Sociologické nakladatelství, 2005. 
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centres on the European Union as a whole but I do not disregard certain 
national particularities, especially noteworthy from the perspective of the 
Czech Republic.   
Another point of interest is the integration of supervision in Scandinavian 
countries, particularly in Norway, for Norway was the first European 
country to have initiated the process of integration (in 1986; 20 years before 
it took place in the Czech Republic). I intend to describe the Norwegian 
way of supervisory regulation and to compare it with the other countries 
within the EU (incl. the Czech Republic) with a view to suggesting de lege 
ferenda changes and to amending regulatory and supervisory frames of 
financial markets in the Czech Republic.  
Solely to describe the issue would not suffice for a book like this, the 
benefit of which should also include the motivation for integration and a 
general overview of basic concepts and existing ways of supervisory 
integration of financial markets and their subsequent comparison. The 
conclusion should ideally try to define the best approach based on up-to-
date observations and it should also provide suggestions and possible 
changes to the legal basis anchored in the EU and Czech legal systems now. 
What is of utmost importance is the up-to-the-minute acquaintance with the 
issue and real-life experience as financial markets are such a dynamically 
developing environment—what used to be the case a year ago might now 
be true only partially, if at all.  
The main aim of this book is the confirmation or refutation of the 
following leading hypotheses together with partial ones. 
The main hypothesis 
a) The process of supervisory integration itself supports and increases 
the effectiveness of supervision over a financial market and decreases the 
systemic risk of destabilising the system.  
b) The function of financial market regulation has been deeply 
integrated into that of supervision and has thus become, to a certain 
extent, a preventive measure—primary supervision.  
 
Partial hypothesis no. 1 
The process of supervisory integration of a financial market is from both 
the institutional and functional perspective a step towards a more 
concentrated set of regulatory powers in the hands of a narrow range of 
supervisory institutions in a centralised way. 
15 
 
Partial hypothesis no. 2 
The process of supervisory integration of a financial market was initiated so 
as to create a more effective way of reacting to a rapidly and continually 
developing world of financial markets, which are due to the increasing 
financial globalisation no longer of national interest only. 
 
Partial hypothesis no. 3 
The process of supervisory integration of a financial market is influenced by 
the enormous importance of the financial market in the national economy 
as the basis of international economic stability, and it helps to create the 
single market in the EU.  
These hypotheses (in particular the main one) should lead towards a 
number of partial conclusions. Given the selected approach, it seems 
apposite not to expect only one conclusion. The research does not aim to 
determine whether the integration of supervision is beneficial or not, it 
rather hopes to reveal the motivation behind the process of integration, to 
estimate when we might expect results of the process, to determine what 
exactly is going on and why, and, last but not least, to analyse whether a 
positive outcome is possible at all. If a partial conclusion is reached and if 
it is not considered to be the best solution, I will try to come up with a 
more suitable option by means of international comparison or de lege 
ferenda proposals. 
As far as the organisation of this book is concerned, Introduction is 
followed by a chapter discussing financial markets and their supervision in 
general, including theoretical frameworks and models that specific 
approaches stem from; this chapter then also classifies financial market 
supervision within the system of financial law. The next chapter discusses 
the crucial notion of financial market supervision in the European Union. 
The very position of this chapter reveals my methodological stance: from 
the general to the specific—the more general and wider legal basis is the 
European one at the moment and the more specific is the Czech one, which 
is derived from the European one. Thus, it seems more appropriate to start 
with the European legal basis, all the more so since the process of financial 
market supervision at the European level is now a hotly-debated matter 
with continuous development. This work also includes an analysis of 
financial market supervision in Norway; it was added for two reasons: 
firstly, Norway was the first country to implement an integrated model of 
financial market supervision (in 1986) and, secondly, Norway is not part of 
the EU, which seems to make such an analysis worthwhile because it 
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enables a comparison of legal bases between a non-EU country with those 
countries which belong to the EU (the Czech Republic, for example). It is 
also immensely interesting to discuss the integration of supervision and its 
legal basis in Norway because of the existence of the EEA Agreement and 
because of the relations between EFTA members participating in this 
agreement and all EU member countries. The purpose of the EEA 
Agreement is the creation of a free single market. It logically follows that 
the legal basis and regulatory and supervisory requirements are similar or 
even identical in the EU and EFTA member countries. These are the chief 
reasons why I included the chapter about Norway and why I try to verify 
the hypothesis about legal similarities and to discover any potential setbacks 
of such Europe-wide cooperation and harmonisation. Supervisory 
integration in the Czech Republic is dealt with in chapter number six. 
Moreover, I included two texts about potential failures of financial market 
subjects. The last part is Conclusion, which sums the whole book up and it 
also offers the assessment of all the hypotheses stated in Introduction.  
 
Further research possibilities 
The topic chosen for this book is a relatively new one and therefore its 
consequences and real-life effectiveness are perhaps just beginning to 
emerge. That is why potential research areas mentioned here are rather a 
guessing game or, better still, a prognosis as to what might happen in the 
field of financial market supervision and regulation in the future. 
I agree with Kubíček, 6 who claims that the primary objective of 
supervision and regulation is the maintenance and further development of a 
fully functional financial market in all its specific forms and types, thereby 
making sure it can fulfil its raison d’être. Supervision and regulation are 
secondary factors surrounding financial markets because only after these 
markets have existed for some time is it possible to come up with regulatory 
and supervisory interventions based on real-life experience with the aim of 
maintaining fully functional financial markets. 
Outlooks are only possible if one is fully acquainted with the current state 
of affairs. One of the richest sources of the latest information in this field is 
the vast number of regulatory and supervisory changes in the area of 
integration itself but also in the organisation of it at various levels: regional, 
national, global. These processes continually seek to harmonise the rules of 
 
6 KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy – rozcestí, scestí nebo ještě něco 
jiného? In Sborník z mezinárodní konference Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy. Praha: Vysoká 
škola finanční a správní 2003. p. 27. 
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operation and enterprise for financial institutions and conglomerates in 
Europe and, indeed, the whole world.   
It is however crucial to sustain the right balance between regulation and 
free enterprise, because overregulation is as harmful as little or no regulation 
at all. Overregulation inevitably leads to useless administrative burden for 
everyone involved: the body of supervision and all financial market entities. 
If supervision and regulation should bear fruit, there is another point to 
bear in mind: it is vital to maintain a certain degree of specificity in the 
ongoing processes of harmonisation. It is hardly desirable to immediately 
and fully harmonise a rather less developed financial market in a Third 
World country as if it were an economically developed part of the world, 
where financial markets (as well as their regulation and supervision) have 
gone through the phase of initial difficulties and their environment is 
consequently far more stable for companies involved in the financial market 
and, also, for the financial system as such. 
The title of this work suggests that I focus not only on institutional 
integration (though it is a subject of primary interest) but also on its 
functional aspect. Functional integration is the setting of supervision from 
the point of view of its subject—it is a way of harmonising supervisory 
functions so that they are in accordance with the objective: the maintenance 
and support of thriving financial markets. In other words, the term refers to 
the unification of supervisory rules influencing the effectiveness of 
supervision. Functional integration logically follows institutional integration, 
which is the basis of this work. My hypothesis holds that institutional 
integration necessarily brings about concurrent functional integration—
there are not specific functions for insurance, capital markets, credit unions, 
banks etc.; there is only one function (to maintain financial market stability) 
encompassing the whole field.  
Further research could verify the expected link between institutional and 
functional integration and it could also determine whether the change is 
purely theoretical or with real-life consequences. To put it another way, has 
the probable existence of one ‘big’ supervisory function (which has emerged 
from various parts of financial markets) brought about any real change in 
terms of its functional focus and of the way supervision works or is it 
simply a matter of terminology? 
It is truly intriguing to entertain the idea that financial market regulation 
has been significantly integrated with financial market supervision (as the 
second part of the main hypothesis states). I firmly believe that it is the case 
as the reverse process is not taking place and, logically, it even cannot take 
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place. One can hardly assume that supervision could integrate with 
regulation because it would then mean that the main regulator (the 
legislator) also has the function of supervision, which clearly is not and 
cannot be true. The legislator is exclusively the main regulator whereas the 
body of supervision (apart from the very supervisory function) maintains 
significant regulatory powers, be it in the form of decrees, instructions and 
statements addressed to those who participate in a financial market, but also 
by providing licences to individual participants.  Given the fact that the 
supervisory body is, when compared with other state and private 
institutions, the closest to financial markets, it works with first-hand 
experience and information. The supervisory body is also the most active 
supplier of initiatives and it keeps the role of the consultant as far as 
legislative proposals are concerned. These proposals come from the 
Ministry of Finance,7 which confirms the hypothesis that regulation is 
integrated with financial market supervision. 
It needs to be answered whether the introduction of integrated 
supervision with a dominant functional model8 has any bearing upon the 
effectiveness of supervision itself. Taken at face value, it seems to me that 
it does not as I am convinced that what is essential is the setting of the 
rules in the given financial market, effective sanctioning if the rules are 
broken, and the extent to which financial institutions identify with the 
imposed rules. The very existence of regulation and supervision is a 
preventive measure against potential threats to the whole financial system, 
while regulatory and supervisory bodies also need to take into account 
potential risks. 
In connection with the crucial role of lawmakers and their part in the 
process of regulatory and supervisory integration, Palat comes to the 
conclusion that financial market regulation must unavoidably be regulated 
and, at the same time, it is essential to supervise this regulation and make 
sure it is objective. 9 
To sum up, further research will, in all likelihood, include up-to-date 
analyses of the systems and ways of supervisory integration of financial 
markets and their mutual comparisons. It is only possible to evaluate the 
 
7 In actual fact the main source of legislation are European regulations. 
8 The functional model is based on the vertical mechanism of supervision—individual 
supervisory institutions usually supervise all financial entities but only from a certain 
perspective: according to the type of market failure. These most frequently include systemic 
risks, investor and consumer protection, prudential regulation and supervision, and also the 
supervision of economic competition.  
9 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 209. 
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pros and cons and offer improvements in the field of supervisory 
integration if one takes into account the current practice, positive and 
negative experience of supervisory bodies and regulators along with 





FINANCIAL MARKET AND ITS SUPERVISION 
 
This chapter introduces the concept of a financial market and its 
supervision. In addition, it considers its position within the system of law 
and society alike. It deals with general legal norms and it also analyses the 
reasons for financial market supervision including its actual realisations. 
Considering the fact that the next chapters are concerned with specific ways 
of supervision (including existing systems), it is important to analyse the 
theoretical possibilities and arrangements first. Only after having done this, 
may I apply this information in the following chapters about the current 
state of financial market integration in the Czech Republic and in Europe, 
too. First, I attempt to classify financial market supervision within the 
system of law to make absolutely clear at the very beginning of the chapter 
where the topic selected for this dissertation finds itself within the legal 
system and which part of the system is being dealt with here.   
 
The position of financial market supervision in the system of law 
 
In this chapter I try to classify financial market supervision in the system 
of law; in other words, I want to find and delineate the place it occupies 
there. This is a vital thing to do with every legal norm and financial market 
supervision is no exception whatsoever. Norms that occupy the same 
position in the system of law share a number of common features. The 
classification within the system of law itself reveals common features that 
the norm under investigation shares with the others in the same 
position—that is the right platform for deeper understanding and a more 
accurate analysis of the system and the norms within. It goes without 
saying that financial market supervision is directly linked to financial law, 
but financial law is not such a small field to make unnecessary the exact 
placement of the norms within the system. Financial law is a rather young 
discipline which has broken free from administrative law with which it still 
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maintains the closest bond. Its independence and its exact classification 
are described below.  
It would theoretically also make sense to place financial market 
supervision into the system of administrative law not only because financial 
law separated from administrative law but also because financial market 
supervision processes are, since they are in fact administrative procedures, 
under the authority of Administrative Procedure Code. Thus, supervision 
becomes part of administrative law (e.g. an administrative procedure to 
acquire a banking licence) 
Nonetheless, there is one strong argument for the inclusion of financial 
market supervision into the system of financial law: the subject of legal 
regulation of financial markets is social relations connected with the 
creation and distribution of funds, which is in accordance with the subject 
of legal regulation of financial law (as is discussed below). There is a small 
anomaly though: the subject of legal regulation of financial law is social 
relations created and maintained through those funds which are in the 
public interest. That is not always the case when it comes to legal regulation 
of financial markets. This anomaly is compensated with the fact that it is 
undoubtedly in the public interest to regulate and supervise financial 
markets due to their importance for the integrity of the economic system.  
Given the fact that money relations are not the focal point of legal 
regulation of administrative law, it is, in my view, demonstrated (by finding 
the common core in the subject of legal regulation of financial markets and 
financial law) that financial market supervision falls within the realm of 
financial law. 
Another necessary step is to delimit the notion of financial market 
supervision (from now on also just ‘supervision’), for its correct placement 
within the system of financial law is unthinkable without realising what 
supervision actually entails. 
 
1. The system of financial law 
Before delimiting the system of a legal discipline, it is necessary to defend 
the independence of the given discipline. Financial law undoubtedly is an 
independent discipline as it fulfils the establishing criteria which generally 
justify the existence of an independent legal discipline.  
According to Mrkývka10 these criteria include 
 
10 MRKÝVKA, P. PAŘÍZKOVÁ, I. RADVAN, M. et al. Finanční právo a finanční správa. 1. 
díl. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2004. p. 32. 
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- independent and specific subject of legal regulation 
- methods of legal regulation.11 
- internal cohesion of legal norms. 
- social acceptance of the discipline 
 
All these criteria are met by the discipline of financial law, thereby setting 
itself free from other legal disciplines. 
The subject of financial law is specific social relations involved in 
various financial activities and reflecting a number of financial 
phenomena. Financial law governs in particular those relations in which 
the state is involved and which indirectly or not affect the base money or 
its parts12. To put it simply, financial law is not concerned with relations 
with a contractual basis—these rather belong to civil or commercial 
law13. 
Financial law is a specific public-law discipline with close bonds with 
administrative law; in fact it broke free from it. But financial law also has a 
lot in common with private-law disciplines, which deal with legal relations 
involving payments and money—the contractual positions of the subjects 
are, however, equal.  
Experts and the lay public alike accept and respect financial law as an 
independent discipline. Discussions surrounding its position are a thing of 
the past and to cast doubt on this discipline as public-law part of the Czech 
legal system is now virtually unheard-of.   
For the purpose of the classification of supervision within the system of 
financial law is crucial the discipline-defining criterion of internal cohesion 
of legal norms—the uniqueness of the system of financial law. The defining 
systemic features are: 
- a higher rate of mutual legal norms in contrast with norms from other 
legal disciplines. 
 
11 Mrkyvka states the specific methods of legal regulation of financial law, the public-law 
character of regulation, the attributive share of public authority, the dominant power 
character of legal relations, an independent specification of financial law obligations, 
financial law acts, and the imperative character of legal regulation Cf. MRKÝVKA P., 
PAŘÍZKOVÁ, I. Základy finančního práva. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2008. p. 30. 
12 BAKEŠ M. et al. Finanční právo 6th ed. Praha: C.H.BECK 2012. p. 12. 
13 This does not apply without exception, however, because financial law also deals with 
state loans and the sale of the state property. 
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- a relative autonomy of the given set of legal norms from the norms of 
the other disciplines14. 
Despite the unquestionable existence of the system of financial law, 
financial law is not codified in a unified way and is instead fragmented into 
several independent acts. As a result, there is a wide range of norms with 
not so rigid links between them. I hold that financial law as a whole defies 
entire codification, mainly due to the vast scope of interest of all its 
subdisciplines. 
The closest bonds exist between individual subdisciplines of financial law 
and then also between mutually close subdisciplines which form two 
different systems on the basis of their purpose and their character: fiscal and 
non-fiscal parts of financial law. The system of financial law is defined by 
the internal differentiation of its branches into coherent groups of financial-
law norms as regards their content and the similarity of the social relations 
that they govern15. With the increasing rate of globalisation the range of 
public financial activities changes, thereby creating new limits to the scope 
of financial law. 
The scope of financial law naturally increases with the increase in 
financial activities of the public sector and with the increasing number of 
state interventions into economy. It means that financial law has a wider 
scope in those countries where economic interventions are frequent; this 
subsequently influences the system of financial law there, too.  
Most experts in financial law divide the system into two parts: the general 
and the specific16  part, though there is hardly a consensus about the 
existence of the general part because it is only with great difficulty that one 
can find a common core for all subdisciplines of financial law. Likewise, 
there are no common sources of law in the technical meaning of the word; 
yet, I am convinced that the general part of financial law can be accepted—
chiefly because of the fact that there is a common characteristic for all 
financial-law norms: they govern financial relations. 
The main division within the system of financial law is to be found in the 
specific part, namely the division into the fiscal and non-fiscal parts. The 
former is defined by those social relations in which the primary interest is to 
regulate the cash flow in the public budgets. The non-fiscal part, on the 
 
14 PRUCHA P. : Základy správního práva a veřejné správy  - obecná část . MU Brno 1994. p. 34. 
15 MRKÝVKA, P. PAŘÍZKOVÁ, I. RADVAN, M. et al. Finanční právo a finanční správa. 1st 
vol. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2004. p. 56. 




other hand, regulates social relations in which the cash flow is only 
secondary because the main point of interest is the regulation of money 
itself and of the monetary system as well. This division is essential for those 
common notions and principles on which the general basis of both 
subdisciplines is formed. This in turn enables a better and a more 
transparent interpretation and application of financial-law norms. The fiscal 
part of financial law includes the arrangement of budget law, tax law, and 
customs law.  The non-fiscal part then deals with currency law, foreign 
exchange law, public banking and insurance law, the legal regulation of 
supervision of the capital market and credit unions, and, finally, the 
hallmarking law. 
Financial law can also be divided (apart from the abovementioned 
division into the general and specific parts) into procedural financial law 
(norms of procedurally legal character17), administrative financial law and 
criminal financial law. These subdisciplines however exceed the scope of 
this work and will not be discussed in any greater detail.  
If we accept the idea that financial market supervision entails supervision 
of the banking sector, credit unions, the capital market, insurance industry, 
pension savings companies, pension funds, exchange offices and, finally, 
institutions in the area of payments, then it is, beyond any doubt, true that 
financial market consists of basically the same areas as the non-fiscal part of 
financial law, the only exception being the presence of financial market law 
in place of currency law (for more information see the subchapter below). 
Yet, it would be wrong to claim that the financial market is the same entity 
as the non-fiscal part of financial law; however, it is possible to say that 
financial market law falls within the realm of the non-fiscal part of financial 
law. This statement hints at the independence of financial market law; it 
indeed meets the discipline-defining criteria of independence and specificity 
of the subject of legal regulation. The subject of legal regulation here is legal 
relations which are formed within financial markets, i.e. within their various 
branches. The other discipline-defining criteria of financial market are 
identical with those met by financial law. Therefore, I do not think that it 
would be correct to call for a complete independence of the discipline of 
financial market law; it is nonetheless not erroneous to accept the existence 
of financial market law within the realm of financial law, i.e. in its non-fiscal 
part.  Financial market supervision is then conceived of as a branch of 
financial market law. This theoretical assessment of financial market law 
 
17 The procedural position of subjects, the procedural actions when deciding the matters of 
superiority and inferiority and the procedural actions of subjected entities—e.g. self-
application within the system of tax law and the legislative process, too. 
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enables a more transparent and easier understanding of the structure of 
financial law, but it also enables a more accurate classification of what this 
book deals with, namely the issue of financial market supervision. If it is 
clearly stated what financial market law is and where it belongs within the 
legal system, it is then much easier to delineate the area of financial market 
supervision and to determine by which means it is performed and what is 
the nature of the legal relations under supervision. 
It is now time to turn our attention to a branch of financial law which 
comprises the subject of this book: financial market supervision, which is a 
section of legal regulation in the non-fiscal part of financial law as the 
following diagram illustrates. 
 
Diagram no.1 –A schematic classification of financial market supervision within the 
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2. Financial market supervision and its position in the system of 
financial law 
Financial market supervision can be described as a role performed by a 
public authority. It is a power supported by the state which guarantees 
potential sanctioning of subjects if financial market rules set by the 
regulatory bodies are broken. 
Supervision and regulation set rules which protect the stability of the 
banking sector, the capital market, the insurance industry and pension 
funds. These entities are systematically regulated, subsequently supervised 
and, if need be, sanctioned if the rules are not properly observed. I dare say 
that in the Czech Republic regulation is in fact a subset of supervision since 
the former has been largely integrated into the latter. I view supervision as a 
process that consists of three stages: 1/ regulation, 2/ proper supervision 
and 3/ possible sanctions. To justify this bold claim I would like to point 
out that all three stages have been integrated into one authority, namely the 
CNB (Česká Národní banka/Czech National Bank). 
Legal norms in connection with financial markets comprise acts prepared 
by the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Justice, as well as 
implementing regulations and orders issued typically by the CNB. The same 
institution also provides help to those involved in financial markets by 
means of interpretative and explanatory materials (e.g. official notices and 
answers to questions). Obligatory rules and interpretative materials are more 
and more often issued directly by the EU authorities.18  
Financial market supervision in the Czech Republic is performed by the 
CNB.19 Owing to the fact that the supervision covers a wide range of areas, 
powers and duties in individual sectors are modified within sectoral laws.20 
The main supervisory objective and supervisory principles are very similar 
in all those areas; yet, there are some particularities stemming from the 
diversity of activities in individual institutions of the financial market. It 
thus seems apposite to shed more light on them now.  
To maintain the perfect working order, credibility and stability of the 
financial market is not and cannot be just a question of free marketing 
 
18 CNB. Legislation and methodological materials of the CNB in the field of financial 
market. [qtd. 26th May 2017]. Available at 
https://www.cnb.cz/cs/dohled_financni_trh/legislativni_zakladna/index.html.  
19 On the basis of Act no. 6/1993 Coll. on Česká národní banka, as amended (from now on 
just ‘CNB Act‘). 
20 The capital market and its supervision is also regulated by Act no. 15/1998 Coll. on 
Supervision in the Capital Market Area and on the Amendment of other Acts. 
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mechanisms; thus, there are a great number of regulatory and prescriptive 
rules—mainly in the form of legal norms. The range of legal norms is 
rather diverse and to supervise the whole system of rules and to reach 
conclusions and administer sanctions (if the rules are broken) is called 
financial market supervision. This supervision covers all institutions within 
a financial market.  
Financial institutions are supervised so as to maintain the stability of the 
financial system in the Czech Republic. Other top priorities include: 
support of development, discipline and competitiveness of financial 
institutions, prevention of crisis, protection of investors and clients and 
strengthening public credibility, in particular as regards the banking 
system, the credibility of which seems to be of vital importance to the 
entire system. 
Banking regulation is a preventive measure consisting of the creation and 
enforcement of conditions, rules and limits for the activities of banking 
institutions.21 Supervision of financial market institutions is not motivated 
by a desire to interfere in private-law relations between institutions and their 
clients, nor is it motivated by a wish to substitute the work of courts and 
criminal justice. It is not to be expected that supervision will prevent 
institutions from making some poor strategic or investment decisions. It 
cannot prevent the failure of an individual either. What it can do, though, is 
to regulate and examine the effectiveness and functionality of the governing 
and inspecting systems of financial institutions, for which are responsible 
the leading authorities in those financial institutions. There are a lot of 
demands placed on them regarding their professionality, expertise, and 
experience.  The main function of supervision is to use its public-law bodies 
to intervene in case there are some imperfections—it can impose 
receivership or revoke the licence. Above all, it offers protection of the 
system of financial institutions and the financial market in its entirety as well 
as prevention of future failures or illegal conduct. 
Supervision of a financial market and its institutions involves decisions 
about requests and granting licences, permissions, registrations and prior 
consents according to special legal norms, the inspection of rules observing 
in accordance with the issued licence or permission, the inspection of 
obedience to the law (to which the CNB is authorised through acts or 
special legal norms), the inspection of obedience to the regulations and 
orders issued by the CNB, the acquisition of information necessary for 
supervision and its subsequent enforcement, but also checking its 
 
21 MRKÝVKA, P., RADVAN, M. Veřejné bankovní právo In MRKÝVKA, P. et al. 
Finanční právo a finanční správa, 1st vol. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2004. p. 219. 
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credibility, completeness and topicality, the infliction of corrective measures 
and sanctions and procedures about administrative offences and  
misdemeanours.22 
 
The supervision of credit institutions 
The main task in this area is to supervise banks, savings banks and credit 
unions. 23 These operate in almost the same way as banks, although there are 
a few notable exceptions: they offer their services to their members only 
and their mandatory registered capital is only 35 million (unlike 500 million 
for banks). As far as rules are concerned, the supervisory ones are set in the 
same way.  
It goes without saying that the stability and optimal working order of the 
banking sector, perceived as worthy of public trust, are the fundamentals of 
a healthy economy. Credit unions undoubtedly play an important role as 
well, but it is the banking sector whose role, from the point of view of the 
whole system, is absolutely crucial. 
Having been granted legal authorisation24, the CNB issues regulations and 
public notices that state the conditions on which licences can be obtained 
and they also set prudential rules in the individual sectors of credit 
institutions’ enterprise.  
Banking regulation is generally focused on the maintenance of financial 
market stability; that is why it is clear that supervision of this specific area 
constitutes the very basis of supervision of the entire financial market—
credit institutions, banks in particular, are in fact the most important 
institutions where finances are cumulated and redistributed. Any collapse of 
an individual bank can seriously destabilise the entire financial system—not 
only because banks (as credit institutions) manipulate large sums of money, 
but also because banks often influence other areas of financial markets, 
above all that of the capital market.  
 
 
22 CNB. Dohled nad úvěrovými institucemi. Online [qtd. 2nd  June 2017]. Available at 
https://www.cnb.cz/cs/dohled_financni_trh/vykon_dohledu/postaveni_dohledu/uverov
e_instituce/index.html. 
23.The scope of banking activities is regulated by Act no. 21/1995 Coll. on banks as 
amended. The scope of credit unions is based on Act no. 87/1995 Coll. on savings and 
credit unions and some other regulations connected with it, as amended.  





Capital market supervision 
 
Service providers and their enterprise in capital markets are supervised by 
the designated part of financial market supervision. Namely these are 
institutions that arrange capital market trading25 and the ones specialised in 
collective investment26. Legal authorisation gives the CNB the authority to 
issue public notices that specify conditions allowing entrance to the capital 
market, prudential rules, codes of conduct with investors and client, and last 
but not least, the rules of market transparency.  
I firmly believe that from the point of view of the whole system this part 
of financial market, along with credit institutions and supervision of 
insurance companies, is the most significant for the overall economic 
stability. However, in comparison with banking institutions the danger of 
failure or just a drop is not of such importance, which can be demonstrated 
by contrasting the regulation of a bank and a trader in securities, as the main 
figure in the capital market. Unlike banks, traders in securities do not play 
such a crucial role especially because of their relative unimportance in 
payments. An imminent bankruptcy of a trader does not pose a major threat 
to the entire system of finances.27 Moreover, funds (money and investment 
instruments) which have been entrusted to a trader are still in the 
customer’s possession and are kept separate from the trader’s possessions; 
there is no such separation as far as banks are concerned. Traders with 
securities are also in possession of liquid assets, so if there happen to 
emerge some financial difficulties, they can sell the assets at the current 
market value.  
There is, however, one feature common to both credit institutions 
supervision and capital market supervision, namely the fact that the role of 
supervisory and regulatory activities should be preventive (forbidding 
entrance where necessary and issuing prudential rules) with the aim of 
minimising the danger of bankruptcy.  
 
Supervision in insurance 
In this area supervision is focused on the activities of insurance and 
reinsurance28 companies, insurance dealers, and also insurance adjustors. 29  
 
25 Regulated in particular by Act no. 256/2005 Coll. on capital market enterprise, as 
amended. 
26 Regulated by Act no. 240/2014 Coll. on investment companies and trusts, as amended. 
27 MAYER, C. The Regulation of Financial Services: Lessons for the UK for 1992, in 
DERMINE, J., ed  European Banking in the 1990s, Oxford: 1993. pp.  41-61. 
28 Act no. 277/2009 Coll. on insurance, as amended. 
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The main institutions under supervision here are insurance and 
reinsurance companies, but supervision applies, of course, to individual 
dealers and adjustors as well. The supervisory authority checks whether all 
legal obligations are fulfilled, prudential rules are observed and whether the 
body is provided with all the information it demands.  
 
Supervision of pension institutions and pension funds 
Credibility and stability of the pension scheme is one of the prerequisites 
for the well-being of every society, and economy as well, naturally. There is 
supervision of pension funds30, pension institutions31 operating 
transformation, participation and retirement funds, and foreign institutions 
operating employment pension schemes.32 Legal regulation in this area 
concerns primarily pension schemes and supplementary pension insurance, 
retirement savings, supplementary and employment pension savings. The 
CNB acts in accordance with the law on capital market supervision.33 
 
Supervision over payment and electronic money institutions 
The CNB performs supervision of the activities of payment and electronic 
money institutions as well as the activities of small-scale electronic money 
issuers and small-scale payment service providers. Typically, supervision is 
carried out by means of regulations34 and public notices which stipulate the 
conditions of entrance and prudential rules for the range of institutions 
within the field. 
 
Supervision over exchange offices 
From the macro-economic point of view, exchange offices do not pose a 
significant threat to the system; hence the main objective is to strengthen 
the credibility and safety of exchange-office services, for example via 
 
29 Act no. 38/2004 Coll. on insurance dealers and insurance adjustors, as amended. 
30According to Act no. 42/1994 Coll. on supplementary insurance with contribution from 
the state and on amendments to acts linked with its implementation 
31 According to Act no. 426/2011 Coll. on pension savings, and Act no. 427/2011 Coll. on 
supplementary pension savings 
32 Rules introduced for employment funds according to Act no. 340/2006 Coll. on 
employment pension schemes, which thanks to the orders from the EU enables foreign 
employment pension schemes to operate in the Czech Republic.  
33 Act no. 15/1998 Coll. on capital market supervision and on amendments to other acts. 
34 Under Act no. 284/2009 Coll. on payments. 
30 
 
complete transparency of exchange rates. More importantly though, 
exchange offices are often used to legalise proceeds of crime; consequently 
they are under considerable supervisory attention, because these activities 
are of interest not only from the perspective of economy and financial law, 
but also criminal law. 
Exchange offices, provided they are not credit institutions, can only be 
run by legal or natural persons registered at the CNB. As far as supervision 
is concerned, part of the process is to make sure that officers abide by the 
demand for information when serving clients. It is thus vital that clients 
have all the available information when doing business with exchange 
offices.  
The activity of the CNB is, to a certain extent, restricted35 to declaring 
public notices in which there are registration forms to exchange-office 
activities and also the contents of supplements. 
 
 
Financial market supervision within the system of law - summary  
Financial market supervision has its firm place not only within the system of 
financial law but in the entire legal system of the Czech Republic, and, 
indeed, globally as part of financial market law. I am convinced that to 
integrate supervision into the system of financial law (and financial market 
law) is logical and hardly to be disputed; equally, it makes it possible to 
stabilise the economic system by means of supervising the institutions active 
in the financial market, their entrance to the market and their activities 
there, but also by means of increasing the credibility of the financial market 
(and its individual segments) in the public eye.   
The financial market is an area into which enter not only a high number 
of financial institutions, but also members of the public (equipped with 
varying degrees of professional knowledge): these include investors, 
individual savers or one-time participants. Therefore, any instability or 
frequent threats in the form of possible bankruptcies of some major 
institutions in the financial market could have devastating economic 
consequences for individuals and the whole system and its stability, too. 
The classification of financial law may not appear standard in comparison 
with some other (older) legal disciplines, but it has long defended its 
independent position within the system of law thanks to its clear 
classification, its acceptance by the public and its possibilities to react to 
 
35 Under Act no. 219/1995 Coll. on foreign exchange law, as amended. 
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emerging public needs. The system of financial law is a necessary 
prerequisite for further academic exploration and for moving financial-law 
theory into practice, often with up-to-date modifications to ensure that 
current societal and economic demands are met. Supervision is firmly 
anchored in this system and it is hard to imagine that there should be any 
significant changes or shifts regarding its position in the system of financial 
law, which in turn enables its development and stabilisation, thereby 
strengthening not only the credibility of supervision itself, but also of the 




The financial market in almost all its areas (including that of the capital 
market in the form of money and capital) has developed rapidly in the past 
decade. The effects can be seen in the increasingly more and more 
interwoven web of national markets and the diminishing differences 
between individual financial sectors. Big financial groups’ importance and 
influence has been on the increase and, in general, the world has witnessed 
international financial globalisation. This all called for gradual changes to 
financial supervision and its organisation. For example in the Czech 
Republic there used to be four supervisory authorities—conceivably too 
many for such a small financial market. 36 
The financial market is a system of relations, instruments, entities and 
institutions that enable the accumulation, distribution and allocation of 
temporarily available financial funds on the basis of supply and demand. 
The financial market makes it possible to redistribute available funds on a 
voluntary contractual basis.37 
The financial market is primarily used to trade financial instruments, most 
notably securities and other entities. Most of the trade deals with financial 
instruments with a long payback period—more than a year. In this case we 
talk about the capital market. Scheffrin has it that the capital market is a 
 
36 It was a supervisory model divided into sectors—each sector took charge of a different 
segment of the financial market. The CNB was responsible for banks, the Commision for 
Securities for the capital market, the Ministry of Finance for insurance companies and 
pension funds, and the Office for Supervision over Credit Unions for savings and credit 
unions.  
37 KOTÁB, P., KARFÍKOVÁ, M, VONDRÁČKOVÁ, P. Základní finančněpravní 
instituty. In BAKEŠ, M. et al. Finanční právo, 6th rev. ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012. p. 102. 
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market where money is provided for a period longer than one year.38 
Finances from the capital market are obtained with a view to financing 
long-term investments of trading companies, households but also 
governments. Typical financing instruments include long-term bonds, bank 
and consortium loans, mortgage loans and mortgage bonds. The capital 
market also makes use of equity securities (shares and profit participation 
certificates), which have basically no fixed payback date. Short-term markets 
are those financial markets where instruments have paybacks periods of 
days, months or the maximum of one year. Typical instruments include 
short-term securities, loans, credits and deposits to be paid back within one 
year, e.g. bills of exchange, short-term bonds, deposit certificates (deposit 
slips), interbank deposits, short-term bank deposits etc. Sheffrin39 concludes 
that financial markets are used for short-term financing, sometimes for 
loans to be paid almost ‘overnight’. Capital markets, on the other hand, are 
used for long-term financing, such as the purchase of shares or credits 
where the payback date is not expected in less than a year.  
This is, indeed, the division proposed by Kotáb,40 namely the division of 
financial market into the capital and money markets according to the 
character of traded instruments (financial claims) and the period of their 
validity. I consider money markets and capital markets parts of financial law, 
which is a view confirmed by Zucchi41, who is convinced that the money 
market and the capital market are not the only branches of financial market, 
although they are the most important ones  and the most frequently 
employed as well. 42  
It is extremely important to distinguish between securities and financial 
instruments, for these are most certainly not the same notions. Financial 
instruments are the most general types of assets which can be traded. Apart 
from securities financial instruments also include futures, forwards, swaps 
and other instruments, clearly different from securities.   
 
38 SULLIVAN, A., SHEFFRIN S. M. Economics: Principles in action. Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003. p. 283. 
39 SULLIVAN, A., SHEFFRIN S. M. Economics: Principles in action. Upper Saddle River, New 
Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2003. p. 283. 
40 KOTÁB, P., BAKEŠ M. Základní finančněpravní instituty. In BAKEŠ, M. et al. Finanční 
právo, 6th rev. ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012. p. 103. 
41 ZUCCHI, K. Financial Markets: Capital Vs. Money Markets [online]. Investopedia [qtd. 
14th November 2017]. Available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/052313/financial-markets-capital-vs-
money-markets.asp. 
42 Financial markets often include other disciplines belonging to the financial sector, 




Financial markets consist of seven parts, for which I suggest the term ‘the 
classification of financial market disciplines’: 43 
- money market (including payments, electronic money and systems of 
payments) 
- foreign exchange market 
- banking and co-operative banking 
- insurance and supplementary pension insurance 
- capital market  
- precious metals market (the legal discipline is usually called 
hallmarking).44 
 
This classification has one disadvantage, namely the fact that there seems 
to be a big overlap with the content and classification of non-fiscal part of 
financial law (excluding currency law). As a result, there might arise a certain 
amount of confusion over what belongs to the financial market and what 
does to the non-fiscal part of financial law. This can be avoided if one 
reminds oneself of the diagram no. 1 above: it is clear that the non-fiscal 
part of financial law is a broader concept than the financial market, which is, 
in fact, its (i.e. the non-fiscal part of financial law) subset.  
Classification of Šoltés and Kulhánek 45 offers an alternative view—it 
seems to be, in my opinion, a criteria-based classification: 
- primary and secondary markets 
- bond markets, stock markets, commodity markets, and foreign 
exchange markets  
- spot markets and terminal markets 
- national financial markets and international financial markets (further 
divided into foreign markets and euromarkets) 
 
 
43 KYNCL, L. Sjednocení dozoru nad finančními trhy v rámci reformy veřejné správy. In 
Sborník z konference Dny veřejného práva, Právnická fakulta, Masarykova univerzita, 2007, pp. 1 
- 8. 
44 Personally, I feel that a better label is ‘commodity market’ because I would include here 
also commodities which do not belong to precious metals.  
45 ŠOLTÉS, V., KULHÁNEK, L. Finanční trhy. In POLOUČEK, S. et al. Peníze, banky, 
finanční trhy. Praha: C.H.Beck, 2009. p. 210. 
34 
 
In primary financial markets there are traded primary issues of financial 
instruments whereas secondary markets trade financial instruments which 
have already been issued. The second group takes into account the nature of 
the instrument, which is being traded.46 Kotáb47 adds that the foremost 
function of primary markets is the acquisition of financial capital for new 
investment, while secondary markets focus on the sale of already-issued 
financial instruments where the main objective is to ensure liquidity for 
investors, i.e. to make it possible to convert financial instruments into liquid 
finances. The third group mentioned here is centred on the time elapsed; it 
distinguishes between spot markets (business is realised within several days 
after it is sealed48) and terminal markets49 (the day of realisation, including 
the derivatives, is put back to a stated date in the future). The concept of 
the national financial market is, of course, a relative one: for entities based 
in the Czech Republic the national market is the Czech one while all the 
others are, naturally, foreign markets. International financial markets in the 
currency valid for the given state are foreign markets whereas international 
financial markets in a foreign currency (from the point of view of the 
country in which the market is based) are euromarkets. 50 
From the above-mentioned classifications I prefer the discipline-based 
one, even though it is, taken at face value, a carbon copy of the 
classification of the non-fiscal part of financial law (with the exception of 
currency law). This is discussed here in the chapter on the classification of 
supervision within the system of law. Nonetheless, this does not diminish, I 
believe, the plausibility of the classification, for it offers an accurate division 
of the financial market into individual subfields. One cannot deny the fact 
that the second classification is also valid but it focuses on criteria rather 
than disciplines, which (when applied) means that each discipline could 
appear—according to the selected criterion—in a number of groups.  
I find the discipline-based classification of financial markets more 
appealing also because I deal with supervision of the entire financial 
market including some particularities in individual disciplines. Still, I offer 
 
46 ŠOLTÉS, V., KULHÁNEK, L. Finanční trhy. In POLOUČEK, S. et al. Peníze, banky, 
finanční trhy. Praha: C.H.Beck, 2009. pp. 209 – 214. 
47 KOTÁB, P., BAKEŠ, M. Základní finančněpravní instituty. In BAKEŠ, M. et al. Finanční 
právo, 6th rev. ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012. p. 104. 
48 For example, it is typically 3 working days for the SPAD business system at Prague Stock 
Exchange, plc.    
49 A specific example here could be the purchase of some shares with the delivery taking 
place in six months—the so-called forward transaction.  
50 KOTÁB, P. BAKEŠ, M. Základní finančněpravní instituty. In BAKEŠ, M. et al. Finanční 
právo, 6th rev. ed. Praha: C. H. Beck, 2012. pp. 214 - 215. 
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a further modification of the discipline-based classification to make it even 
more fitting:    
- credit market (including banking and co-operative banking) 
- capital market  
-  monetary market 
- insurance market 
- foreign exchange market  
- commodity market 
 
Banking and co-operative banking can be labelled as credit institutions 
since their common distinctive feature is the provision of credits (loans)—
hence the collective name ‘credit market’. The notion of banking also 
includes financial services provided by banks; unless these services (though 
provided by banks) belong to a different financial market discipline. The 
basic banking activity is the accumulation of temporarily available finances 
of the depositors; these finances are then made available again in the form 
of loans. This enables the flow of money in economy and the amount of 
temporarily available finances in circulation is multiplied.51 Co-operative 
banking is realised via credit unions—they differ from banks in the legal 
form (credit unions may only be founded in the form of a society), the 
amount of the required basic capital (CZK 35 million as opposed to CZK 
500 million for banks), and the range of clients for whom credit unions may 
offer their services (members only). In all other respects, especially as far as 
prudential enterprise rules are concerned, credit unions need to meet the 
same requirements as banks.52 For this activity it is, of course, necessary to 
possess a licence issued by the relevant state authority.  
The capital market is a place where the capital is traded by means of 
securities and their derivatives. One can say it is a subset of the financial 
market.53 Out of all financial market disciplines the capital market is the 
most interesting for this book and its main topic (supervisory integration) 
 
51 Wikipedia.org, Banka [online]. Wikipedia [qtd. 14th November 2014]. Available at 
http://cs.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banka#cite_note-1. 








because the capital market’s basis is the transfer of money (in the form of 
issues) and the purchase of securities from subjects in surplus (investors, 
often as consumers) to subjects in deficit (issuers—those who issue 
securities). The capital market is part of the financial market in every 
country. There are two types of capital markets, namely regulated and 
unregulated ones. Regulated markets are mainly stock markets (in the 
Czech Republic it is the Prague Stock Exchange, plc. and RM- System 
Czech Stock Exchange, plc.). The majority of European capital cities and 
developed countries have their own regulated market, chiefly in the form 
of a stock exchange. Unregulated markets trade with securities and other 
financial instruments; however, they are not regulated (e.g. multilateral 
commercial systems which can only be run if certain conditions set by the 
state are met). 
Despite being interconnected, these two parts of the financial market 
must be kept apart since they perform different activities and they behave in 
a different way when it comes to handling finances.  
In the past, highly developed and dynamic capital markets often brought 
about financial innovations and newly-emerged segments of the market, 
with which countries had to deal by means of regulation and supervision. 
Owing to the considerable administrative burden and the sheer complexity 
of the task, the problem used to be solved by establishing a new institution 
that took care of those new supervisory and regulatory duties. Thus, a range 
of specialised institutions gradually emerged, each of which only took care 
of a certain part of regulation and supervision. It was impossible for it to 
cover the entire spectrum. Even though this specialisation enabled closer 
inspection of the securities market, it, of course, also led to a gradual loss of 
the overall view. This happened for instance in Great Britain or the USA.54 
The notion of monetary market was discussed above when I talked about 
the differences between monetary and capital markets. These financial 
market disciplines are, to my mind, the most dynamic disciplines and their 
supervision is, therefore, subject to constant changes and modifications 
which attempt to react to the current situation in the world, both politically 
and economically speaking.  
The insurance market is supposed to secure the most important values 
(like health or life) often threatened by a number of external factors. 
Insurance helps to minimise the risks of both economic and non-economic 
 
54 PAVLÁT, V. Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy ve světě: současný stav a výhled do 
budoucna. In Sborník z mezinárodní konference Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy. Praha: 
Vysoká škola finanční a správní 2003. p. 17. 
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activities. There are specialised institutions which offer insurance services, 
for which they need a licence issued by the state authority; these institutions 
are called insurance companies.  
The foreign exchange market is a market where foreign currencies are 
traded in a cashless way. Money only figures here in the form of deposits 
on foreign currency accounts. The foreign currency market, on the other 
hand, is a market where foreign currencies are traded in cash. An ordinary 
foreign exchange office is an example of the clients’ form of the foreign 
currency market. Anybody willing to enter the business may do so without 
any restrictions.55 Foreign exchange markets are the sphere of activity for 
dealers (who are end consumers), brokers (who arrange deals for others; 
particularly if the dealer in the transaction wishes to remain anonymous), 
and market makers. A market maker is a dealer who on a working day has 
the obligation of revealing (on request) the foreign exchange rates. It is a 
person who seals business with dealers; thus they are, as a matter of fact, 
foreign exchange officers in a cashless form. The same role of a market 
maker in a foreign currency market is performed by a foreign exchange 
officer, who exchanges cash. Regulation and supervision in this area is 
carried out over both the foreign exchange and foreign currency markets. 
Any activity can only be performed if one possesses a licence issued by the 
given state authority.  
The commodity market enables the purchase and sale of commodities. 
The principle operating here is the very same as the one in the capital and 
monetary markets, but the subjects of transactions are, needless to say, 
commodities. Commodities are goods which are traded in the market 
regardless of quality. The supplies from various suppliers are mutually 
replaceable. Thus, cars cannot be called a commodity, because they are 
made in many versions at different prices. By contrast, copper is a 
homogenous product which can be traded at a unified price at global 
markets. 56  
The overview of financial market disciplines above discussed the 
characteristic features of the disciplines themselves—the segments and their 
subjects which operate there. When assessing the importance of the 
financial market and its segments’ influence on the economic situation, I 
would like to express my conviction that they affect society and economy 
 
55 MIKOLÁŠOVÁ M. Co je to devizový trh a jak vlastně funguje? [online]. Dům financí 
[cit. 14th November 2017]. Available at http://dumfinanci.cz/clanky/48-co-je-to-devizovy-
trh-a-jak-vlastne-funguje. 




enormously; that is why their proper working order and their correct setting 
play a key role in achieving economic stability and prosperity. Given the fact 
that the workings of the financial market (and its segments) are not merely 
customary—the financial market is regulated, i.e. it is delimited by legal 
norms and then through legal norms supervision is carried out over its 
activities—it is therefore crucial to set the ‘rules of the game’ and to anchor 
them in the system of law. In practice, it means delimiting regulation (the 
rules for entrance into the market and the code of behaviour there as well as 
the subsequent application of supervision and inspection). All segments of 
the financial market have existed for some time; they keep developing and 
so do regulatory and supervisory mechanisms. The very fact that individual 
segments have evolved, separated and, to a certain degree, standardised in 
various forms (in particular as part of legal norms) to be later accepted by 
society is a relevant justification of the existence of regulation and 
supervision of the financial market. If the financial market existed without 
regulation and supervision, it would be nothing more than a mere chaotic 
grouping of entities and their activities without proper rules; this would, no 
doubt, result in a system of total economic instability.  
 
Financial market regulation and supervision 
 
It seems apposite now to define properly the notions of regulation and 
supervision, including the related terms control and inspection. While 
regulation is an independent term, control, inspection and supervision are 
intertwined and, to all intents and purposes, basically synonymous. Control 
is a generic term for ‘making sure that the law is observed’ and it comprises 
both supervision and inspection. Inspection refers to a monitoring activity 
carried out by the state; it makes sure that entities abide by generally binding 
orders, internal orders, and individual acts towards entities under control. 
Supervision refers to the same activity; however, crucially, this activity is not 
performed by the state but by a delegated authority independent of the state 
(in the Czech Republic it is the Czech National Bank). In this book I use 
the term supervision in this sense: it is not an activity carried out by the 
state, but by an independent supervisory authority.  
The meaning of the words regulation and supervision implies that 
regulation is a legal framework stipulated in a legislative process. This 
framework regulates financial market rules for all the entities involved so as 
to reach the objectives of regulation (discussed below).  
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Supervision is one of the subsets of regulation; or rather, it is one of the 
manifestations of regulation—supervision is always determined by 
regulation. More specifically, supervision entails the monitoring of the 
regulatory process and its results as well as the monitoring of processes 
and activities of financial market entities in accordance with legal norms 
and with defined conditions for lawful conduct in the financial market. To 
put it simply, supervision is control delegated to another authority. What 
is interesting is the fact that supervision displays some regulatory aspects. 
We could say that it is secondary regulation, i.e. regulation by means of 
secondary57 (subordinate) legislative norms as opposed to primary (legal) 
legislative norms. It needs to be admitted that this secondary regulation is 
for the majority of financial market entities closer, more detailed and also 
more important for everyday business. 
The crucial thing for this book is financial market supervision, which 
also integrates the subordinate financial market regulation within the 
borders set by legislation. The relation between regulation and supervision 
is determined by their common objectives and purposes. This is hardly 
any ground-breaking observation because regulation and supervision 
necessarily must share the direction and goals. Regulation makes 
supervision and it also delimits the way for supervision entrusting it its 
powers and authority with a view to reaching the goals in mutual 
cooperation as well as independently.     
Pavlát58  adds that regulation in the financial sector is usually understood 
as the creation of principles and rules for entities active in the sector. 
Regulation is legal in its character and it regulates economic processes 
taking place in the financial sector. In other words, it issues legal norms 
which help the regulatory authority to exert its influence on the financial 
sector. Part of the activity of the regulatory authority is also supervision of 
supervised entities.  
At the moment the main focus of regulation is placed on the preventive 
approach; the regulatory authority warns against potential threats and 
consequences if legal norms59 were not observed. In fact, the regulatory 
authority stipulates a range of conditions and obligations to be met at the 
very entrance of an entity into the financial market. Then, there are a 
number of conditions regarding compulsory administrative steps and 
 
57 Public notices, measures, directives, guidance notes etc. 
58 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 18. 
59 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 20. 
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registration processes, which need to be observed constantly while doing 
business in the financial market. The regulatory and supervisory authority 
prevents potential prosecution and any potential greater financial losses 
connected with acts of non-compliance with the legal norms. The 
preventive approach unavoidably requires a higher amount of administrative 
work and more time and higher financial demands, both on the part of the 
regulatory authority and the regulated entities; yet, this approach seems to 
be beneficial as far as the entire system is concerned, for problems are 
prevented and their occurrence in the form of bankruptcies is far less 
common.   
 
1. Reasons for regulation and supervision 
The very nature of the financial market has always called for regulation and 
supervision. In my view, every honest financial market participant welcomes 
the existence of certain rules to ensure protection against dishonest conduct 
in the financial market. Every human activity involving more people 
requires some rules to be observed so that each individual has the same (or 
comparable) options and conditions; this absolutely holds true for financial 
activities like the ones going on in the financial market.  
The basic protection from crime and illegal activities in the financial 
market has always been entrusted to the state authority; however, some 
rules created (and they still do) certain self-governing associations ensuring 
that ethical standards are maintained and that financial market enterprise is 
secure. This self-regulation always strengthened whenever there were 
periods of weakened (or not detailed enough) state protection.   
Llewellyn60 mentions a few very interesting reasons why financial markets 
should be regulated: 
a) potential threats to the system in connection with externalities (certain 
forms of market failures). 
b) correction of certain imperfections and market failures.  
c) the need to monitor financial institutions and economies of scale 
existing in this area.  
d) the need for a certain degree of consumer confidence, which is also a 
positive externality.  
 
60 LLEWELLYN, D. The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, Occasional Paper 
No.1. London: Financial Services Authority. 1999. 
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e) the space for ‘Grid Lock’61 together with problems of negative choice 
and moral hazard.  
f) Moral hazard connected with the displayed governmental preferences 
to create security networks such as lender of last resort, the systems 
of deposit insurance, compensation funds, other compensation 
schemes.   
g) The consumer’s interest in regulation as a way of increasing 
confidence and ensuring lower transactional costs.  
 
One of the chief incentives for higher regulation and supervision is the 
economic interest of participants—they desire a problem-free environment. 
This desire has only increased in the past decades due to the growth of 
capitalism. There is no way to ensure the right working order for the 
financial market without a certain amount of regulation and supervision. In 
economically developed areas financial markets play an important role in 
sustaining proper economic growth, which is ensured by an effective 
financial market creating suitable conditions for making profit and for 
macroeconomic prosperity, too.   
Benston62 is of a different opinion though: he claims that regulation is 
only beneficial for those institutions for which it was created: namely 
governments, legislative bodies and regulated financial institutions. 
According to him, regulation is in direct opposition to consumer interests 
and financial institutions are the main beneficiaries because they face less 
competition due to a much more difficult entrance into the market.  
That is why experts often distinguish between: a/ the objectives of 
regulation (what the objectives of regulation are), b/ the justification for 
regulation as such (why regulation is necessary to achieve the objectives), 
 
61 SLAVÍČEK, Ján. Porovnanie dohľadu finančného trhu v Českej a Slovenskej republike. Praha, 
2005. 100 p. Diplomová práce. Univerzita Karlova v Praze, Fakulta sociálních věd. Grid 
Lock is understood by Jiří Havel, the supervisor of this work, as follows: financial 
institutions know how to behave towards consumers, but if the time span for a decision is 
short, then they are more likely to accept a more hazardous strategy, since, in the short 
term it is more beneficial. Even if one of the institutions were inclined to accept a long-
term strategy, it would face serious problems because its competitors will probably opt for 
a short-term strategy. So even a ‘good’ financial institution will behave ‘badly’ under such 
circumstances—it is quite rational and the potential loss connected with the selected 
strategy will probably be covered by consumers.  
62 BENSTON, G. J., Regulating Financial Markets. A Critique and Some Proposals, Hobart 
Paper No.135, London:  Institute of Economic Affairs, 1998. 
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and c/ reasons for regulation (why regulation is put into practice). 63 In the 
broadest sense I put forward the following division of reasons for the 
existence of regulation and supervision: reasons connected with internal and 
external protection.  
External protection refers to society and the systemic (macroeconomic) 
protection of the financial market against crime and other negative effects 
of externalities, which is undoubtedly very much in the public interest. 
Externalities are activities which positively or negatively influence other 
entities, while these entities do not pay for them and are not compensated 
for their consequences, i.e. they are not reflected in the pricing mechanism. 
A classic example of an externality is air pollution.  The state attempts to 
minimise the negative effects of externalities, which of course requires 
expenses64. Other important externalities include, for example, insufficient 
awareness, information asymmetry etc.  
It is often mentioned in academic literature65 that negative externalities 
often include instability of banks and the so-called bank runs66, which result 
in great instability in the whole banking sector.  
Internal protection refers to protection of entities in the financial 
market—mainly consumers/investors. The aim is regulation of the power 
of oligopoly and monopoly (imperfect competition).  
The most pressing financial market problems (which appear to justify 
the motivation for high quality regulation and supervision) are financial 
crime (within the external protection of the financial market) and 
information asymmetry (the main ‘Achilles heel’ of consumers/investors 
within the internal protection of the financial market).  
 
63 LLEWELLYN, D. The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, Occasional Paper 
No.1. London: Financial Services Authority. 1999. 
64 Cf. PAVLÁT, V Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy ve světě: současný stav a výhled 
do budoucna. In Sborník z mezinárodní konference Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy. Praha: 
Vysoká škola finanční a správní 2003. p. 13. 
65 Cf. DOCKING, D.S. et al. Information and Contagion Effects of Bank Loan-Loss 
Reserve Announcements, Journal of Financial Economics, 43(2), February 1997, pp. 219-
240 nebo SCHÖNMAKER, D. Contagion Risk in Banking, LSE Financial Markets Group 
Discussion Paper, no. 239, London: London School of Economics, March 1996. 
66 Cf. ROTHBARD, M. Peníze v rukou státu. Praha: Liberální institut, 2001. p. 55 : Bank run 
is a situation in which customers lose confidence in the bank because they think it might be 
or shortly will become insolvent. As a result, they start to withdraw their money from their 
deposit accounts. If the bank run is caused by incorrect information, it may result in 
bankruptcies of even problem-free banks, because a bank with partial reserves can never 
pay out all the deposits. 
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Naturally, financial crime does not concern just financial markets; it is a 
problem of the whole system of economy. The most common instances 
are tax evasion, financial frauds and other unlawful manipulation (e.g. 
credit frauds, the infringement of prudential enterprise rules, traders with 
securities often fail to observe the best execution rule—they do not always 
act in the best interest of their customer), money laundering etc.  
 
Moral hazard 
Moral hazard is one of the reasons for regulation and supervision as part of 
internal protection of the financial market. It is hard to find an exact 
definition of the term; the Czech Dictionary of Foreign Words67 states that 
moral hazard is a danger that someone might behave in an immoral way and 
jeopardise other people’s interests if there is no threat of punishment for 
their misconduct. In this book moral hazard is linked with various 
compensation schemes that operate in the financial market—they provide 
some kind of psychological comfort in cases of unsuccessful investment. 
Compensation schemes may reduce the loss partially or even totally. Since 
investment is insured (for instance deposit insurance funds within credit 
institutions), financial institutions and consumers may venture into more 
risky business, which is something they perhaps would not undertake if 
there were no insurance. Expenses are thus shared out among other 
consumers because compensation schemes are financed by all financial 
market participants; though, of course, only those who take more risks 
benefit from the schemes. Moreover, if the risky investment comes off, the 
investor receives all the profit, whereas other participants remain empty-
handed. The objective of regulation here is prevention of compensation 
schemes abuse by consumers or financial institutions.   
 
The issue of information in the financial market 
It seems that a lack of information on the part of consumers and 
information asymmetry in the financial market are things that have always 
existed and always will exist. Insufficient information influences the 
decision-making process by not enabling a full appreciation of the deal with 
all its benefits but potential risks, too. Information asymmetry displays 
differences in the amount of information between a financial service 
provider and a consumer—the latter is always worse off.  
 
67Slovník cizích slov [online]. Slovnik-cizich-slov.abz.cz. [qtd. 20th October 2017]. 
Available at http://slovnik-cizich-slov.abz.cz/web.php/slovo/moralni-hazard. 
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It is inconceivable that financial markets could exist without information, 
so whoever possesses high quality information always gains significant 
advantage. Naturally, the crucial matters are the following ones: where the 
given piece of information is from, how it is spread and, above all, 
interpreted, and what steps are taken on the basis of the available 
information. Information is essential for basically all financial market 
activities and if the amount of information is uneven, it creates one of the 
most fundamental barriers to an ideal working order of the financial market. 
It goes without saying that not all financial market participants have equal 
access to information (or the same quality of information), therefore it is 
not a new thing to trade with information, the acquisition of which may 
prove to be relatively costly. I propound the idea that there are three types 
of information: 
- public information (accessible to the general public) 
- private information 
- secret information 
 
As far as the first type is concerned, this information is accessible 
through the media, in particular the internet, and it is usually free of charge. 
The range of information now publicly available has dramatically increased 
thanks to the advancement of technology (the internet). Public information 
nevertheless represents only a fraction of all the information relevant to 
decision-making processes in the financial market.  
Private information originates in private entities and it may be 
promulgated by means of advertising, promotion, mandatorily publicised 
information etc. It may also be available to only a certain group of people or 
to individuals; such information may be labelled internal.  
A certain part of non-public information is information protected by the 
state (it is secret), the rest is information not secret from the point of view 
of public protection; they are, however, secret due to private protection.  
As it has been said, it is vital to have high quality information at one’s 
disposal during negotiating transactions in the financial market. Regulatory 
and supervisory bodies attempt to minimise insufficient awareness and 
information asymmetry. In other words, they try to make sure that the 
highest possible number of participants has the same information (or the 
same access to relevant information). That is why financial institutions are 
required to provide their clients with the widest possible range of 
information not only about the financial market itself, but also about 
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various products that can be purchased there. Llewellyn68 points out, 
however, that no range of provided information can do away with 
information asymmetry when a particular financial service is being 
purchased.  
Other goals that supervisory bodies pursue are the prevention of misuse 
of internal information (i.e. information not available to all participants) and 
subsequent sanctioning if any misuse occurs. In this way, the supervisory 
body helps to maintain equal opportunities for all financial market 
participants.  
 
2. The objectives of regulation and supervision 
Pavlát69 asserts that the main objective of financial market regulation and 
supervision is the protection of investors and, at the same time, the 
maintenance of a perfectly working financial market.   
The International Organisation of Securities Commisions (IOSCO) ranks 
regulatory and supervisory objectives as follows: 1/ the protection of 
investors, 2/ the provision of fairness, effectiveness, and transparency of 
the markets, 3/ the reduction of systemic risks. 70 
Di Giorgio71 also specifies three regulatory and supervisory objectives. 
According to him, these include: 
- The attainment of macroeconomic stability. 
- The attainment of microstability of financial institutions (prudential 
supervision)—this objective can be divided into two smaller parts, 
namely a/ general rules that help to maintain the stability of financial 
institutions and their entrepreneurial activities72 and b/ more specific 
 
68 LLEWELLYN, D. The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, Occasional Paper 
No.1. London: Financial Services Authority. 1999. 
69 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 32. 
70 DELESPAUL, J. C. Accountability and Transparency . In Chalanges for the Unified 
Financial Supervision in the new millennium conference. Talin: 2001. s.1. nebo také IOSCO. 
Objectives and Principles  of  Securities Regulation. 2003. p. 2. 
71 DI GIORGIO, G. et. DI NOIA, C.. ,Financial Market Regulation And Supervision: 
How Many Peaks For The Euro Area. In Brooklyn Journal of International Law 28. Hanover, 
Pennsylvania: Sheridan Press, 2003. p. 469. 
72 For example through law-enforced capital management requirements, loan limits, 
integrity demands etc.  
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rules that take into account the particularities of financial service 
provision. 73  
- The transparency of financial markets and financial institutions, which 
results in a higher protection of investors/consumers. There are rules 
to deal with information asymmetry and some more general rules for 
enterprise management, for example equal treatment of clients. 
- The effectiveness of supervision aimed to enforce financial market 
competition.74  
 
According to Kubíček, the primary goal of supervision and regulation is 
the maintenance and further growth of a perfectly working financial market 
in all its specific types and forms so that it can fulfil its main role. The role 
can be, in a rather simplified way, defined like this: ‘top effectiveness in the 
reallocation of the maximal amount of temporarily available funds so that at 
the right time, in the right amount, at the right place and in the right hands 
they are able to guarantee maximal appreciation and then the return to their 
original owner with a prearranged or usual appreciation’. 75 
Jílek76 adds that regulation and supervision aim to restrict problems and 
bankruptcies of financial institutions and to protect their ordinary clients.  
I would now like to express my dissatisfaction with one of the objectives 
stated by Di Giorgio, namely with ‘the effectiveness of supervision aimed to 
enforce competition in the financial market’. I can only half agree with this 
objective. While it is indisputably necessary to avoid the existence of cartels 
and the abuse of one’s dominant position, the enforcement of competition 
could imply excessive liberalisation, which could well prove to be rather 
harmful. I would suggest a more suitable wording: the attempt to maintain 
and secure healthy competition. The other objectives mentioned by 
Kubíček and Di Giorgio are well-defined and topical, too.  
 
73 For example the ratio between the risk and the capital, the reduction of portfolio 
investment, the regulation of off-balance sheet activities, the management of deposit 
insurance or the compensation schemes for investors.  
74 To be achieved by means of inspection of market force and structure of financial 
institutions and, also, at the micro level by inspection of mergers and acquisitions, the 
avoidance of cartels and abuse of a dominant position. 
75 KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy – rozcestí, scestí nebo ještě něco 
jiného? In Sborník z mezinárodní konference Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy. Praha: Vysoká 
škola finanční a správní 2003. p. 27. 
76 JÍLEK, J. Finanční trhy a investování. Praha: Grada Publishing, 2009. p. 137. 
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I am convinced that the most basic objective, to which other objectives 
lead, is the maintenance and strengthening of a stable financial system as the 
foundation of a healthy economy not only in every country but also in the 
international economic system. To put it another way, the objective aims to 
achieve macroeconomic stability, as described by Di Giorgio. As I have 
already stated above, the financial market and its segments play a crucial 
role in the system; it is therefore equally important to achieve, thanks to 
financial market regulation and supervision (the segments included), the 
right setting of rules, restrictions and options connected with regulation and 
supervision whilst maintaining the freedom of enterprise and healthy 
competition. It is thus important to strike the balance: what seems desirable 
is effective regulation and supervision, not over-regulation and excessive 
supervision which hinder economic prosperity and the stability of financial 
market entities, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the system at the 
macroeconomic level as well.   
 
3. The content of regulation and supervision 
As has been suggested above, regulation and supervision entail several 
individual phases, which can be called the system of regulation and 
supervision.  
The basis is a sum of conditions and rules that must be met and observed 
to be granted permission to enter the financial market. The basic rules are 
the same (or very similar) for all financial market segments77; there are 
nonetheless also some rules specific to individual segments. These rules are 
characteristic in so far as they anchor fundamental conditions for the 
establishment of a financial market institution and for its termination, too. 
Another set of rules govern existing institutions and their activities and 
behaviour in the financial market.78 
It seems to me that while the set of entrance rules is more or less 
standardised and is not subject to change in time, the other set (for existing 
institutions) is under constant revision with the aim of long-term 
harmonisation at both the European and the global levels. These rules for 
prudential enterprise aim to stabilise financial institutions and to protect 
clients/consumers from the risks and dangers in the financial market. 
Furthermore, they protect the entire system, which could be jeopardised (or 
at least weakened) in case more institutions suffer from serious problems. 
 
77 Banking, the capital market, insurance, credit institutions and credit unions.  
78 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 20. 
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Supervision in this area helps to create the environment in which rules and 
prudential enterprise conditions are observed, thereby increasing the 
effectiveness of the financial market. Supervision does not apply only to 
entrepreneurial activities as such but also to products offered at the market 
and the ways these products are advertised; it also inspects the types of 
contracts, the risks involved (entrepreneurial as well as investment risks), 
the observation of payment rules etc.   
Banks often serve as an example of how the system of supervision and 
regulation works in practice. There are four basic areas. 
Pavlát79 distinguishes the following areas: entrance into the banking 
sector, basic rules of banking activities, mandatory deposit insurance, and 
the role of the central bank as the lender of the last resort. Jurošková80 
asserts that the four areas include: entrance into the banking sector, basic 
rules for banking activities, control and enforcement of rules observation, 
and the financial safety network.  
The two systems are similar; the only differences we can find lie in the 
last two areas. The two areas, labelled by Pavlát as mandatory deposit 
insurance and the role of the central bank as the lender of the last resort, are 
lumped together by Jurošková, for whom one term suffices (the financial 
safety network) and who then recognises one more category: control and 
enforcement of rules observation. I find this enlargement by one area of the 
system very fitting because conditions anchored in the legal system are 
insufficient if there are no mechanisms of their enforcement, control and 
supervision with possible sanctions for those who fail to comply. This area 
completes the system, for it is this area that enables off-location and on-
location supervision81, and in case of a breach of rules82, sanctions may be 
imposed.  
Given the fact that regulation and supervision are generally accepted 
without objections, the main point of interest seems to be their scope and 
extent. Firstly, it is important to set ideally the scope of activities under 
regulation and supervision and secondly, it is equally important to set the 
scope of regulation and supervision of the selected activities. The scope of 
regulation is influenced by a number of aspects such as its place, historical 
development and habitual practice, the level of economic advancement etc. 
 
79 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 20. 
80 JUROŠKOVÁ, L. Bankovní regulace a dohled. 1. vyd. Praha: Auditorium, 2012. p. 21. 
81 Cf. from § 26 to § 35 Act no. 21/1992 Coll. on banks, as amended. 
82 Cf. § 26 Act no. 21/1992 Coll. on banks, as amended, where failures in banking activities 
are dealt with.  
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Regulatory and supervisory objectives, as analysed above, seem to be 
universal; thus, the systems of regulation and supervision differ mainly in 
their structures—the numbers, powers and methods of application. 
Individual segments of the financial market have evolved separately for a 
long time. Mutual relations emerged gradually, often in connection with 
failures, breakdowns of market mechanisms, unfavourable circumstances 
etc. The need for quicker and better reactions to problems which had 
originated in various segments revealed the necessity to opt for a more 
integral approach to financial market supervision. One example of its 
manifestations have been (and still are) changes to the structure of the 
system and to the institutional fixation of regulatory and supervisory 
bodies83. The past few decades have seen a vast amount of integration of 
supervision—regulatory and supervisory powers over the entire financial 
market have been integrated into one body or several closely-knit bodies. 
Gradually, individual financial market segments displayed more and more 
common features and their mutual relations got revealed. It most certainly 
does not suffice to merely enumerate reasons for financial market 
supervision and to state its advantages and disadvantages; it is also vital to 
highlight differences between various approaches and to discuss  the results 
achieved in those countries which have undergone the process of 
integration.   
 
The tenets of financial market regulation and supervision 
 
Tenets are academic postulates that create a model for the area of public 
finance and the relations that constitute the subject matter of financial law. 
Postulates accepted by legislation become legal norms, which govern all the 
other norms. 84 
Tenets are sometimes mixed up with principles and both expressions are 
sometimes perceived as synonyms85; other times the notion of principle 
seems to be broader—it refers to more general ideas which apply to the 
whole system of law. Although the terminological difference does not 
appear to be enormous, I would like to stress that I use the term tenets (and 
 
83 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 23. 
84 MRKÝVKA, P. PAŘÍZKOVÁ, I. RADVAN, M. et al. Finanční právo a finanční správa. 1st 
ed. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2004. p. 46. 
85 Tenets and principles are treated as synonyms e.g. in HURDÍK, J. Zásady soukromého 
práva. Brno:  Pr.F.MU,1998, p. 11.  
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not principles) here since this expression is more fitting for more specific 
rules of behaviour typical of individual segments of the financial market, to 
which financial market law belongs. Admittedly, some tenets sometimes 
exceed the field of financial market and can be valid in a more general 
sense. Yet, principles are broader still, as they are valid for the entire legal 
system or for public/private law.   
All tenets are determined by from the goals to be achieved. The goals of 
financial market supervision and regulation have been discussed above—we 
could sum up that the primary goals are growth of the financial market and 
increase in its effectiveness. This can be attained by means of stability and 
security of the financial system and its individual institutions as well as by 
market transparency and its right working order. It is now apposite to 
explain what tenets actually are and what their roles are in the system of 
financial law.  
The tenets of regulation can be seen either as general tenets (those of the 
regulator/legislator) or tenets in a wider sense (those of the regulatory and 
supervisory authority). In the Czech Republic this authority is the Czech 
National Bank (from now on just the CNB). 
The International Organisation of Securities Commisions (IOSCO)86 
has stated crucial regulatory and supervisory tenets with regard to the 
proclaimed objectives. These tenets might be specific for a particular 
segment of the financial market, but they also reflect more general tenets 
valid for the entire financial market. The tenets include:  
- tenets connected with the regulator 
- tenets for self-regulation 
- tenets for enforced regulation 
- tenets for co-operative regulation 
- tenets for financial institutions offering financial products 
- tenets for collective investment schemes 
- tenets for investment  brokers and tenets for the secondary market87  
 
 
86 IOSCO. Objectives and Principles  of  Securities Regulation. 2003. pp. 2-4. 
87 Secondary markets are those markets where issued financial instruments are traded, e.g. 
shares, options or futures.   
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1. General tenets 
One could say that general tenets are those tenets that have their roots in 
international standards; they should contribute towards the creation of a 
general legal framework aimed to achieve the objectives of regulation and 
supervision. Tenets that the regulatory and supervisory authority should 
follow are more or less their specification.  
Internationally, general tenets of regulation and supervision are set by 
means of various recommendations in the preambles of European 
directives and decrees. The most important documents were drawn up by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in particular the Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (issued in 199788) and the Core 
Principles Methodology (published two years later in 1999), which revises 
the original text. In spite of the fact that the materials deal with regulation 
and supervision in the banking sector, the majority of principles and tenets 
is valid for the regulation of and supervision over the whole financial 
market.   
These two documents contain 25 principles globally agreed upon as the 
minimum standards for banking regulation and supervision. They cover a 
whole range of aspects such as powers and objectives of the supervisory 
authority, permitted activities, licencing criteria, consent to a change of 
ownership and to large-scale acquisitions, capital adequacy, risk 
management, consolidated supervision, problem tackling in the banking 
sector, distribution of tasks and responsibility between local and host 
supervision, etc.89 
A great deal of focus is placed on those tenets that help to secure and 
sustain a safe, honest, effective and transparent financial market. Other 
extremely important tenets are those that aim to maintain stability of the 
whole system, especially through diminishing systemic risks.  Likewise, it is 
essential to ensure that financial service providers are able to fulfil their 
obligations towards their clients/consumers. Another set of tenets deals 
with information asymmetry—it protects clients and investors by providing 
them with a sufficient amount of information in order that they can 
adequately manage their own financial matters.  
 
88 Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 
89 Basilejské základní principy efektivního bankovního dohledu (v rozsahu metodiky). 






An overwhelming majority of these tenets can be found in the legal 
precepts of the EU and the Czech Republic. For example, in the Czech 
Republic the tenet about the stability of the entire financial system including 
the need for financial service providers to fulfil their obligations to their 
clients was expressed by means of a legal provision which states that the 
CNB, in accordance with its main objective, supervises people active in the 
financial market, analyses the development of the financial system, 
maintains the right working order and growth of the Czech financial market 
and contributes to the stability of the Czech financial system as a whole. 90 
This provision was later amended91, though, and now it only says that the 
CNB carries out supervision of people in the financial market. 
 
2. Tenets in a wider sense 
The supervisory authority must meet several criteria, one of which is the 
independence of governmental control. We can distinguish three types of 
independence92:  
- personal – the appointment of top executives is not affected by the 
politics  
- financial – supervision is not financed from the state budget 
- operational – the supervisory body is authorised to issue sublegal 
norms. Supervision is carried out independently of governmental 
control and political and executive power has no say in the decisions 
made by the supervisory body. 
Similarly, Delespaul93 observes that there are several proofs of the 
independence of the regulatory body: the way the executives are appointed, 
its financial autonomy, and independent decision making.  
These of tenets can be found in the regulatory and supervisory tenets 
issued by the CNB.  
 
90 Cf. § 2 par. 2 section. d) Act no. 6/1993 Coll., on Czech National Bank, as amended till 
16/8/2013. 
91 Act no. 227/2013 Coll. 
92 MAŠINDOVÁ, V. Institucionální uspořádání regulace a dohledu nad finančním trhem 
v ČR z pohledu CNB. In Sborník z mezinárodní konference Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy. 
Praha: Vysoká škola finanční a správní, 2003, p. 50. 
93 Srov. DELESPAUL, Jean Claude. Accountability and Transparency . In Chalanges for the 
Unified Financial Supervision in the new millennium conference. Talin: 2001. p.1. 
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3. The CNB tenets 
The CNB has issued the following tenets for its regulatory and supervisory 
activities.94 They stem from—or rather correspond to—the tenets issued 
by IOSCO (described above).  
 
Single supervisory policy 
a) consistency and integrity of regulation – unified rules for granting 
licences to enter the financial market; the same risk regulation in 
different segments of the financial market, thereby ensuring equal 
competitive environment for financial market entities active in more 
segments.   
b) taking into account individual customer risk profiles – despite the 
unified policy, the supervisory authority must take into consideration 
individual risk profiles of financial market entities under supervision.   
c) co-operative rule-making – making sure that there is close co-
operation between the Ministry of Finance (as the main legislative 
body in this area) and professional corporations that represent 
financial market participants. 
I believe that a unified supervisory policy is significant even from the 
international perspective since the goals of supervision are the same at all 
levels. Thus, policies should also be identical (or at least highly similar). The 
European Union issues a single policy for its member countries, which is 
sometimes interpreted as a loss of sovereignty. On the other hand, such 
tendencies towards a unified supervisory policy should ideally lead to a level 
playing field for international institutions in all member countries.  
 
Adequacy of regulation 
a) preference of general tenets over more detailed rules – if various 
methods reach the goal, there will not be any need of detailed 
secondary regulation.  
b) adequate amount of regulation – regulation should not pose a threat 
to a healthy competitive environment and to the services and 
products which are offered.  
 
94 Poslání České národní banky při dohledu nad finančním trhem České republiky. [online]. 




This tenet calls for introspective self-analysis on the part of the regulatory 
and supervisory authority, which needs to ask itself whether its activities 
really help to achieve the objectives and whether they may not be excessive. 
It is always extremely important to strike the balance between the fulfilment 
of goals and the maintenance of sufficient entrepreneurial freedom.  
 
Effectiveness of supervision and regulation 
a) Taking into account the costs of regulation and supervision – the need 
to assess sensibly the running costs of supervisory and regulatory 
activities with regard to the objectives.   
b) Effective communication – frequent and open communication with 
entities under supervision helps to remove undesirable obstructions, 
for example bureaucratic ones.  
All activities of the institutions run and financed by the state must be 
effective. This demand holds naturally true for the supervisory and 
regulatory authority as well—the finances expended in supervision and 
regulation must be used effectively to achieve the objectives, but, at the 
same time, regulated and supervised entities should not be burdened with 
useless or ineffective administration. This could lead to higher expenses on 
the part of these entities, and, consequently, their worse economic results, 
which in turn would reduce their tax liability and less finance would return 
to public budgets.  
 
Adequate consumer and investor protection 
a) European law transposition – regulation and supervision in 
accordance with European law; not an excess of demands imposed by 
European law.  
b) professional codes – co-operation among state authorities, 
professional corporations of financial service providers and client 
protection organisations that leads to codes of conduct for financial 
institutions towards their clients. 
This tenet must not be enforced too hard to avoid excessive protection 
of the client or the investor. That could result in such a high number of 
restrictions and administrative obstructions that the environment could be 
left completely devoid of healthy competition. As a result, financial 
institutions then would have no other choice but to offer very similar 
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products at very similar prices and under very similar conditions—the client 
or consumer is then deprived of real choice.  
 
 Measures to protect the financial market from financial crime 
 a) measures to prevent the misuse of the financial market and money 
laundering—special attention paid to impend the financing of 
terrorist organisations.  
b) The sound operation of payment and settlement systems – the 
promulgation and support of high standards of security regarding 
payment and settlement systems and their potential failure and 
misuse.  
To prevent financial crime is not only a tenet and an objective of financial 
law, but, of course, of criminal law, too. It is one of the most general and 
basic regulatory and supervisory tenets, for it spreads right across the entire 
legal system.    
 
Support of market discipline 
a) issued information in accordance with risk management – the focus 
placed on the issued information and its reflection of the true 
financial situation, thereby enabling objective assessment and 
management of risks.  
b) market effectiveness and the reduction of the danger of its misuse – 
compulsory information issued by the entities should increase the 
effectiveness of the financial market, thereby reducing the risk of 
market misuse and misuse of non-public internal information.  
This tenet is concerned with the support of the sound operation of 
economy—it sets out to maintain the adequate operation of 
competitiveness and consumer protection. Further, this tenet applies to 
financial executives whose duties (if properly fulfilled) also prevent 
improper competition, examples of which include the concealment of 
information or the acquisition of non-public information, which, naturally, 
might provide the guilty parties with an unfair advantage over their 
competitors.   
Co-operation among home entities involved 
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a) self-regulation – the support of self-regulation by means of 
professional corporations of the regulated entities and also by means 
of necessary legislation. 
b) co-regulation –transfer of some powers from the supervisory 
authority to professional corporations with simultaneous supervision 
of the execution of the newly-transferred powers. 
Both self-regulation and co-regulation seem to be relatively effective and 
democratic tenets, because it is reasonable to expect that self-regulation 
might ensure the attainment of some objectives in the same way as 
regulation performed by the state authorities. It is, however, crucial to 
establish limits for self-regulation and co-regulation so that any abuse of the 
transferred powers does not result in endangering or destabilising the 
financial market, or any of its segments.  
 
International co-operation 
a) integration of the European financial service market – the 
intensification of integration of the single European financial service 
market, including the convergence of supervisory rules and 
mechanisms. 
b) balanced relation between the home and host supervisory authorities 
– the goal is balanced supervision of international financial groups 
while maintaining an appropriate relation between the home and host 
supervisory authorities and sufficient powers for supervisory 
authorities to perform their legal obligations. 
c) crisis management – European international co-operation when 
handling financial crises.  
This tenet is more of an obligatory issue rather than a proper tenet, 
because in a large number of regulatory and supervisory cases there is hardly 
any possibility for the CNB to divert from the EU course. Thus, it is rather 
a compulsory acceptance of current attitudes and mechanisms that arise 
from the international commitments the Czech Republic (hereinafter ‘the 







Employees and their professionalism and expertise  
professional approach and high internal standards when carrying out 
supervision—even higher than what is required of the supervised entities.  
 
Supervisory ethics 
the employees of the CNB are required to observe the code of ethics and 
universally accepted ethical norms.   
The last two tenets might seem to be rather minute with little or no 
practical manifestations. It does not appear possible to find out whether 
they are fulfilled or not because, to a large extent, these tenets present 
categories, the fulfilment of which remains considerably subjective.  
All the tenets above, set by the CNB as the supervisory and regulatory 
authority of the financial market in the Czech Republic, reflect, to a large 
extent, the supervisory and regulatory objectives which have been discussed 
above. Furthermore, I find them similar to the tenets found in the 
Administrative Procedure Code95, which is undoubtedly linked with the fact 
that the CNB is an administrative body as well and the Administrative 
Procedure Code tenets apply to the CNB, too. Whilst all the tenets are 
important, I find the first three (the single supervisory policy, the adequacy 
of supervision and the effectiveness of regulation and supervision) to be of 
crucial importance, since these are the main tenets that should ensure the 
maintenance and strengthening of a stable financial system as the basis of a 
healthy economy. They are tenets that decidedly copy also other regulatory 
and supervisory objectives. However, can tenets differ from universally 
accepted objectives at all? It does not seem possible because tenets are one 
of the ways to achieve the desired goals, as is clear from the above-
mentioned list of tenets issued by the CNB.   
The tenets of regulation and supervision are both internationally and 
nationally largely standardised and widely accepted by financial market 
entities. Of course, it remains to be seen whether the tenets are applied and 
observed in real life, be it in the form of international recommendations, 
preambles to legal norms, acts, or declarations issued by the supervisory 
authority. It is clear that theory is one thing, but practice might be a 
completely different thing. For example, it is no secret that in some cases 
the CNB demands more information and obligations than what it should 
according to the European rules—more specifically it applies to some 
mandatory questionnaires that financial institutions need to submit at 
 
95 Cf. §2 - §8 Act no. 500/2004 Coll. on the Administrative Procedure Code, as amended. 
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certain times. At first glance, the CNB seems to be breaking the tenet 
concerning the adequacy of regulation. Yet, a high number of tenets are 
assessed by each entity rather subjectively, and what seems to be within the 
tenet to one entity, might not appear so to a different financial market entity 
(particularly if their positions in the financial market are different, e.g. an 
institution, a consumer, the supervisory authority).  
In conclusion, we might sum up that supervisory and regulatory financial 
market tenets are relatively accurately and correctly defined rules which, 
ideally, secure the attainment of regulatory and supervisory objectives.  
 
The systems of financial market regulation and supervision  
 
This subchapter aims to define and analyse ways to carry out financial 
market supervision and regulation; in other words, it analyses the systems 
that can potentially be applied to supervision and regulation. Since the 
objectives that the systems pursue are largely identical, the differences tend 
to lie in the structure of the supervisory mechanisms and they are 
determined by other factors such as the historical development, habitual 
practice, and the level of economic advancement.  
Pavlát is convinced that a unitary model of regulation and supervision is 
not likely to happen even in the long-term future. Universal models of 
financial market regulation and supervision do not and even cannot possibly 
exist. It is nonetheless almost certain that a certain amount of unification of 
the existing systems is going to take place with the aim of exerting a higher 
amount of pressure to solve problems, revealed via inspection, faster. This 
is the current trend in banking supervision, internal systems of control and 
risk monitoring in banks.96  
Regulatory and supervisory authorities issue sublegal norms; their other 
tasks involve continuous supervising, inspecting, and also sanctioning if 
rules are not observed. Moreover, these institutions are, to a large extent 
(and together with a given ministry), responsible for primary legal norms. 
Supervisory and regulatory institutions differ in fundamental as well as 
marginal matters from country to country. As a consequence, there are 
various systems of regulation and supervision applied in practice. First, I 
deem it necessary to set certain criteria and characteristic features, according 
 
96 PAVLÁT, V. Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy ve světě: současný stav a výhled do 
budoucna. In Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy. Sborník z konference. Praha: Vysoká škola 
finanční a správní 2003. p. 18. 
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to which it is possible to classify regulatory and supervisory systems. These 
criteria are set differently within individual systems.  
There are various classifications of the systems;97 here I apply the ones 
found in Pavlát:98 
- subject of regulation and supervision: institutional, functional, 
objective-based regulation.  
- scope of regulation and supervision: universal (‘mega-system’), 
specialised.  
- number of regulatory and supervisory bodies: a single body, a couple 
of collaborating bodies, multiple bodies. 
- position within the state authorities: centralised, decentralised, mixed.  
- powers and responsibilities: autonomous (independent), subordinate 
(to a higher-level authority).   
- democratic character of operation: involving self-regulation or 
without self-regulation. 
- way of financing: from the regulated entities, from the state budget, a 
combined way of financing.  
- way of performing regulation and supervision: formally bureaucratic 
v. factual; rigid v. flexible; transparent v. non-transparent.  
 
As far as I am concerned, the crucial classification is the one based on the 
subject of regulation and supervision, which I would rather call the way of 
executing regulation and supervision. These days the models found most 
often are the institutional one (also called the sectoral) and the functional 
model.  
The sectoral model deals with financial market regulation and supervision 
according to the institutional arrangement based on separate regulatory 
sections for individual segments of the financial market.99 
 
97 E.g. DELESPAUL, Jean Claude. Accountability and Transparency. In Challenges for the 
Unified Financial Supervision in the new millennium conference. Talin: 2001. p. 1. He 
defined criteria such as power, independence, responsibility towards other institutions and 
transparency of the regulator’s activities.  
98 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 40. 
99 There are 3 variants of this model: 1/ separate regulatory institutions for the banking 
sector, the capital market and investment services, the insurance industry and 
supplementary pension insurance. 2/ partial integration of the banking sector, which is 
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In comparison, the functional model is based on the potential types of 
market failures. This model is linked with the existence of regulators or 
specialised bodies for the protection of investors and consumers, for 
prudential regulation and supervision, for economic competition and for the 
stability of the financial system. It is nevertheless possible that these 
regulators might be represented by individual departments or divisions 
within one institution. 100 
The CNB in its text about the institutional arrangement of financial 
supervision101 mentions some possible arrangements of the integrated 
system, based on two fundamental models – the sectoral one and the 
functional one. The former model entails an institutional arrangement of 
regulation and supervision based on the fundamental sectors of financial 
intermediary activities.  
Both functional and sectoral models have the following variants: 102  
- complete sectoral and functional integration – supervision carried 
out by a single institution in all three basic financial sectors: from the 
functional perspective this single institution supervises financial market 
transactions, the observation of prudential rules (the attitude to 
clients/consumers and investors). Complete sectoral and functional types of 
integration are, to all intents and purposes, identical.  
- the model of separate regulators – the sectoral model keeps the 
institutions for  various branches separate (banking, the capital market and 
investment services, insurance and supplementary pension insurance); the 
 
united with supervision and regulation of insurance companies; alternatively, there can be 
the so-called ‘two-pillar’ system, where banking supervision is performed by the central 
bank and a completely different institution entrusted with regulatory powers carries out 
supervision over all non-banking institutions and the capital market alike. 3/ complete 
integration of supervision – all financial service institutions and the capital market are 
supervised by a single supervisory institution. 
100 The CNB created the functional model consisting of three sections: the financial market 
supervision section, the regulation and financial market analysis section, and the licence and 
sanction section. It is a functional model with several sections, all integrated into one 
institution. 
101 CNB. Institucionální uspořádání finanční regulace a dohledu v Evropské unii. [online] 
CNB [qtd. 3rd October 2017]. Available at 
<http://www.cnb.cz/miranda2/export/sites/www.cnb.cz/cs/dohled_financni_trh/souhr
nne_informace_fin_trhy/ostatni_analyticke_publikace/download/fin_regulace_eu.pdf>. 
102 CNB. Institucionální uspořádání finanční regulace a dohledu v Evropské unii. [online] 






functional model also makes use of several institutions, each of which 
supervises a different area according to the function; i.e. one institution 
supervises protection of investors and consumers and observation of fair-
play rules in the market, another one takes care of prudential supervision 
and regulation, the central bank is responsible for maintaining stability of 
the whole financial system, and there is also a regulator for economic 
competition.  
- partial integration of supervision – the sectoral model employs a 
‘two-pillar’ system: it unites banking supervision with that of securities 
traders (possibly with some involvement of the central bank); the functional 
model unites several institutions for supervision of more areas (e.g. the 
supervision of financial stability and prudential enterprise), often with some 
involvement of the central bank.   
 
Table no. 1: The institutional organisation of financial market supervision in the EU 
member countries.  














27 12 1 8 3 3 
100% 44% 4% 30% 11% 11% 
 
Source: PÁNEK, D., Proces integrace regulace a dohledu nad finančními 
institucemi103 
A different approach to financial supervision classification is found in 
Shoenmaker, who distinguishes three models: sectoral, functional, 
integrated. I am convinced that there is no essential conflict between the 
two authors and their tables in which they assign countries to different 
models of supervision. Their choice is more likely to be influenced by the 
application of different structural models. As a result, Shoenmaker’s 
 
103 PÁNEK, D., Disertační práce. Proces integrace regulace a dohledu nad finančními 
institucemi. Brno, 2012. 129 s. Masarykova Univerzita, Fakulta ekonomicko – správní. 




sectoral model only includes those countries which Pánek considers to be 
sectoral-like with separate supervisory institutions. Given the fact that 
there is a considerable time gap between the two tables, there took place 
another change: Belgium and Great Britain joined the functional ‘twin 
peaks’ model in 2011. 
 
Table no. 2. Organisational structure of financial supervision 
Basic models 
Countries Sectoral model Cross-sector model- 
functional model 
(twin-peaks – two 
supervisory bodies) 
Cross-sector model-  
integrated without 
the central bank 
Cross-sector model-  
integrated with the 
central bank 























Source: SHOENMAKER. D.: Financial Supervision in the EU104 
 
Schoenmaker’s typology is, in my view, correct; yet, I would label all 
cross-sector models which carry out supervision in the functional way as 
functional, because the adjective is linked with financial market supervision 
according to the typology of market failures. Further, within the functional 
model we may distinguish three submodels: 1/ twin peaks, 2/ integrated 
with the central bank and 3/ integrated without the central bank. Personally, 
I would find it simpler and more fitting if the supervisory models were 
divided into the sectoral and functional types with further subdivisions 
based on the existence of just one or more supervisory institutions. That is 
the model in the Czech Republic, where there is the functional model with a 
 
104 SHOENMAKER, D. Financial Supervision in the EU [online]. In CAPRIO, G. (ed.), 
Elsevier Amsterdam, Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization, April 2011. [qtd. 17th 
November 2017]. Available at 
http://personal.vu.nl/d.schoenmaker/Encyclopedia_Financial_Supervision_in_the_EU_v
1%20%2828-4%29.pdf.. p. 14. 
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single institution; in Shoenmaker’s typology this model is to be found in the 
cross-sector integrated model with the presence of the central bank.  
The basis of the functional model is the typology of market failures. In 
the field of financial intermediation there are four types of market failures: 
information asymmetry, market abuse, systemic instability and anti-
competitive behaviour. 105 
There are four main domains of financial supervision and regulation based 
on the aforementioned types of market failures: 
- prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions’ enterprise 
focused on their financial health, liquidity, and solvency. 
- financial market supervision and regulation aimed at market abuse (both 
the capital market and over-the-counter markets). The chief objective is 
consumer protection. 
- systemic regulation and supervision of the financial market and its 
stability. The objective is minimising systemic risks of the concatenation 
of bank insolvencies (or of other financial institutions).  
- The regulation of the competitive environment and its supervision. The 
objective is to eradicate anti-competitive behaviour.106  
 
Shoenmaker107 adds that EU member countries gradually leave the 
sectoral model and adopt the functional one instead in reaction to the cross-
sectoral nature of financial markets and financial institutions.  
I do not deem it vital whether the sectoral or functional model is applied. 
It is true that in Europe the functional model prevails, having been adopted 
in many countries recently. Both models have their advantages and 
disadvantages, naturally, and there seem to be several factors affecting the 
choice of the right model. I am far from convinced that one model is 
superior and thus generally recommended; yet, it appears that for several 
 
105 CARMICHAEL, J.: Experiences with Integrated Regulation, [online]. Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority [qtd. 1st September 2017]. Available at 
http://www.apra.gov.au/Insight/Documents/APRA-Insight-1st-Quarter-2002-
Experiences-with-integrated-regulation.pdf. p. 3. 
106 LLEWELLYN, D.: The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, FSA, Occasional 
Paper No.1, 1999. 
107 SHOENMAKER, D. Financial Supervision in the EU [online]. In CAPRIO, G. (ed.), 
Elsevier Amsterdam, Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization, April 2011. [qtd. 17th 
November 2017]. Available at 
http://personal.vu.nl/d.schoenmaker/Encyclopedia_Financial_Supervision_in_the_EU_v
1%20%2828-4%29.pdf.. p. 25. 
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reasons the functional model is more suitable, modern and flexible. If the 
supervisory authority focuses on market failures, which are almost identical 
in all financial market sectors, this model allows almost identical problem-
solving mechanisms regardless of in which sector the problem originated. 
Seeing that the financial market sectors are, to a large extent, intertwined, 
there usually are, in my view, legislative changes taking place across them. 
The application of legislative changes is then much quicker and more 
accurate in the functional model, since if there is a change in the attitude to 
a market failure, the change sweeps across all sectors. As far as the sectoral 
model is concerned, every sector must react separately and adopt the 
changes, whereas in the functional model only one supervisory section 
reacts across financial market sectors.  
Shoenmaker108 goes on to say that EU member countries gradually adopt 
the functional model due to the cross-sector nature of financial markets and 
financial institutions.  
Australia is a very interesting example of a country with the functional 
model of supervision. This model was adopted in the 1990’s109 and there 
are several supervisory institutions—hence, we talk of partial integration 
within the functional model here. The Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission110 supervises the financial market and all the 
transactions therein, and it also supervises financial services offered by 
financial institutions, thereby protecting financial market investors and 
clients. This body is also a financial market regulator that assesses financial 
market effectiveness in accordance with its fair and transparent operation. 
Every entity willing to do business in the financial market must possess a 
licence issued by ASIC, or to fulfil the conditions of a licensing 
exemption. The other body is APRA (Australian Prudential Regulation 
 
108 SHOENMAKER, D. Financial Supervision in the EU [online]. In CAPRIO, G. (ed.), 
Elsevier Amsterdam, Encyclopedia of Financial Globalization, April 2011. [qtd. 17th 
November 2017]. Available at 
<http://personal.vu.nl/d.schoenmaker/Encyclopedia_Financial_Supervision_in_the_EU
_v1%20%2828-4%29.pdf> s 25. 
109 CNB. Institucionální uspořádání finanční regulace a dohledu v Evropské unii. [online] 




110 ASIC: Our role [online]. Australian Securities & Investments Commission [qtd. 17th 




Authority), 111 which supervises prudential regulation of financial 
institutions.112 
I am convinced that the Australian functional model of supervision (with 
all the years of successful operation) or a model closely matching the one 
found in Australia could be one of the viable options or sources of 
inspiration for other countries. One authoritative body focuses solely on the 
system, its operation, and the protection of consumers and investors 
whereas the other authoritative body deals with economic vitality of the 
most important financial market institutions. These two authoritative bodies 
together form the framework of the financial market supporting 
macroeconomic stability. This model could be improved by merging the 
two bodies into one (with two sections), which would enhance 
communication and co-operation (for instance passing important 
information from one section to the other one), and, ultimately, the 
effectiveness of financial market supervision, too.    
 
1. Types of financial market regulation and supervision systems 
If anyone wants to find the common features of various systems, they 
should start by defining the types of systems. We could say that there are 
basically three types of systems of financial market regulation and 
supervision: 
a) unitary system (also called the mega – system), in which there is only 
one regulator for the entire financial sector performing regulation and 
supervision of all financial sectors including the capital market 
b) system with two regulators, each of which is responsible for a part of 
the tasks involving regulation and supervision of the capital market 
(or, possibly, the whole financial market)  
c) system of financial market regulation and supervision performed by 
one or more specialised regulators.113  
 
 
111 APRA: Supervison [online]. Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. [qtd. 17th 
November 2017]. Available at 
<http://www.apra.gov.au/AboutAPRA/Pages/Supervision.aspx>. 
112 Australian banks, building societies and credit unions (with the permission to accept 
deposits), insurance and reinsurance companies, associated companies and pension funds 
(excluding self-governing funds).  
113 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 40  
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The so-called mega-systems need to be internally differentiated, which 
means that within one body there operate individual sections which, in 
effect, copy the function of independent small-scale institutions that 
regulate and supervise a certain set of institutions (in the sectoral model of 
supervision and regulation these include banks, securities traders, 
investment companies, funds, and insurance companies) or a set of 
activities (if the system of regulation and supervision is a functional one). 
The crucial difference lies in the fact that the mega-system brings about 
unitary and central management, which seems to be far more flexible and 
rids the system of imperfect and often also very complicated coordination 
of small-scale regulatory and supervisory institutions.114 
To assign the right amount of independence to supervisory and 
regulatory bodies is one of the crucial conditions for modern systems of 
financial market supervision and regulation if they are to work properly. 
Also, it is essential to enforce the highest possible deal of financial market 
transparency.115 These are the most important tasks for a regulator, 
which/who needs to set the basic mechanism that can further influence 
other stabilising features in the financial market.  
It goes without saying that the system of regulation and supervision is 
vital for the attainment of regulatory and supervisory objectives—therefore 
it needs to be optimised according to the current needs of a particular 
country and the local conditions. The main criterion of success must be the 
results a particular system brings. Because EU member countries use 
different systems (many countries still use the sectoral model as opposed to 
the functional one- cf. tables no. 1116  and 2 above), it is rather tricky to 
assert that one system is better than the other one; no system is universal in 
this respect. It seems to me, though, that the functional model is more 
flexible and allows quicker reactions if problems occur. Furthermore, it 
appears to enable easier communication within the supervisory body as well 
as more closely-knit procedural mechanisms, e.g. when granting licences or 
during on-location and off-location supervision. It remains true, however, 
 
114 PAVLÁT, V.  In PAVLÁT, V., KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. VŠFS 
Praha: EUPRESS, 2010. p. 41. 
115 PAVLÁT, V. Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy ve světě: současný stav a výhled do 
budoucna. In Sborník z mezinárodní konference Regulace a dozor nad finančními trhy. Praha: 
Vysoká škola finanční a správní 2003. p. 9. 
116 Cf: CNB. Institucionální uspořádání finanční regulace a dohledu v Evropské unii. 






that if the system works and bears fruit as far as its objectives are 
concerned, the particularities of the system might not be of such great 
importance.  
Scandinavian countries serve as an intriguing example of countries with 
‘small’ financial systems, where occurred, at different times, integration of 
supervision into one supervisory authority. The very existence of such small 
financial systems made this possible. The Scandinavian example showed 
how beneficial the change was as there was an emergence of highly-
specialised professionals within the sphere of the supervisory authority.117 
The first integration of financial market supervision in Europe took place 
in Norway in 1986 (the first one ever had happened only two years before 
in Singapore). It seems apposite now to analyse the reasons behind the 
Norwegian decision to make this step so early on.  
The chief incentives included increase in effectiveness of supervision in 
the banking and insurance sectors (where take place similar changes in the 
market and also even within the field of economic competition), 
strengthening of the securities market supervision and administrative 
rationalisation (IT systems and the recruitment of experts).118 
The motives for integration in Norway were manifold. Due to the 
liberalisation and deregulation of financial markets, there was an urgent 
need to provide better financial supervision. In addition, it was desirable to 
prevent financial instability and to encourage higher effectiveness in the 
financial markets—this was connected with earlier problems with qualified 
and knowledgeable people. Last but not least, the boundaries between the 
banking sector, securities and insurance were rather hazy and there were 
also initiatives to set up large financial conglomerates.  
The system of financial stability in Norway is based on three pillars—
apart from the supervisory authority, responsibilities are shared by the 
Ministry of Finance and the central bank (Norges Bank). Together, these 
organisations form a tripartite institution, the representatives of which meet 
regularly at least twice a year. The Ministry of Finance supervises financial 
stability and financial regulation. The central bank is responsible for the 
monetary policy and the supervisory authority (called Finanstilsynet) takes 
 
117 TAYLOR, M. FLEMING, A. Integrated financial supervision, Lessons of the 
Scandinavian experience.  Finance & Developement vol. 36. Washington: International 
Monetary Fund. December 1999. No. 4. p 44. 
118 MOSS, N. Integrated supervision in Norway: Organisational structure, history and 
experience. Presentation of Finanstilsynet, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
in conference in Sofia  3rd May 2010. p. 27. 
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charge of supervision of financial institutions and it is also active in the 
legislative process (it helps to create and propose relevant bills). The 
functional model of supervision was adopted in Norway, too; it adheres to 
the principle which maintains that the same risks should be regulated in the 
same way, regardless of which financial institution carries the risk.  
The supervisory authority is also responsible for supervision of auditors 
and external accountants, claims management companies and also for 
supervision at the macroeconomic level.  
The body in charge of the Norwegian financial market (not in charge of 
the monetary policy in Norway, though) is called Finanstilsynet (formerly 
Kredittilsynet) and it came into existence in 1986 following a merger 
between two regulatory and supervisory institutions. The first was The 
Bank Inspection (founded in 1900), which included from the year of 1983 
the Brokers Control Agency as well. This body also used to supervise 
estate agents. The other body was The Insurance Council, which was 
established in 1911 and it carried out supervision of insurance companies 
up until 1992.119  
Naturally, there are several reasons why financial supervision and 
regulation should involve the central bank, as there are several reasons why 
it should not. In Norway the reasons against the central bank involvement 
prevailed and they opted for a dual structure—the supervisory authority acts 
independently of the central bank. In the past, one of the soundest 
arguments against the integration of supervision and regulation into one and 
only body was the theoretical conflict between the monetary-political 
objective and the performance of banking supervision on the part of the 
central bank. This argument has been refuted, though, since this conflict did 
not manifest itself in real life at all.120 
I would argue that it is not such an important issue whether the 
supervisory organ involves the central bank or whether they are separate, 
thereby creating a two-pillar system of financial stability within the given 
country (as in Norway). Every country has gone about the process of 
integration in a different way, but the goal remains the same: the creation of 




119 MOSS, N. Integrated supervision in Norway: Organisational structure, history and 
experience. Presentation of Finanstilsynet, the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
in conference in Sofia  3rd May 2010. p. 26. 
120 BRIAULT, C.: Revisiting the rationale for a single national financial services regulator, 
FSA, Occasional paper 16th February 2002, p. 27. 
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INTEGRATION OF SUPERVISION IN EUROPE 
 
In Europe, integration of regulation and supervision is a long-term ongoing 
process which accompanies the growth of the financial market itself. This 
process has always reacted to the contemporaneous political and economic 
situation in the countries of Europe, but it has also been affected by 
international economic features, as was demonstrated during the financial 
crisis in 2008. Needless to say, the process of integration had already been 
under way by then, but the financial crisis in 2008 intensified it and it also 
set the course of action for the future, aiming to prevent any more crises or, 
at least, to reduce the damage inflicted by them. 
International financial conglomerates offer a wide range of financial 
products that penetrate various financial market segments. Thus, the areas 
of supervision overlap, which creates a burden not only for the financial 
conglomerate (more legislation awareness and administration), but also for 
the supervisory body or bodies (more communication and administration). 
Integration significantly simplifies the process of supervision, for it 
provides a clear legislative basis, all financial market segments are covered 
and there is no needless administration between the supervisory bodies. 
As big financial companies do business in many countries (often rather 
diverse), there is a clear signal for globalisation of supervision—it is 
desirable that conditions in all countries should be as similar as possible. 
This not only liberalises business possibilities and reduces administration, 
but it also leads to equal opportunities and makes it harder for 
entrepreneurs to be selective on the basis of how demanding and detailed 
supervision in other countries is. 
In Europe (but globally as well) motives for integration include attempts 
to create a single financial market with increasingly more and more 
interconnected supranational European financial groups, and also with 
more close-knit relations between financial market segments. I am not 
sure if the EU countries right from the beginning desired the current form 
of financial regulation and supervision, i.e. the creation of a supranational 
level of supervision which should ensure safety and stability of the 




The European Parliament adopted many resolutions121 (even before the 
outbreak of the financial crisis and then during the crisis as well) calling 
for transformation towards an integrated system of supervision in Europe, 
which would ensure equal treatment for all entities involved at the EU 
level and which would also reflect the growing financial market integration 
within the EU.  
In reaction to the financial crisis in 2008, the European Commission 
initiated a range of measures to create a safer and healthier financial sector 
for the single market122.  
These measures are being adopted gradually in various forms. Given the 
fact that globally as well as Europe-wide the most important role in the 
financial sector is played by banks, the majority of these measures entail 
stricter prudential demands for banks, better consumer/investor and 
depositor protection, and management rules for insolvent banks. As a 
result, these measures led to ‘The Single Rulebook’, a single set of rules for 
all financial entities in all 28 EU member countries, which also serves as the 
basis for the Banking Union as the current peak of supervisory integration 
tendencies in the EU (further discussed in a separate chapter below). 123 
The system of prudential supervision in the EU is based on the so-called 
‘home country principle’—supervision of an international financial 
institution is carried out by the supervisory authority from the home 
country, i.e. the country in which the parent company is registered or in 
which it was granted the licence (as opposed to its branches opened in other 
countries – ‘host countries’). The EU law enables financial institutions to 
open and run branches without legal personality in other EU countries 
without consent from the host country. This principle of opening branches 
without consent is called the ‘single passport’. If the parent company, 
however, establishes subsidiaries or any other legal entities with legal 
 
121 For example the resolution of 13th April 2000 on the Commission’s statement on the 
making-up of financial market framework: action plan; the resolution of 21st November 
2002 on prudential supervision rules in the EU; the resolution of 11th July 2007 on the 
financial service policies (2005-2010): the white book and others. 
122 The global financial crisis certainly indicates the necessity for changes in the paradigm 
of the regulation and supervision of financial institutions. Thus in response to the financial 
crisis, changes were made on an EU level in the regulatory and supervisory architecture of 
the single financial market. The following publication present details: JURKOWSKA-
ZEIDLER, A. The architecture of the European financial market : legal foundations, 
Gdańsk ; Warsaw : Gdańsk University Press : Wolters Kluwer, 2016, pp. 53-117. 
123 Adapted from: EU single market, Banking union. European commission. [online] 2014 [qtd. 




personality, the host country (its supervisory authority) automatically 
assumes supervisory powers. In addition, the parent company has to obtain 
any permission or licence (required for its activity) issued by the 
authoritative body of the host country. 
It is generally accepted124 that the home country principle should 
increase the effectiveness of supervision at the international level and it 
should also bring about the reduction of costs when compared with 
double supervision (i.e. if it were carried out both by the home and the 
host countries). The home country principle thus represents an effective 
solution to the problem of supervision of financial branches from other 
countries.  
It must be conceded, though, that this seems to be a rather theoretical 
and, to a certain extent, a trivial purpose, which is evident and not worthy 
of an in-depth analysis. The crux of the matter rather lies in different 
attitudes towards branches and subsidiaries in host countries. Legally, the 
difference is crystal clear; it is not so from the functional point of view, 
though, since branches and subsidiaries operate in a similar way and their 
failure has a very similar impact on the system in the host country. I 
therefore deem the single passport principle rather flawed and buck-passing 
as well. Who will pay out financial compensation to clients with insured 
deposits in case of branch insolvency in the host country? Given the fact 
that it is an entity without legal personality, it should be the home country 
authority, but this seems extremely hard to enforce in practice.125 
A clear deficiency in the system of mutual acknowledgement is the 
focus on entities with legal personality (branches or cross-border services), 
hence the exclusion of financial institutions’ subsidiaries from the system 
of mutual acknowledgement. As a result, it is harder to assign activities to 
legal persons, on which the division of supervisory duties is based. The 
profound difference between legal and organisational structures 
complicates supervision, since supervision is based on the power to 
supervise legal persons (legal structure), which, however, may not fully 
 
124 Např. GOORIS, J., PEETERS, C., Ecore Discussion Paper, Home-Host Country Distance and 
Governance Choices in Service Offshoring. 2009 [online] 2013 [qtd. 9th November 2017] Available 
at http://www.ecore.be/DPs/dp_1328618572.pdf , p. 24. 
125 To illustrate this let us look at the Icelandic bank Icesave, an internet branch of 
Landsbanki bank in the Netherlands and Great Britain. The lost deposits were refunded 
from the host countries’ funds, but the costs were left unpaid for by the Icelandic 
government. This outcome was sanctioned by the EFTA court.  Available at: Novinky.cz. 
Soud podržel Island ve sporu s Británií a Nizozemskem o vklady. 2009 [online] 2013 [qtd. 11th 




correspond with where the given activity took place (organisational 
structure). There seems to be a great deal of political challenge in tackling 
the discrepancy between operationally integrated financial groups in 
search of synergies and legally-bound supervisory authorities in search of 
effective ways to deal with these financial groups and their practices.126  
International financial groups with subsidiaries are supervised by more 
authorities (unlike branches), which necessarily results in applying national 
supervisory mechanisms to institutions offering international financial 
services. This is hardly compatible with the model of integration in the EU. 
Admittedly, what determines whether an international company decides to 
set up a branch or a subsidiary often remains undisclosed and it probably 
depends on more criteria.  
Still, it seems extremely beneficial not to apply different criteria to 
branches and subsidiaries, for these are very similar entities from the 
functional point of view and are therefore highly comparable as far as the 
systemic risk is concerned. 127  
One of the most problematic issues surrounding the home country 
principle is the distribution of responsibilities and subsequent problem-
solving between the home and the host supervisory authority. The host 
country may not be familiar enough with the parent company and its 
operation. Also, the host country’s main responsibility is the supervision of 
liquidity—a problem may arise when the host country authority, in its bid to 
maintain the stability of the financial system, needs information about a 
particular branch beyond the area of liquidity. The host country authority 
actually cannot possibly demand information from the home country 
authority; consequently, supervision of branches without legal personality 
becomes extraordinarily difficult without close co-operation needed for 
effective supervision.  
The scheme of supervision of financial institutions in the EU is based on 
the principle of local jurisdiction. In accordance with this principle, national 
supervisory authorities exercise their power within the borders of their 
country and leave foreign activities of local financial institutions to the 
 
126 SCHOENMAKER, D., OOSTERLOO, S. Financial supervision in Europe: A proposal 
for a new architecture. in: L. JONUNG, L. – WALKNER, C. – WATSON, M. Building 
the Financial Foundations of the Euro – Experiences and Challenges. London: Routledge, 
2008. pp. 337-354. 
127 HERTIG, G. – LEE, R. – MCCAHERY, J.A. Empowering the ECB to Supervise 
Banks: A Choice-Based Approach. ECGI Working Paper Series in Finance. WP no. 
262/2009 [online] 2009 [qtd. 8th November 2017] Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1327824, p. 35. 
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supervisory authority of the relevant country (with the exception of their 
branches). This traditional local jurisdiction principle is, however, hardly 
compatible with the conditions of a single internal market, because it 
submits entities of the same financial institution to various mechanisms of 
supervision according to where these entities are located. Such a principle 
complicates free movement of capital and free provision of financial 
services. As a consequence, the introduction of rules for the mutual 
acceptance of financial service licences within the EU has fallen short of 
general expectations. Moreover, I hold the view that the different approach 
to subsidiaries and branches is not correct, since their influence and 
potential danger to the financial system is more or less equal—they should 
therefore be treated identically.  
 
 
The process of integration of the European financial market 
 
One of the biggest challenges for EU politics is creating the single market, 
not just formally (in 1993) but factually as well. This can only be achieved 
through integration and harmonisation of European (i.e. the EU) financial 
markets.128 
The first important step was the so-called Financial Services Action 
Plan (FSAP129), which identified three basic priorities: 1/ to create a single 
 
128 The financial markets have become much more international in recent decades, while 
their regulation and supervision still remain under the domestic jurisdictions. Thus, the 
issue of common responsibility for the financial market stability is still a basic challenge for 
the European Union especially after the experience of the recent global financial crisis. See 
more: JURKOWSKA-ZEIDLER, A. EU financial market law : from minimal 
harmonization to federalization, in: Radvan, M., Gliniecka, J., Sowiński, T., Mrkývka, P. 
(eds.): The financial law towards challenges of the XXI century : (conference proceedings): 
Brno : Masaryk University, 2017; Publications of the Masaryk University, theoretical series, 
edition Scientia, file no. 580, pp. 379-393, Web of Science: 
https://www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/Radvan_Financial_challenges.pdf 
129 The first incentive to the creation of the Action Plan was the European Council meeting 
in Cardiff in June 1998. Next, a European Commission statement called ‘Financial Services: 
Building a Framework for Action’ was issued on the 28th October 1998, which was 
presented upon the European Council initiative in December 1998 in Vienna. This 
document built a framework for the future action plan with all the particular regulations 
and with a timeline for their gradual implementation into the legal systems of the EU 
member countries. The following step saw the creation of the action plan according to the 
European Commission Directive called ‘Implementing the framework for financial 
markets: action plan’ from 11th May 1999, approved at the Cologne summit in June 1999, 
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market in the financial services area, 2/ to open and secure the retail 
financial services market, and 3/ to strengthen prudential supervision 
rules.130 
This plan aimed to restrict institutional, regulatory, and tax barriers and 
to support financially the development of small and medium-sized 
enterprises.131 The approval of the Action Plan was supported by 
discussions of the specially-formed expert group called the Financial 
Service Policy Group (FSPG), which consists of representatives from the 
council of ministers of finance ECOFIN and representatives of the 
European Central Bank. 
In 2000, the Action Plan became a priority of the Lisbon process and its 
final version was passed in April 2000 in Lisbon with 42 legislative 
regulations132 aiming to integrate national financial markets into a single 
European market. 133 The introduction of the euro in 1999 also greatly 
facilitated the process of integration, especially in the money market.  
One of the most important achievements of the FSAP is the Financial 
Conglomerate Directive134, drawn up in December 2002. It created rules 
that should help the leading supervisory body in a financial conglomerate 
decide how to close loopholes in existing supervisory mechanisms. The 
Directive also called for closer co-ordination and a more effective exchange 
of information between supervisory bodies of individual financial market 
sectors. The FSAP initiated the establishment of a securities commission. In 
 
during which the European Council also encouraged the European Commission to 
continue the action plan work.  
130 Adapted from: Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). European Commission. [online]. 
European Commission [qtd. 9th November 2017]. Available at  
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financial
_services_general_framework/l24210_en.htm. 
131 KAŠSOVIČ, J., Lamfalussy proces, Finančné trhy. [online]. Finančné trhy, březen 2008. 
[qtd. 9th November 2017]. Available at: http://www.derivat.sk/index.php?PageID=1436. 
p.2. 
132 These regulations concerned a whole range of financial market entities such as investors, 
brokers, issuers, and national financial market authorities.  
133 KAŠSOVIČ, J., Lamfalussy proces, Finančné trhy. [online]. Finančné trhy, březen 2008. 
[qtd. 9th November 2017]. Available at: http://www.derivat.sk/index.php?PageID=1436. 
p.3. 
134 Directive 2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2002 on the supplementary supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and 
investment firms in a financial conglomerate. 
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reaction to this, an entirely new structure of commissions was created, later 
to become known as the Lamfalussy process.135 
 
The Lamfalussy process 
 
In 2000 ECOFIN set up the so-called Committee of Wise Men with 
Alexandre Lamfalussy (a famous banker and economist) as the chair of the 
newly-established organisation. Later, the process was named after him. The 
main task of the committee was to analyse financial market regulatory 
mechanisms and to put forward a proposal for a more flexible, effective and 
transparent legislative framework for capital market regulation, ensuring at 
the same time that the legal basis was adaptable to the global financial 
market situation.  
The committee concluded its efforts by issuing the Lamfalussy Report136 
on 15th February 2001. The report suggested steps necessary for the creation 
of a new legislative framework. The suggestion involved a four-level 
mechanism of accepting, approving and controlling the implementation of 
financial market regulations in the EU. It can be viewed as a process of 
integration of European financial institutions and EU member countries. 
What is interesting about this report is the fact that the committee was 
initially supposed to deal with the capital market industry only (indeed, in 
March 2001 it led to the approval of a new legislative framework for the 
securities market); yet, the overall impact of the report and its legislative 
proposals affected the entire financial market.   
Each of the proposed four levels focused on a specific stage of 
implementation of legislation within the EU and the final version of the 
document was ratified by the European Parliament in February 2002.  
 
1st level: Legislative framework 
EU legal norms are proposed by the European Commission and approved 
by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union via the 
 
135 FITZGERALD, S. The reform of financial supervision in Europe. Institute of 
International and European Affairs, Dublin [online] 2009 [qtd. 9th November 2017] 
Available at http://www.iiea.com/publications/the-reform-of-financial-supervision-in-
europe. 
136 Initial Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities 




usual legislative procedure. This is the way regulations and directives are 
also approved.  
 
2nd level: Implementing measures 
Four committees were established to collaborate in negotiating and passing 
secondary legislation, which should promptly react to the dynamically 
developing financial market. This legislation was supposed to be 
implemented into national legal norms. The four committees were: the 
European Securities Committee, the European Banking Committee, the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Committee, and the 
European Financial Conglomerates Committee.  
 
3rd level: Facilitation of convergence of regulatory practice by 
supervisory committees  
The next step was implementation of primary and secondary legislation into 
national legal systems of member countries. The co-operation among 
member countries was facilitated by three committees under the European 
Commission, all of which were composed of representatives of member 
countries’ supervisory authorities. This level was supposed to increase the 
exchange of information, legislation and directives so that financial market 
supervision gradually became more and more unified. A considerable source 
of problems was the fact that these committees’ powers were rather 
limited—they were not allowed to issue legally binding acts.   
The three committees were the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors, the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors, and the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators.  
 
4th level: The enforcement of directives 
The European Commission not only checks the accordance between EU 
legislation and national legislation in member countries, but it also takes 
enforcement action if the implementation of EU legislation is imperfect or 
inconsistent. 
Lamfalussy’s conception is based on the subsidiarity principle, i.e. it 
prefers effective institutional organisation of financial market supervision at 
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the national level. It means that the European Commission does not 
recommend any specific solutions in this respect.137 
Having formulated this plan, the European Commission revealed the 
‘Green Paper on Financial Services Policy (2005-2010)’ in 2005, aiming to 
deepen the process of integration and to harmonise financial market 
services. This paper envisaged the creation of an internal market, the 
existence of which would boost economic growth in member countries. 
Companies, particularly international ones, were supposed to gain easier 
access to the capital and to some new ways of financing owing to a wider 
range of financial products and services and also owing to the fact that the 
state debt and payments were supposed to go down in price significantly. 
The Green Paper brought forward a number of directives grounded in the 
Lamfalussy institutional framework, which was designed to intensify the 
process of national financial markets supervisory integration and 
harmonisation. This period also saw the introduction of the single 
European passport and the principle of the home country primary 
competence in supervision (based on the location of the regulated entity). 
The underlying assumption here was closer co-operation among national 
supervisory authorities, which, however, has not always been sufficiently 
effective.  
In 2004, the Council of the European Union praised this process stating 
that it had succeeded in increasing harmonisation of the preparatory process 
as well as in the subsequent implementation in individual member countries. 
The quality of supervision was assessed in the ‘White Paper on Financial 
Services Policy (2005-2010)’, but also in later (largely positive) evaluative 
reports.138 
 
It is not an easy task to offer an overall assessment of the Lamfalussy 
process because of the main obstacle: the global financial crisis and its 
negative impact, which the supervisory mechanisms did not prevent. 
Following the crisis, the Lamfalussy process came in for a lot of criticism. 
Nevertheless, the International Monetary Fund issued a report in 2007, in 
which it asserted that ‘[o]n the financial stability framework, progress is 
being held back by the continuing tension between the impulse toward 
 
137 JAKUB, F. Disertační práce. Analýza modelů regulace a dozoru nad finančním trhem. 
Praha, 2011. 179 p. Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Fakulta financí a účetnictví. Vedoucí 
práce . Petr Musílek. p. 67. 
138 IIMG, AKERHOLM, J., SCHACKMANN-FALLIS, K-P., et al. Final Report 





integration on the one hand and the preference for a decentralized 
approach, in particular for supervision, on the other. Specifically, under the 
EU’s home-host supervision model, supervisors are accountable only to 
their national authorities, informational asymmetries between home and 
host supervisors are large, and actions by one supervisor have potentially 
large effects on the jurisdiction of another. Especially when applied to large 
cross-border financial institutions (LCFI), this setting largely precludes 
progress toward efficient and effective crisis management and resolution, 
thus fostering moral hazard and unnecessary risks for national taxpayers.’ 139 
The flaws of the Lamfalussy process combined with the financial crisis 
brought about increased focus on three areas crucial to revitalisation of the 
financial system, as expressed in a European Commission report, issued on 
the 29th October, 2008. The first area mentioned in the report concerned a 
new/different organisational structure of financial supervision which took 
into account systemic risks and was resistant to financial crises and to the 
domino effect sweeping across all member countries. The second area 
involved suggesting better ways of overcoming the consequences of 
financial crises by means of adjusting monetary and fiscal policies of EU 
member countries. The third area aimed to strengthen international 
regulatory measures and to increase co-ordination among supervisory 
bodies and macroeconomic policies of the member states.140 
Implementation of the suggested improvements was rather lengthy and 
laden with complications. The purpose was to make member countries 
approve fast high quality legislation. The process of implementation, 
however, faced numerous problems because of insufficient political 
support, which, in turn, adversely affected the quality of the entire process 
of supervisory integration and ratification of the norms. As a result, the 
process also often took far longer than initially envisaged. I also believe that 
the subsidiarity principle, adopted for the Lamfalussy process, is not the 
best option, because it presupposes an institutional organisation of 
supervision at the national level—that can hardly lead to real harmonisation. 
The process of implementation was further hampered by fears of destroying 
the balance among European bodies due to the distribution of power 
during the process of implementation.  
 
139 Euro Area Policies: 2007 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report International Monetary 
Fund Country Report No. 07/260 [online] 2007 [qtd. 9th January 2017] Available at  
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07260.pdf, p. 27. 
140 JAKSON, J., Financial Market Supervision: European Perspective. Congressional 
Research Service. [online] 2010 [qtd. 17th May 2017]. Available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40788_20100204.pdf. p. 13. 
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The main benefit of the Lamfalussy process can be seen in the incentive 
for the creation of integrated legislative framework of financial market 
supervision in Europe. It initiated proper co-operation among member 
countries and European supervisory and regulatory bodies through the 
creation of the abovementioned commissions and it also brought closer the 
single framework for European financial market supervision. 
 
De Larosière report 
 
Following the financial crisis, there was a need to reassess the previous 
measures adopted in the area of financial market supervision. A new reform 
of significant proportion with Europe-wide application was called for. This 
reform began in 2008 with the aim of analysing the main causes of the 
financial crisis and it also strove to put forward plans for strengthening the 
supervisory demands, which would provide more protection for European 
citizens and which would also help people to regain confidence in the 
financial system.  The then chair of the European Commission Jose Manuel 
Barosso put together an expert group led by an ex-president of the 
International Monetary Fund Jacques de Larosière. Its task was to analyse 
systemic deficiencies and propose suggestions, recommendations, and 
measures to strengthen the system of supervision in the EU and to restore 
confidence in the financial system as a whole. The objective was thus clear 
right from the outset: to create a more effective and sustainable system of 
supervision in the EU. The question remained, however, whether to opt for 
a centralised approach or rather leave the power and responsibility to 
national supervisory authorities while insisting that their mutual co-
operation be better and more intense. 
In February 2009 this expert group published a report called ‘The High-
Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU’141, later to be known as 
the ‘De Larosière report’. Apart from the analysis of deficiencies in the 
system used at that time (mentioned above), it came up with 31 
recommendations that should attain the objectives. This report also 
included proposals to create a new supervisory structure with a view to 
increasing effectiveness of the European supervisory framework, thereby 
positively affecting the stability of the system, too. Ultimately, this was 
 
141 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU chaired by Jacques de 
Larosière: Report [online] 2009-02-25 [qtd. 17th May 2017].  




supposed to lead to a dramatic reorganisation of the institutional structure 
of financial regulation and supervision in the EU. The principal change 
concerned the fact that the newly-established institutions were to be given 
authority to issue legally-binding directives to national regulatory bodies and 
specific financial institutions as well.  The De Larosière report also justified 
the handover of authority by explaining that there was essentially no 
conflict with the basic principles of subsidiarity and proportionality142 and 
by pointing out the need to promote some supervision to the European 
(rather than national) level due to the ever-increasing integration and 
consolidation of the European financial market.  
The European Commission agreed with De Larosière’s conclusions and 
in September 2009 it adopted five legislative proposals (financial 
supervision package), which were then referred to the European 
Parliament and the Council of the European Union for acceptance. In 
October 2009 the European Commission submitted a proposal for the 
Omnibus I143 directive, which introduced basically a new system of 
supervision by means of 11 amendments to council directives. These 
legislative proposals were approved by the Council of the European 
Union and the European Parliament in September 2010, and the 
European System of Financial Supervision came into existence. The 
negotiations lasted for more than a year and the new supervisory body was 
founded thanks to a number of regulations from the European Parliament 
and the Council of the European Union144. The new system of supervision 
 
142 These principles also guaranteed that everyday supervision was in the hands of national 
supervisors. 
143 Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council  of 24th  
November 2010, amending directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 
2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 
2009/65/EC. 
142  
- Regulation (EU) No. 1092/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24th November 2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (hereinafter the ‘ESRB 
Regulation’) 
- Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24th November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Banking Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and repealing 
Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (hereinafter the ‘EBA Regulation’). 
- Regulation (EU) No. 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24th November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No. 




took effect on January 1st 2011. It established a two-pillar structure of 
supervisory bodies in the whole of the European Union—macro and 
micro-level supervision. 
In spite of the fact that the legislative proposal from the European 
Commission in many aspects copied De Larosière’s report, it was also 
hugely influenced by pressure from some member countries which 
vigorously opposed far-reaching reforms. The transfer of responsibilities to 
the proposed European authorities and their potential intervention in 
everyday supervision were not accepted because of a lack of political will—
the prevailing attitude saw this transfer as a breach of the national 
sovereignty principle.145  
The effect of the De Larosière’s report was far from revolutionary or 
unique; we can say it was more or less an inevitable outcome of the 
prevailing trends, brought about by the needs to deal with the financial 
crisis. Although the report as a whole was not novel (admittedly, there 
were a few novel features and specific details), it summarised and 
politically united the contemporary opinions and tendencies.146  It needs to 
be admitted that nobody could possibly have expected a radical U-turn—
that would have been impossible due to the financial market needs. 
Moreover, completely revolutionary ideas would never have gathered 
enough political support. Thus, the main task was to choose, after a 
careful analysis of the unsatisfactory situation, the optimal conception to 
achieve the objective: the systemic stability of the financial market. Owing 
to the fact that the proposal put forward by the expert group and the 
political will are two different things, it was clear right from the outset that 
the centralising proposal would be watered down by many compromising 
modifications; yet, there were some significant changes to the system of 
financial regulation and supervision. At the end of the day, this was 
another step towards Europe-wide integration of financial market 
regulation and supervision. It is not such an important matter that the 
report was not radically novel; the importance lies in the fact that it 
 
- Regulation (EU) No. 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24th November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No. 716/2009/EC and 
repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC (hereinafter the ‘ESMA Regulation’; 
the EBA, EIOPA a ESMA regulations together referred to as the ‘ESA Regulation’). 
145 JUROŠKOVÁ, L. Bankovní regulace a dohled, Praha: Auditorium.2012. p. 91. 
146 A similar reform was proposed by e.g. SCHOENMAKER, D. – OOSTERLOO, S. 
Financial supervision in Europe: A proposal for a new architecture. in: L. JONUNG, L. – 
WALKNER, C. – WATSON, M. Building the Financial Foundations of the Euro – 
Experiences and Challenges. London: Routledge, 2008. pp. 337-354. 
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gradually intensified and strengthened the process of integration. It goes 
without saying that all novel ways eventually succumb to compromise and 
it is very unlikely that there will ever appear a one-step radical solution. 
What initially seemed to be hugely controversial and radical was (after 
some revision process) finally approved as a compromise.  
 
The system of financial supervision in Europe 
 
This system is based on two pillars defined by the De Larosière’s report. 
The pillars were defined after a careful analysis of the previous supervisory 
mechanisms and their deficiencies and after identifying the best remedial 
approach to the problems that the financial crisis had exposed.  
The first pillar is represented by supervision at the macroeconomic level 
performed by the European Systemic Risk Board (hereinafter the ESRB). This 
board is composed of members with voting rights (i.e. the General Council 
of the European Central Bank, the chairs of the European Banking 
Authority -EBA, the European Securities and Markets Authority and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, the European 
Commission representatives, the chairs and vice-chairs of the ASC and the 
ATC) and non-voting members (representatives from national supervisory 
authorities and the chair of the EFC).  
The second pillar is microeconomic supervision called the European System 
of Financial Supervisors (hereinafter the ESFS), for which are responsible three 
bodies: the European Supervisory Authorities (the ESA), the ESA Joint Committee 
and national supervisory authorities. 147 Completely new institutions were 
the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA). 
ESA consist of new bodies transformed from the former third-level 
Lamfalussy commissions (the CEBS, the CESR, and the CEIOPS). These 
new bodies have legal personality and are subject to legal regulation from 
national supervision according to the location. Their objective is protection 
of the public interest by means of increasing stability and effectiveness of 
the financial system. More specifically, their tasks included ways of 
strengthening the integrity and increasing the transparency of the European 
financial market—this can be achieved, among other things, through 
 
147 JANOVEC, M. Současná integrace dohledu na finančních trzích. obchodněprávní 
revue, Praha: C. H. Beck, 2013, year 2013, issue  6, p. 161. 
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financial market supervision and regulation. Regulatory and supervisory 
changes first saw improvement of quality and status of the existing 
European supervisory bodies and only then did the abovementioned 
transformation of commissions into the new institutions take place. 
The establishment of the ESFS was only the first step in the reform of 
supervision in the EU. In connection with the EU legal system, this was not 
an attempt to centralise supervisory competences at the European level, 
because it could not make legally binding decisions and ESA did not hold 
direct supervisory power within the EU. Thus, their main task was to 
supervise supervisory authorities of the member countries. There is, 
however, one interesting exception to this rule: ESA can perform direct 
supervision of financial market participants in three cases, if the necessary 
conditions are met. This will be discussed below.148 
Another crucial step towards a full-scale reform of the system of financial 
supervision in the EU was the foundation of the Banking Union, again 
discussed in a separate chapter below. 
 
1. Macro-prudential supervision- The European Systemic Risk 
Board 
This type of supervision centres on prevention and problem-solving within 
systemic risk of the whole financial market. Systemic risk is defined as ‘a risk 
to the stability of the financial system and therefore [it] has an impact on the 
internal market and the real economy’.149 The goal is clearly predominantly 
preventive. The ESRB is concerned chiefly with monitoring, preventing and 
softening potential systemic risks to the financial stability in the EU; these 
risks stem from the ongoing processes within the financial system and 
general macroeconomic development. The ESRB and its activities should 
keep the internal market in the right condition and should also ensure a 
sustainable share of the financial sector as far as economic growth is 
concerned.150  
The ESRB does not have legal personality or legal competences and, as a 
result, it cannot be considered a European body; it is rather a soft-law 
organisation. 151 As a matter of fact, it is an organisation that should use its 
 
148 KÁLMÁN, J. The reform of financial supervisory system of the European Union. 
International relations Quarterly, Vol. 5. No. 2 (Summer 2014). p. 3. 
149 Art. 2 (c) ESRB Directive. 
150 Art. 3, par. 1 ESRB Directive.  
151 VERHELST, S. Renewed financial supervision in Europe – Final or Transitory. In 
Egmont paper No. 44. 2011 p. 28. 
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credit and expertise to positively influence top politicians and supervisory 
authorities in their decision-making process. This body should, above all, 
ensure with its expertise and the right setting of internal processes 
confidence in its ability to a/ make independent decisions, b/ produce high 
quality analyses, and c/ to reach firm conclusions.152 
The ESRB is linked with the European Central Bank (hereinafter ‘the 
ECB’) within the EU structure. One proof of the close bond can be seen in 
the fact that the tasks of the Secretariat of the ESRB are undertaken by the 
ECB, which provides basic operational assistance to the ESRB; 
furthermore, members of the General Board are appointed by the central 
bank governors and the chair is the ECB president. One could thus 
conclude that the ESRB is, to a large extent, an organisational unit of the 
ECB with its own legal status and specific competence.   
 
The organisational structure of the ESRB 
The ESRB is located in Frankfurt upon Main and it is composed of five 
units: the General Board, the Steering Committee, the Advisory Scientific 
Committee, the Advisory Technical Committee, and the Secretariat.  
 










Source: VERHELST, S. (2011) p. 21. 
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The General Board is the main decision-making body of the ESRB; it takes 
decisions which are necessary for accomplishing the tasks the ESRB has 
been entrusted with.153 The Board has 67 members, 38 of whom have 
voting rights: the president and vice-president of the ECB, 28 national 
central bank governors, a European Commission representative, 3 chairs of 
the ESA bodies, the chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee and his two 
deputies, and the chair of the Advisory Technical Committee. Non-voting 
members include experts from each member country (nominated from 
national supervisory authorities—28 people) and the president of the EFC 
(Economic and Financial Committee). The first chair of the ESRB is the 
president of the ECB. He is elected for a term of five years.154 In the future 
it is expected that the ESRB should be completely independent of the ECB, 
especially after the introduction of the single supervisory mechanism. In 
addition, the institution’s independence is further strengthened by the fact 
that the chair of the ESRB should always be someone with no political 
affiliation and a high level of expertise so as to make sure that the person 
enhances the credit of the ESRB. Such a person should not be the president 
of the ECB—it could, for instance, the ex-governor of a central bank or a 
top executive from a national supervisory authority.155 Except for the chair, 
there are also two vice-chairs, one of whom is also a member of the General 
Board of the ECB and is elected by all its members, while the second vice-
chair is the chair of the Joint Committee.  
The Steering Committee helps in the decision-making process of the ESRB 
by preparing meetings, revising the documents under discussion and 
assessing the progress of ESRB activities.156 This body is composed of the 
chair and the first vice-chair of the ESRB, the vice-president of the ECB, 
four other members of the General Board, a European Commission 
member, the chairpersons of the three ESA bodies, the president of the 
EFC, the chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee, and the chair of the 
Advisory Technical Committee.  
 
153 Art. 4, par. 2 of the ESRB Regulation. 
154 Art. 5 par. 1 the ESRB Regulation.  
155 In the revision process of the ESRB were issued several recommendations by means of 
the Directorate General for Internal Policies towards European legislators. Cf. 
MCPHILEMY, S. ROCHE, J.  Review of the New European System of Financial 
Supervision. Part 2: The Work of the European Systemic Risk Board, Report [online] EU 
2013 [qtd. 24th May 2017]. p.86. Available at 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/507490/IPOL-
ECON_ET%282013%29507490_EN.pdf> 
156 Art. 4 par. 3 The ESRB Regulation. 
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The Secretariat is in charge of everyday business of the ESRB, supported 
by the ECB, which offers analytical, statistical, logistic and administrative 
help to the ESRB.157 The Advisory Scientific Committee offers scientific 
support and the Advisory Technical Committee provides advice and 
support necessary for the task fulfilment of the ESRB, including the 
assessment of financial stability in the EU.  
 
The main tasks and powers of the ESRB 
As it was mentioned above, the main tasks include making analyses and 
monitoring risks with their timely idnetification. This is achieved by means 
of warnings and recommendations—measures taken to reduce the risks. 
Among other things, it issues recommendations regarding a quarterly setting 
of the level of ‘countercyclical buffer’158 in all member states. This is 
followed by close monitoring of the warnings that have already been issued. 
Further, a new system ‘Early Warning Exercises’ (EWE) has been 
introduced—together with the MMF it represents of the analytical 
instruments at the ESRB’s disposal159. The EWE system is composed of a 
number of tests carried out every six months with the aim of establishing to 
what extent the international financial market is prone to systemic risk.  
Warnings and recommendations can be general or specific and they can 
be addressed to the EU as a whole, to individual countries or groups of 
countries, to one or more ESA bodies, or, finally, to one or more national 
supervisory authorities. They are never aimed at individual financial 
institutions for such a step would go beyond the macroeconomic focus. The 
main aim is to warn against possible systemic risks, which could, in turn, 
provoke political responses.  
 
157 The Council Regulation (EU) No. 1096/2010 of 17th November 2010 conferring 
specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning the functioning of the 
European Systemic Risk Board 1096/2010. 
158 Setting a limit for the capital of credit institutions and demands for liquidity are one of 
the main instruments of macro-prudential supervision as stated in Regulation CRD IV (see 
below). Liquidity demands consist of liquidity coverage ratio Tier 1 (LCR) and net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR). The former states the desired amount of liquid assets a particular 
bank needs to possess in order to survive financial market downturns. The latter is 
concerned with the sources of financing or its stability. These demands for the capital are 
being implemented gradually and their full implementation is only expected after January 
1st 2019.   
159 The IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise: Design and Methodological Toolkit. The 




The crucial question to be answered here is whether the ESRB possesses 
enough advisory and analytical competence. In my opinion, it does—not 
every single body or organisation must necessarily possess legally binding 
power. I am convinced that the ESRB is not a body that provides ‘only’ 
advice and recommendations about risks. Even though recommendations 
from the ESRB are not legally binding, they represent a certain way of 
regulation that is endowed with mechanisms such as the ‘act or explain’160 or 
‘naming and shaming’ ones—aimed to ensure rules observation. The 
‘naming and shaming’161 mechanism is known from the OECD. In certain 
cases this mechanism brings negative publicity. Having informed the 
Council in advance, the General Board of the ESRB can decide to publicly 
announce their warnings and recommendations; sometimes there might 
even be a public hearing in the European Parliament. 162  
These mechanisms try to make the addressees abide by the 
recommendations; if they do not, they are then asked to explain their 
decision—in certain cases this explanation must be released to the public.  
163 This is, in itself, a relatively powerful instrument at the ESRB’s 
disposal, despite not being legally binding. The institutional division 
between macroeconomic and microeconomic supervision is, I believe, 
correct—although the two influence each other, their supervision is rather 
specific with high qualification demands on people who perform the 
supervision. In addition, if the two types of supervision were integrated 
into one and only body (the ECB), there might be a conflict of interest, 
particularly because of the ECB’s other important competences. 
 
160 This mechanism comes from art. 17, par. 1 of the ESRB Regulation. The addressee (the 
Commission, one of more member states, one or more ESA bodies, one or more national 
supervisory authorities) is obliged to inform both the ESRB and the Council of the 
measures taken after receiving a recommendation, or it must explain its inactivity. If the 
ESRB is not content with a specific reaction or explanation, it may instantaneously inform 
the Council or ESA.  
161 The OECD uses this mechanism to identify tax heavens and to fight money laundering. 
Cf. e.g. “Name and shame” can work for money laundering. OECD Observer No 223, 
October 2000 [online] 2000 [qtd. 25th May 2017] Available at 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/358/_93Name_and_shame_94
_can_work_for_money_laundering.html.   
162 For more information see: PFAELTZER, J. W, Naming and Shaming in Financial 
Market Regulations: A Violation of the Presumption of Innocence? In Utrecht Law Review, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 134-148. 
163 FERRAN, E., ALEXANDER, K. Can Soft Law Bodies be Effective? Soft Systemic 
Risk Oversight Bodies and the Special Case of the European Systemic Risk Board, in 
University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 36/2011. [online] 2010 [qtd. 
24th May 2017] Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1676140. pp 30-31. 
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Conversely, one can also come to the conclusion that supervision at the 
macroeconomic level should be integrated in the ECB’s competences—
this opinion rests on some decisive legal factors164 which call for 
unification of the micro and macroeconomic levels of supervision; 
naturally, the only institution suitable to perform both types of supervision 
is the ECB. 165 As far as I am concerned, the very existence of the ESRB 
and its competence is beneficial to the financial market. It adds value to 
the financial system from the macroeconomic point of view and it also 
fills a void in the system of supervision; a void that got fully exposed 
during the financial crisis.  
It is true that the ESRB cannot make legally-binding decisions, but it is 
endowed with natural authority springing from its good reputation and of 
its representatives (highly respected central bankers from the member 
states). This should ensure that their recommendations will be accepted. 
Yet, this unenforceability could prove to be the Achilles heel of the body, 
because I am not sure that the EU is integrated to such an extent as to 
permanently and voluntarily accept and implement whatever the ESRB 
comes up with.    
A weak point of the ESRB is the fact that it gathers data from national 
databases which might not include all the (correct) information. This, of 
course, influences identification of possible threats—these might not be 
detected or they might be interpreted in the wrong way, which ultimately 
lead to such catastrophic consequences as the ones caused by the financial 
crisis.  It could therefore make the ESRB analyse a certain situation as a 
threat, although there is no threat whatsoever. Every warning issued by the 
ESRB that turns out to be completely false will result in a loss of credibility; 
all the more so since it entails higher costs for some financial market 
participants. It is a matter of sensitive application, which the ESRB must 
always bear in mind to be successful. I believe it is something this 
organisation is capable of.   
 
 
164 The fact that macro-prudential supervision under the ECB is supported by art. 127 of 
the SFEU (former art. 105 of the EC Treaty).  
165 OTTOW, A.T.- VAN MEERTEN, H. The Proposals for the European Supervisory 
Authorities: The Right (Legal) Way Forward? Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht, Vol. 1, 
2010 [online] 2010 [qtd. 25th May 2017] Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1517371>. p. 43. 
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2. Micro-prudential supervision—the European Supervisory 
Authorities 
Micro-prudential supervision existed in Europe in the form of the three 
committees based on the Lamfalussy report (discussed above). The ESA 
bodies are essentially the biggest change brought about by the establishment 
of the ESFS. 
The reform enormously increased the competence, responsibility and 
autonomy of ESAs (when compared with the previous committees), 
supported by the possibility to make use of legally binding instruments.166 
Generally speaking, financial market supervision moved much closer to the 
level of the EU primary law. 
Newly-established bodies replaced the previous ones and the main point 
of difference lies in the aspect of legal personality—they can issue legally-
binding decisions addressed to supervisory authorities in member countries, 
and, under special circumstances, addressed to specific financial institutions 
as well.  
The structure of ESAs 
ESAs are endowed with legal personality and in every member country their 
scope of legal personality is determined by the local legal system. At the 
European level, micro-prudential supervision entails three ESAs, the Joint 











166 RODRIGUEZ, P.I. Towards a New European Financial Supervision Architecture In 
Columbia Journal of European Law Online, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2009. s 3. [online] 2010 [qtd. 26th 













Source: VERHELST, S. (2011) p. 35. 
The three ESA institutions are practically identical in terms of their 
organisation:  a/ Board of Supervisors, b/ Management Board, c/ Chairperson, d/ 
Executive Director, e/ Joint Committee, f/ Board of Appeal (the last two are 
institutionalised in the ESA structure as the common ESA units), and g/ 
Stakeholder group. 167   
The main decision-making body is the Board of Supervisors, whose 
voting members are the chairs of national supervisory authorities and they 
reach decisions according to the simple majority principle. Given the high 
number of members, this body is not sufficiently flexible; that is why there 
is the Management Board, consisting of the chair and six other members. 
The Management Board carries out the tasks ESAs are entrusted with. The 
voting members of the Board of Supervisors are the ones who elect 
members of the Management Board as well as the Chairperson and the 
 
167 For example the Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group (a participating group for 
securities and markets), with which ESMA should consult norms and technical instructions 
while forming a common rulebook. Such a group is composed of 30 members, who evenly 
represent the EU financial market participants, their employees, as well as consumers, 
investors and people who use financial services. The same applies to EBA and EIOPA and 
their stakeholder groups. Cf. art. 37 of the ESA Regulation and  EMMENEGGER, S. 
Procedural Consumer Protection and Financial Market Supervision. EUI Working Papers 
Law No. 2010/05. [online] 2010 [qtd. 26th May 2017] Available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616322 p.7.  
The participating group for the EBA is the Banking Stakeholder Group, while for EIOPA 
there are two groups, namely the Insurance and Reinsurance Stakeholder and Occupational 
Pensions Stakeholder Group. 
Board of Appeal 








Executive Director of ESAs—in this way national supervisory authorities 
retain some of their former influence.  
ESA is represented by the Chairperson, who should be a person of high 
professional as well as personal integrity with impeccable knowledge of 
the world of financial markets and with much experience of their 
supervision and regulation. He or she presides the Board of Supervisors’ 
and the Management Board’s assemblies and is responsible for preparing 
the activities of the Board of Supervisors. The Executive Director is in 
charge of ESAs. 
The Joint Committee works as a kind of a forum through which the ESA 
bodies regularly and intensely co-operate to ensure cross-sector consistency. 
The Board of Appeal is a body in charge of appeals and it consists of six 
members and their six substitutes, all of whom demonstrate a high level of 
expertise and experience.  
The establishment of the Stakeholder groups is a major step towards 
better consumer protection because the groups can be involved in the 
decision-making process, at least in the form of consultations. They can 
officially take part in making decisions168 and, since they are institutionalised 
now, they can see to the fact that democratic principles are observed—in 
the past a lot has been left to desire in this area. These groups operate in a 
similar way as the Advisory Technical Committee within the ESRB. One 
can see their existence as an interesting and beneficial move since 
discussions with the leading representatives of financial markets can bring 
up intriguing topics and proposals which might balance regulatory and 
supervisory pressure. These groups as the addressees of regulation and 
supervision can intervene in cases of ‘over-regulation’.  
 
The tasks and competence of ESAs 
Before one analyses the individual tasks ESAs perform, it is worth stating 
what tasks it certainly does not have and why ESAs were not founded—
this could enhance the comprehensibility of the following part. ESAs do 
not perform day-to-day supervision of financial institutions; this task is 
still in the competence of national supervisory authorities.169 What ESAs 
have at their disposal is soft law instruments as well as competence to 
issue binding decisions, although these can be challenged. All three ESA 
 
168 EMMENEGGER, S. Procedural Consumer Protection and Financial Market 
Supervision. EUI Working Papers Law No. 2010/05. [online] 2010 [qtd. 26th May 2017] 
Available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1616322>. p. 7. 
169 Recital no. 9 of  EBA and ESMA Regulations, and Recital no. 8 of EIOPA Regulation.  
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supervisory bodies have almost identical tasks, only ESMA has some extra 
supervisory responsibility and also the power to ban certain financial 
activities, if need be.   
The tasks and instruments of ESAs might be divided into three sections: 
the quasi regulatory power, supervisory power, and legally-binding decisions 
in the form of legal norms enforcement. The crucial part is the last one—
these instruments were the main benefit of the supervisory reform.  
Table no. 5: Tools and tasks of the ESAs. 
 
 
Source: author's own processing. (based on the ESA Regulation). 
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The Single Rulebook 
One of the main objectives of the ESAs is to work on the single rulebook. 
The ESA Regulation does not define exactly what is meant by such a code. 
The Council of Ministers described the single rulebook as a basic set of 
rules and standards across the EU that are directly applicable to all financial 
institutions operating in the single market.170 However the fact remains that 
even this statement is not an unequivocal determinator of what a single 
rulebook is, and for this reason, there is ample room for interpretation by 
the ESAs, which on the other hand, can also bring contradictions between 
supervisors. 
However, the single rulebook does not include a complete 
harmonization of the rules applicable to financial institutions that should 
lead to less contradictory financial legislation in all member states. This 
results in fewer opportunities to resolve the regulatory dispute (regulatory 
arbitrage)171 and the reduction of gold-plating172 issuess. 173 
In general, supervisory practices vary from one member state to another 
and Regulatory arbitrage in cases when a contradiction between member 
states brings efficiency losses for a single market. The ESAs should, 
therefore, have the necessary powers to effectively coordinate supervisory 
actions carried out by national supervisory authorities both when 
authorising or registering an undertaking and as part of an ongoing review 
of supervisory practices. 
A possible solution for avoiding Regulatory arbitrage is to centralise 
powers to the hands of ESAs. One of the first steps could be found in the 
enforcement powers ESMA’s for CRAs and TRs. When there are more 
financial market institutions under the direct supervision of ESAs, there is 
no place for conflicting legislation in Member states. One possible way 
 
170 The Council of the European Union, Agreed Council Conclusions on Strengthening EU 
Financial Supervision, 10th June 2009, 10862/09, p. 5. 
171 ‘Regulatory arbitrage’ – The differences in financial regulation led to regulatory 
arbitrage, i.e. a situation in which financial institutions strive for the most friendly 
supervisory framework possible. Member states afraid of regulatory arbitrage (or keen to 
make us of it) are inclined to restrict regulatory demands. For more info cf.  TABELLINI, 
G., Why did bank supervision fail? In The First Global Financial Crisis. of the 21st Century, 
VoxEU Publication, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 193p., [online] 2008 [qtd. 28th 
May 2017]  Available at 
<http://www.voxeu.org/sites/default/files/First_global_crisis.pdf>. pp. 45-47. 
172 It is a situation in which member states can introduce stricter regulatory rules if they 
want to. 
173 VERHELST, S. Renewed financial supervision in Europe – Final or Transitory. In 
Egmont paper No. 44. 2011 p. 40. 
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could be seen in the new proposed practice of ESMA considering certain 
types of prospectuses with a cross-border dimension, where their approval 
is centralised at the level of ESMA.174 The centralisation of their approval, 
as well as all related supervisory and enforcement activities at the level of 
ESMA, will enhance the quality, consistency and efficiency of supervision 
in the Union, create a level playing field for issuers and lead to a reduction 
of the timeline for approvals. It will eliminate the need to choose a 'Home 
Member State' and prevent forum-shopping.175 
The other possible solution is to produce more detailed harmonization of 
the rules applicable to financial institutions for the single rulebook. These 
rules should allow less space for conflicting financial legislation in member 
states and therefore fewer Regulatory arbitrages. 
ESAs have two tools to reach the goals mentioned above. The first tool is 
non-binding regulatory recommendations and guidelines.176 ESA can 
address these recommendations and guidelines to national supervisors as 
well as individual financial institutions. These recipients should comply with 
such recommendations and guidelines. In cases where they fail to do so, it is 
necessary for the supervisor to sufficiently justify such action. However, this 
only applies to financial institutions and only if the recommendation or 
guideline explicitly expresses such a request. 
The second tool is the regulatory and implementing technical 
standards.177 Implementing standards ensure uniform implementation of 
EU law without legislative changes. Regulatory standards supplement or 
amend legislation, but only elements that are nonessential.178 
ESAs make "only" draft standards for the European Commission, which 
is the body which decides on their approval.  By the same token, the 
recommendations and guidelines are not legally binding, and from this we 
 
174 These are the wholesale non-equity prospectuses offered only to qualified investors, the 
prospectuses which relate to specific types of complex securities, such as asset backed 
securities, or which are drawn up by specialist issuers and the prospectuses drawn up by 
third country issuers entities in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. 
175 European Parliament. Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the 
council. Com (2017) 536 final. Brussels 20.9.2017. p. 8. 
176 Article 16 of the ESA Regulation. 
177 Article 10-15 ESA Regulation. 
178 Article 290-291 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), OJ C 83, 
30.3.2010, p. 1-388. 
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can deduce its “quasi” nature, because ESAs do not in fact have regulative 
competences.179  
On the other hand, the possibility of the European Commission in 
relation to draft standards is limited in terms of their change. The European 
Commission may intervene in drafts only if ESAs fail to provide adequate 
drafts within the stipulated deadline. In practice, the Commission does not 
endorse the drafts of ESAs only in exceptional cases, and it therefore gives 
added value to the quasi-regulative competence of ESAs. 
It follows from the above that the drafts of technical standards have a 
greater impact on the harmonization of legislation in the financial market 
than guidelines and recommendations (as a soft law tool). At first sight, 
quasi-regulative competences seem almost powerless, but upon closer 
examination, it is indeed a regulative competence. Especially the fact that 
the European Commission in the case of ESAs technical standards drafts 
practically do not interfere shows that the entity which forms these 
standards is currently ESAs. 
 
Supervisory colleges and their support 
Supervisory colleges with cross-border activities within the given sector 
used to be formed ad hoc and the first were established in the 1980s’. They 
are thus not a novelty brought about by the financial crisis or supervisory 
integration.180 In spite of the Lamfalussy process helping to institutionalise 
the colleges, the nature of co-operation was rather voluntary, involving the 
home supervisor (as the main supervisor within a particular college) and the 
other members of the college for one institution.181 There were problems 
 
179 Cf. MOLONEY, N. The European Securities and Markets Authority and institutional 
design for the EU financial market – a tale of two competences: Part (1) Rule-Making. 
European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 12. No 1 (2011), pp. 41-86. 
180 The first supervisory college to be established was the college for the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International, advocated by the supervisory authorities from Britain, 
Luxembourg and other countries. After its fall in 1991 European supervisors called for 
improving international co-operation among supervisors that are in charge of supervision 
of global banks. There were a number of colleges established in an ad hoc manner 
supervise international financial institutions. Also, there emerged colleges for the exchange 
of information regarding institutions such as Citigroup, HSBC, and the Deutsche Bank. Cf 
ALFORD, D. Supervisory Colleges: The Global Financial Crisis and Improving 
International Supervisory Coordination [online] 2010 [qtd. 18th June 2017] Available at: 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1545291>, pp. 5-7. 
181 E.g. the Federal Reserve Bank of New York is the main supervisor in Citigroup, BaFin 
fulfils the same role for the Deutsche Bank in Germany, and the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) is the main supervisor in HSBC in Great Britain. Supervisory authorities 
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concerning the division of powers and responsibilities within colleges and 
there was no coercive instrument to settle disputes between national 
supervisory institutions in relation to one financial institution; sometimes 
there were also disputes about who should be the main supervisor in cases 
of international mergers.  
A relatively important change for supervisory colleges was the 
modification of relations between home and host supervisory authorities 
brought about by the amendment to the CRD III directive. 182 National 
supervisors are obliged to close co-operation within colleges. Such colleges 
are established mandatorily for all major financial institutions. To put in a 
different way, the authority which is in charge of European consolidated 
groups183 as the main supervisor must found a supervisory college and 
inform ESAs of its activities. The colleges are not composed solely of 
supervisory authorities from the countries where major financial institutions 
have their subsidiaries, but also of supervisory authorities from countries 
where major institutions have their important branches. 
Consequently, one of the main tasks was the definition of what 
constitutes the notion of an ‘important branch’. A host supervisory 
authority can use this label, thereby becoming part of the supervisory 
college established by the main supervisor for the given international 
financial institution.  Simultaneously, the home supervisory authority is 
obliged to inform others of any exceptional situations regarding the 
financial institution. The home and host supervisory authorities also need 
to reach an agreement when they determine the capital requirements of 
European consolidated groups and their members above the minimum 
level. 
Formerly, there used to be problems with settling disputes within colleges 
of one financial sector (within the competence of ESAs now). To settle 
 
from Great Britain, the USA, Canada, France, Hong Kong and Switzerland used to meet 
regularly in order to exchange information about HSBC.  The Federal Reserve, the FSA 
and the Swiss Federal Banking Commission meet every six months to discuss the 
transactions in the UBS and Credit Suisse. Cf. MCCARTHY, C. How should international 
financial service companies be regulated? [online] 2004 [qtd. 18th June 2017] Available at: 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2004/sp196.shtml>.  
182 Directive 2009/111/ES of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16th 
September 2009 amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC, and 2007/64/EC as 
regards banks affiliated to central institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, 
supervisory arrangements, and crisis management, par. 3 
183 European consolidated group is a group in charge of European banks and European 
financial holdings.  
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cross-sector disputes (financial conglomerates doubling as banks and 
securities traders are no exception) there is the Joint Committee of ESAs. 
If one national supervisory authority disapproves of another authority’s 
conduct, ESAs intervene as a mediator setting a time limit to find an 
agreement. If the negotiations fail, ESAs issue a binding decision stating 
what a given authority must do or what it must refrain from doing. Only 
then can ESAs issue a decision addressed to a specific financial institution, 
providing that the national authority again fails to comply with the 
previous decision. 
Solving problems is the major point of the current legal basis that filled a 
void in the Lamfalussy process. Co-operation with supervisory colleges does 
restrict itself to just that, though. ESAs’ role includes maintenance of 
consistent and coherent functioning of colleges – ESAs’ representatives can 
be present at college meetings as observers, they can demand all relevant 
information, they can ask a college for revision of a decision that results in 
incorrect application of Union law or does not contribute towards 
supervisory convergence, they can initiate and co-ordinate stress tests, etc.184 
 
Union law enforcement – binding individual decisions  
As I suggested above, the main point of the reform was the newly-
acquired power to issue binding decisions—an instrument of law 
enforcement. This competence is the first to give EU bodies the 
possibility of functional supervisory power over supervisors and market 
participants.185 It is worth pointing out that this competence is about 
supervision of member states’ supervisors and it is only possible to issue 
binding decisions in more serious cases. 
Similarly, one needs to realise that these decisions do not overturn 
decisions of national supervisors; they employ the direct impact effect (as is 
characteristic of Union law) as, according to the ESA Regulation, they are 
given priority over all the previous decisions made by relevant bodies in that 
particular case.186  
 
184 HUSAR, M. Diplomová práce. Dohled Finančních institucí v EU. Brno, 2013. 117 p. 
Masarykova univerzita, Ekonomicko – správní fakulta. Vedoucí práce . Dalibor Pánek. p. 
56. 
185 MOLONEY, N. I. Reform or revoluton? The Financial Crisis, EU Financial Markets 
law, and the European Securities and Markets Authority. International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly, 2011, Vol. 60, Issue 2. p. 532.  
186 ESA Regulation, art. 17 par. 7; art. 18 par. 5. 
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As regards the Czech Republic, we might ask whether the CNB should 
enforce the decisions it did not make (they were made by ESAs). ‘To solve 
this we should look at art. 291, par. 1 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (hereinafter as the ‘TFEU’), which says that member 
countries are obliged to take any internal legal measures necessary to adopt 
binding Union acts. Decisions issued by ESAs are, as a matter of fact, 
specification of obligations stated in the Union directive on the basis of 
which it is issued. In other words, to breach this decision is simultaneously a 
breach of the directive, the observance of which the CNB checks. If 
individual ESAs’ decisions are breached, the CNB is authorised to impose 
sanctions according to Czech law’.187  
Every addressee of ESAs’ decisions can ask for their revision; that is why 
the Board of Appeal was established (as demonstrated in the table above 
showing the structure of ESAs). The right to appeal belongs not only to 
addressees but to anyone who is directly affected by the decision. The 
Board of Appeal can then return the case to the relevant ESA body with a 
legally binding resolution or it can uphold the decision. The second way to 
defend oneself is to lodge a complaint with the Court of Justice of the 
European Union pursuant art. 263 of the TFEU; or, in case of inaction on 
the part of ESAs, one can lodge a complaint pursuant art. 265 of the TFEU. 
The appellate procedure is relatively weakly regulated; e.g. there is no 
definition of grounds for appeal to the Board of Appeal, which, in my view, 
means that one can use any reason (if sufficiently relevant). 
It is exactly the chance to appeal against ESA decisions or to lodge 
complaints to the Court of Justice that represents a considerable step 
towards fully fledged supervision with a considerable amount of judicial 
responsibility.  
Generally speaking, if a national supervisory authority infringes Union 
law (if the directives are not applied properly or are not applied at all), the 
relevant state is held responsible for it. If this infringement is not rectified 
or set right in line with Union law even after the European Commission has 
issued a statement, there is no other option for the Commission but to 
bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union 
pursuant art. 258 of the TFEU (lawsuit for inaction). Only a member state 
can be sanctioned. 
 
187 HERBOCZKOVÁ, J. Dohled nad evropskými finančními trhy v rukou Evropské unie. 
Dny práva – 2010 – Days of Law [online] 2010 [qtd. 2nd August 2017] Available at: 
<http://www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/dny_prava_2010/files/prispevky/04_finance/Herbo
czkova_Jana%20_(3664).pdf>. p 12. 
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The chance to issue legally binding individual decisions is an interesting 
and highly innovative federal feature, one of the first of its kind in this area. 
The ESA bodies, however, face the problem of binding restrictions which 
restrict the field of activity for making decisions. Consequently, we should 
not overrate this new instrument of Union law enforcement. On the other 
hand, since I consider myself to be a supporter of federalism in the EU, I 
entirely count on the fact that the means of Union law enforcement will be 
enlarged, at least by slimming down the limits restricting the use of binding 
individual decisions. 
 
Union law infringement 
If such a situation happens (Union law infringement by a national 
supervisor188), ESAs have, before the European Commission lodges a 
complaint, one more mechanism at their disposal to enforce the law. Firstly, 
they investigate the alleged law infringement and then they suggest measures 
to be taken by the given national supervisor. If this fails to bear fruit, the 
European Commission can issue a formal statement about the matter. If the 
supervisor’s measures are still inadequate, ESAs can demand proper 
reaction from the given financial institution. This can only happen if Union 
law is, in the given case, directly applicable to financial institutions 
(especially as far as regulations and technical norms are concerned) and 
what ESAs demand is necessary for the maintenance of competition in the 
market or of the financial system stability.  
In this particular case I hold the view that the conditions for the use of 
this instrument (i.e. that ESAs can actually demand adequate response from 
a specific financial institution) are too restrictive and should partially be 
done away with. To restrict this instrument to directly applicable law and, at 
the same time, to protection of competition or the stability of the financial 
system is so limiting that the use of this instrument is practically purely 
theoretical. In my opinion, it would be beneficial to leave out the condition 
of direct applicability of Union law to financial institutions, which would 
open the door for the instrument. 
 
Mediation between national supervisory authorities 
Another reason for issuing a binding decision is mediation between national 
supervisory authorities.189 After the initial phase of conciliation, ESAs have 
 
188 Art. 17 of the ESA Regulation. 
189 Art. 19-20 of the ESA Regulation. 
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the power to take measures that are binding for national supervisors. If 
these measures are ignored, ESAs can address them to financial institutions 
directly. These measures are given priority over those adopted by national 
supervisors. Nonetheless, the main task for ESAs is to fulfil the role of a 
mediator rather than to issue a wealth of binding decisions.   
Disputes between national supervisory authorities often occur within 
supervisory colleges, when host supervisory authorities unsuccessfully 
attempt to make home supervisory authorities act. In this respect, one may 
entertain the interesting idea of prompt corrective measures, for example in 
favour of colleges of regulators.  
In the USA this practice has been in existence for two decades in the field 
of banking supervision. Prompt corrective measures can be defined as 
regulations which are to be adopted if there is a slump in the bank capital. 
Their application in the EU was advocated for example by David Mayes190, 
who stated that the introduction of prompt corrective measures would 
provide an answer to a breach of the capital adequacy directive. Mayes also 
expressed his view that this type of action would be useful if prudential 
management in banks showed fundamental defects. It was suggested that 
the adoption of prompt corrective measures should be within the 
competence of supervisory colleges and that their main beneficiaries would 
be countries where foreign banks dominate. Host authorities would not 
need to fear that that their own banking system would break down because 
of a home supervisor’s passivity, since the home supervisor would have to 
intervene in case the health of a banking group deteriorated.191 
 
Decisions in emergency situations 
Effective problem solving may be realised upon the initiative of a body co-
ordinating national supervisory authorities; among others it may be a 
recommendation from the ESRB. An emergency situation may be declared 
by the ECOFIN Council after it has received a request from one of the 
following institutions: the European Commission, the ESRB, or a national 
supervisory authority. Also, the ECOFIN Council may not declare it 
without having consulted the case with the particular institution that 
submitted the request.192 After the emergency situation is reported to the 
 
190 MAYES, D., G. Early Intervention and Prompt Corrective Action in Europe. Bank of 
Finland Research Discussion Papers, No 17/2009. 
191 JUROŠKOVÁ, L. Bankovní regulace a dohled, Praha: Auditorium.2012. pp. 96-97. 
192 WYMEERSCH, E. The institutional reforms of the European Financial Supervisory 
Systém, an interim report. In Ghent Univ. Financial Law Institute Working Paper No. 2010-01.  
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European Parliament and the European Commission, the decision is then 
revised every month: it might be renewed or cancelled by the ECOFIN 
Council or it might expire. 
Emergency situation decisions193 are individual decisions addressed to 
national supervisory authorities asking for specific response. If the response 
from the given national supervisory authority is not adequate and if no 
explanation (demanded by ESAs) is offered, the subsequent procedure is 
the same as in case of a breach of Union law (cf. above).  
Binding decisions in the abovementioned cases are only applicable in 
cases of ensuring compliance with EU law or when an emergency situation 
has been declared. This rather restricts the applicability of these measures. 
The process of an emergency declaration may appear overly complicated; 
on the other hand, it is a non-standard case with possible interventions into 
national sovereignty so the complicated process of declaring an emergency 
situation is understandable. There’s no denying that binding decisions are 
another step to strengthening centralised supervisory powers in the EU: a 
step from national to European supervisory authorities.   
 
Supervisory limits 
Every member country can make use of protective measures if it thinks 
that an ESA decision threatens its fiscal power. This limit to the 
application of direct decisions is motivated by attempts to maintain and 
protect the crucial principle saying that member countries have exclusive 
power in their fiscal policies. 
It is possible to apply this protective measure if ESAs make a decision in 
an emergency or in its role of a mediator. A member country can then claim 
that the decision makes an impact on its fiscal responsibility; it must let 
ESA know that it is not going to obey the decision, thereby suspending the 
decision. If there is uncertainty surrounding the case and if the given 
national supervisory authority and the European authority dispute over it, it 
is the Council that issues a final verdict binding for both parties. The verdict 
is reached through a qualified majority. Of course, the Council is composed 
of member countries; therefore the power of ESAs might be endangered 
since the Council’s verdict may be based on politics rather than expertise. 
 
[online]. 2010 [qtd. 29th May 2017]. Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1541968> p. 17. 
193 Art. 18 of the ESA Regulation. 
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‘Many analysts agree that this is a cumbersome procedure, and one in which 
national interests are likely to prevail against the common good’.194 
A general problem (mentioned here a few times already) is the limits to 
the use of individual decisions in all three cases of Union law enforcement, 
which are, to my mind, extremely restrictive. Again, it is a compromise in 
need of revision to make it meaningful (i.e. to make it applicable in 
practice). Presently, it is not very likely that these decisions will ever be 
applied; they will remain purely theoretical unless their applicability 
becomes far easier and the limits to their use are significantly deregulated. 
Only then will it be possible to say that the EU is on the way to federalism.  
    
The assessment of the ESFS reform 
With the benefit of hindsight after the reform based on the De Larosiere’s 
report started, it is now easier to assess the pros and cons of it. I dare say 
that because of the immense scope of several dozens of international 
financial institutions and because of their influence not only in the area of 
financial markets, it is in the public interest that the supervisory powers 
become centralised. Initially, it was a bold move executed shyly, largely due 
to some member countries and their political interests which prevented full 
centralisation of supervision. The reform does introduce flexible 
identification of problems of international financial institutions, but it 
somewhat ignores the conditions for prompt and co-ordinated intervention 
on the part of regulators and supervisory authorities. I am convinced, 
though, that had it not been for the financial crisis, this reform would have 
been realised in a far less centralised way, if at all. Hence, we might say that 
the financial crisis, along with the great number of problems it caused, was 
also beneficial to a certain extent, in so far as it triggered a move that should 
ideally enhance economic stability in the future. Possible future crises shall 
never be prevented completely; yet, the establishment of the ESFS should 
increase readiness and enable quicker reactions to problems, thereby 
softening the negative consequences (even though the main instrument to 
achieve this remains the same: more effective international communication 
and co-ordination). Without a doubt, this is a big benefit of this system of 
international supervision. 
 
194 FITZGERALD, S. The reform of financial supervision in Europe. Institute of 





The establishment of the ESFS can be considered the initial step towards 
creating a ‘supervisory architecture’ package in the area of finance.195 It is 
one of several steps taken in reaction to the financial crisis. Generally 
speaking, with the ESFS having been created, supervision was directed 
towards a more dynamic and centralised form in the whole of Europe; still, 
the reform was to continue: the next step was the realisation of direct 
financial market supervision in the EU. 
The first step in creating a new form of supervision saw the introduction 
of supervisory authorities within the ESFS with only that competence 
which allows direct intervention in financial market activities as a last-resort 
instrument only.196 The reasons behind this were chiefly political and legal. 
Daily financial supervision was left in the hands of national authorities on 
a decentralised basis in accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. The new European authorities do not replace the national 
ones; they merely supplement them. At this stage of the reform, the centre 
of direct supervision is still in the competence of national supervisory 
authorities, including international disputes, which are conducted via the 
liability of home and host supervisory authorities and a supervisory college 
(even though ESAs now have a new power regarding settling disputes). This 
is a rather sensitive area and to reach a consensus between the European 
Commission and member states is far from easy; that is why we should 
consider the first step as a positive one, in spite of the absence of direct 
supervisory power. Thus, I believe that the result brought by the ESFS is 
the maximum that could possibly have been reached—it was the first 
curtailment of sovereignty and exclusive powers that supervisory 
authorities, up until then, had had. It was later possible to carry on and, in 




195 FAHEY, E. Does the emperor have the financial crisis clothes? Reflections on the Legal 
Basis of the European Banking Authority. In Modern Law Review, 2011, vol 74(4), pp. 581-
595. [online] 2011 [qtd. 29th May 2017] Available 
at:<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1715524> p. 581. 
196 FERRAN, E. Understanding the New Institutional Architecture of EU Financial 
Market Supervision. In FERRARINI, G., HOPT, KJ and WYMEERSCH, E. (Ed), 
Rethinking Financial Regulation and Supervision in Times of Crisis. Oxford University Press, 2012. 
p. 151. Also in University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 29/2011. 
[online] 2010 [qtd. 31st May 2017]. Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1701147>. p. 41. 
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Capital adequacy as the pivotal area of macro-prudential supervision.  
 
Although this book does not aim to analyse individual regulatory rules, it is 
necessary to include a small digression into the area of regulatory 
integration, namely into capital adequacy, which will complete the picture of 
supervisory integration. This will centre on the banking sector as it is the 
most important part of the financial market. Moreover, banks are those 
financial institutions that often get involved in the other areas of the 
financial market as well. In other words, there is a universal model of 
banking (sometimes together with securities traders), whose regulation is an 
intriguing supplement. The reason why capital adequacy regulation is so 
vital is the fact that supervisory authorities (whether it is at the European or 
national level) supervise the pre-set rules for the amount of capital in 
individual institutions, thereby carrying out macro-prudential supervision 
and reducing the danger of failure of one or more financial institutions—
with some likely impact on stability of the entire system, too. 
The capital adequacy principle aims to eliminate risks which every 
financial institution unavoidably faces and which can never be eliminated 
completely. Risks may potentially lead to losses; it is, however, crucial that a 
loss does not affect the creditors and that each institution should be able to 
cover it using its own sources only, i.e. its capital. Each risk is quantified and 
its possible loss is assessed—the size of the loss is called a capital 
requirement. The aggregate of capital requirements thus corresponds with 
the amount of risk the given institution faces and the aggregate must be 
equal to or lower than the capital of the financial institution.197 Capital 
adequacy thus refers to the demands for the amount and quality of the 
capital with regard to the risk undertaken by the financial institution. 
As far as law is concerned, capital adequacy is dealt with by means of 
three pillars. In mutual co-operation they should enhance the financial 
stability of the system. The first pillar states the formula for calculating 
capital adequacy along with minimum capital demands. These include the 
minimum credit risk, market risk and operational risk that financial 
institutions undertake. The second pillar involves supplementary 
supervisory activities for individual financial institutions. Each institution 
should assess the risks it undertakes and set the capital demands 
accordingly. This is revised and checked by the supervisory authority that 
can order higher capital demands than what the first pillar orders. The third 
 
197 ZEMAN, D. Regulace bank. Prezentace na kurzu příprav na zkoušky zvláštních 
insolvenčních správců. Praha: 24.2.2015. pp. 4-5. 
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pillar aims to strengthen market discipline by determining what information 
must be made publicly available.  
 
1. Basel I  
Since the middle of the 20th century there have been inequalities among 
banking institutions because of various legal bases of regulation in 
individual countries (not only European ones). Because the competition is 
international, banks from countries with less strict regulatory rules gained an 
unfair advantage—their operational costs, for instance, were lower.  
These inequalities were the reason why the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS)198  was created. It was comprised of central bank 
governors from the G-10 countries.199 This committee reached its ultimate 
goal in 1988 when it issued the Basel Capital Accord (Basel I) signed by all 
G-10 governors. It was the first international agreement as far as financial 
risks and their regulation were concerned. This document determined 
capital adequacy: banks were asked to hold capital equal to 8% of their risk-
weighted assets. This concept only involved credit risk, therefore a proposal 
to add market risk was approved in 1993. Market risk involved three kinds 
of risk: interest rate risk, currency risk, and equity risk. 
Having been instructed in a series of recommendations, the EU issued 
directives that member countries gradually incorporated into their legal 
systems. The most important directives seem to be the Capital Adequacy 
Directive200 and the Investment Services Directive,201 in effect from 1st 
January 1996, whose aim was creation of the single capital market.202 Capital 
adequacy was later imposed on investment companies and securities traders 
as well—they had had less strict regulatory rules than banks up until then. A 
 
198 It is rather an informal institution that should provide a discussion forum to promote 
co-operation among financial supervision institutions (central banks). It operates under the 
BIS (the Bank for International Settlements). Also shortened to the Basel Committee. Cf. 




199 Comprised of the following countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the USA.  
200 The Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD I) 93/6/EEC 
201 The Investment Services Directive  (ISD) 93/22/ EEC 
202 In the CR the ISD was implemented by Act No. 256/2004 Coll., Capital Market 
Undertakings Act.  
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new directive called Capital Adequacy Directive II (CAD II) 203 was issued in 
1998 and it also took into account market risk. 
 
2. Basel II 
Gradually (mainly with new technologies having been invented) Basel I 
turned out to be insufficiently flexible; furthermore, new risks emerged with 
increasing influence on financial markets (e.g. the operational risk) which 
cannot possibly have been accounted for in Basel I. 
It was necessary to draw up a new document to remove the 
imperfections in Basel I. A new Basel accord was approved in 2002.204 Apart 
from credit and market risks it also mentioned the need of a capital 
requirement for the operational risk. In addition, the mechanism of 
individual ratings prevailed, allowing banks and traders to choose the best 
method for calculating their capital requirements according to investment 
services they offer. 
Basel II increased the demands for risk management and also enhanced 
market discipline by stipulating certain demands on banks and traders 
regarding information to be made publicly available (e.g. information about 
shareholders, strategies and mechanisms of reducing risks etc.). Basel II was 
implemented into Union law by two directives, known as the CRD,205 
affecting banks, credit unions, electronic money institutions and securities 
traders. The directives were to be implemented by 1st January 2007. In 
reaction to the financial crisis the CRD was revised and later replaced by the 
CRD II, which is comprised of three directives.206 Apart from some 
 
203 CAD II consists of three directives: 98/31/EC, 98/32/EC, and 98/33/EC.  
204 Implemented into the legal system of the CR by regulation no. 123/2007 Coll., 
stipulating prudential rules for banks, credit unions, investment firms.  
205 Capital Requirements Directive was comprised of the Directive 2006/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14th June 2006 relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions and the Directive 2006/49/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14th June 2006 on the capital adequacy of 
investment firms and credit institutions. 
206 Directive 2009/27 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
certain Annexes to Directive 2006/49 / EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council as regards technical risk management provisions 
Directive 2009/83 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending certain 
Annexes to Directive 2006/48 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards technical risk management provisions 
Directive 2009/111 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directives 2006/48 / EC, 2006/49 / EC and 2007/64 / EC as regards banks affiliated to 
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technical amendments, the new document amends the relations between 
home and host supervisory authorities (by establishing supervisory 
colleges—see above), it makes use of hybrid calculations of Tier 1 capital207, 
it changes the rules for involvement and, last but not least, it amends the 
demands for securitisation and liquidity risk management. 
The CRD III208 later introduced an increase of demands for the capital, 
implementation of suitable mechanisms of remuneration and possible 
interventions from supervisory authorities.   
A new set of rules created by the BCBS was announced on the 16th 
December 2010 and it came to be known as Basel III.209 Demands for 
capital adequacy were increased, new rules for weighting risk of assets was 
introduced, countercyclical banking activities were regulated, the leverage 
ratio was introduced, and banking liquidity management was strengthened. 
The definition of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1), Tier 1 capital210 and 
supplementary capital Tier 1 were made stricter. Capital buffers were 
introduced (the build-up of capital reserves in good times that may be used 
 
central institutions, certain capital items, large exposures, supervision and crisis 
management 
207 These are financial instruments falling under Non-core Tier 1 capital with hybrid 
characteristics of stock and debt instruments marking the boundary between the capital and 
the debt. What is necessary is their long-term character and its ability to cover losses while 
maintaining complete serviceability. 
208 Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital 
requirements for the trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of 
remuneration policies. 
209 This set of regulations aims to improve the existing regulation, supervisory rules and 
mechanisms of risk management in the banking sector. The first version of Basel III was 
issued by the BCBS at the end of 2009 and it left a three-year period to fulfil all the 
demands.  Originally, the implementation process was supposed to take place between 
2013 and 2015; yet, changes in effect of the 1st April 2014 put the process back to the 31st 
March 2018. Cf. Česká asociace pro finanční řízení (CAFIN), Basel III (zvýšená regulace 
bank) CAFIN.CZ [online]. 2014 [qtd. 8th June. 2015]. Available at < 
http://news.cafin.cz/slovnik/basel-iii-zvysena-regulace-bank>. 
210 According to art. 4 par. 1 section 118 of the CRR Directive the term ‘capital’ refers to 
the total of Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 is part of the bank’s capital, it is a total of: paid-up core 
capital listed in the List of Company Registers, paid-up share premium account, mandatory 
reserves, other profit reserves (without those with a special purpose), retained earnings 
brought forward after taxation, the profit in the process of approval minus the expected 
dividends, normal period profit minus the expected dividends and tax deductions. Tier 2 is 
part of the bank capital comprised of reserves (up to 1.25% of the risk-weighted assets 
/RWA/), the subordinated debt A (up to 50% of Tier 1), and other capital funds. Cf. CNB. 




in periods of stress) as well as intensification and improvement of banking 
supervision with more effective ways of releasing information.  
It was not only the BSCB that played the key role in finding solutions to 
the financial crisis and subsequently influenced the revision process of Basel 
II. Other important players were supranational entities like G20 
representatives and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which is an 
international organisation, authorised to promote financial stability by 
observing and issuing recommendations concerning the global financial 
system.211  
 
3. Basel III 
According to Basel III standards, the minimum capital requirement does 
not change: it remains at 8% of risk-weighted assets. The standards, 
however, do change two other requirements: the minimum level for 
Common Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) increases from 2% (Basel II) to 4.5% of 
RWA and the minimum level for Tier 1 increases from 4% (Basel II) to 6% 
of RWA. Other Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital are not given any minimum 
limits; nevertheless, it is clear that the total of Tier 1 (CET1 + other Tier 1) 
and possibly also Tier 2 is min. 8% of RWA. 
Basel III introduces two new capital buffers: fixed and variable. The fixed 
Capital Conservation Buffer should reach 2.5% of RWA. The variable 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer should always remain in the region of 0% to 
2.5% of RWA depending on the economic cycle. 
The capital conservation buffer demands require that the banks should 
keep the core Tier 1 capital at least at 2.5% of RWA and it should also be 
higher than the minimum capital requirement (8% of RWA).  
 
211 The FSB was established in April 2009. It was transformed from the Financial Stability 
Forum (FSF). (Financial Stability Forum) under the authorisation of the G20 countries. It 
consists of the representatives of national supervisory authorities, ministers of finance, 
international financial institutions, central banks representatives from developed countries 
and big developing countries alike.  Its members include economically influential countries 
(the USA, Great Britain, Spain, Germany, Italy, France, Switzerland, the RSA, China, Hong 
Kong, Canada, Australia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Japan), big developing 
countries (Argentina, Brasil, Russia, India, Turkey, Indonesia), the EU represented by the 
European Commission and the ECB, international institutions (the BIS, the MMF, the 
OECD, the World Bank), institutions authorised to set standards (the BCBS, the CGFS, 
the CPSS, the IASB, the IAIS, the IOSCO). Cf FSB. Member Institutions Financial 




The Countercyclical Buffer is used to reach a macro-prudential goal: it 
should protect the banking sector from periods of excessive indebtedness 
(credit financing). This capital buffer is only applied in cases of heavy 
indebtedness, which leads to extensive accumulation of systemic risk. If 
applied, the Countercyclical Buffer is seen as an extension to the scope of 
the Conservation Buffer. Its height may change over time and its 
implementation depends on ‘national’ circumstances.212 
The protection of the banking sector does not entail only making sure 
that banks remain solvent even during periods of stress—with the help of 
the minimum capital requirement and the capital conservation buffer. The 
main aim seems to be making sure that the banking sector has enough total 
capital at its disposal to sustain the credit flow in economy without casting 
doubt on its solvency even during periods when the entire financial system 
goes through much stress and indebtedness is rapidly increasing. This 
should help reduce the risk of credit loans restricted by regulatory capital 
requirements, which could put economy in jeopardy and result in further 
credit loss in the banking system.213 
As far as liquidity is concerned, Basel III introduces two new indicators, 
the aim of which is to ensure that banks have enough liquid assets. The first 
one is called the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (the LCR) and it assesses short-
term liquidity. It means that banks need to possess enough high-quality 
liquid assets to cover their total net cash outflows over 30 days. The second 
one is called the Net Stable Funding Ratio (the NSFR) and it assesses 
liquidity for more than one year. The value of these ratios should never be 
lower than one. The new leverage ratio introduces the ratio of Tier 1 capital 
to the total of on- and off-balance sheet items. The final value should be 
higher than three. The objective is to prevent an excessive increase in on- 
and off-balance sheet leverage.214 The final configuration of the LCR and 
the NSFR has not been stated yet—the European Commission should 
determine the NSFR by the end of the year 2016 (with the demands coming 
 
212 Basel Committee. Press release, 12th September 2010: "Group of Governors and Heads 
of Supervision announces higher global minimum capital standards". 
213 Basel Committee, 16th December 2010: "Guidance for national authorities operating the 
countercyclical capital buffer". 
214 Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems - 




into effect at the beginning of 2018) and the final calculation215 of the LCR 
is expected during autumn 2015 (in June 2016 it is still not known though).  
In accordance with Basel IIII new requirements are being implemented 
gradually and they should not come into full effect before the 1st January 
2019, when the capital adequacy should reach the total of 10.5%. The 
capital which does not meet the conditions for Tier 1 capital or 
supplementary Tier 1 capital should be eliminated by the end of 2023. 
On the 8th December 2011 EBA issued a recommendation to all EU 
member countries in which it asks that the 71 top banks in the EEA should 
have the CET 1 capital at the level of 9% by the 1st July 2012.216 According 
to this recommendation member countries themselves can, to a certain 
degree, determine the basis for the calculation of this demand.217 The 
European Commission stated that the two special demands (for systemically 
important banks) and other special demands springing from the evaluation 
from supervisory authorities according to Pillar II will be placed above the 
minimum regulatory demands and the demand for the capital reserve. This 










215 The minimal LCR requirements will be implemented gradually according to the CRD 
IV. They should reach the maximum on the 1st January 2018. Cf. Finanstilsynet. Risk 
outlook and Financial Trends for 2015. April 2015. p. 30. 
216 EBA press release – a formal recommendation by the Board of Supervisors of EBA, of 
8th December 2011, which asserts that national supervisory authorities should require that 
the biggest banks strengthen their capital position by building exceptional and temporal 
capital reserves in comparison with the state debt evaluation so that they reflect market 
prices in September that year. In addition, banks will have to create exceptional and 
temporal capital reserves to ensure that the ratio of Tier 1 capital reaches the 9% level by 
June 2012.  
217 EBA Recommendation on the creation and supervisory oversight of temporary capital 




Diagram no. 2. The overview of the structure of the capital in Basel III and CRD IV 
 
 
Total represents min. 8% of the capital comprised of the total of Tier 1 (CET 1 min. 
4.5% RWA + other Tier 1 = min. 6% RWA) and possibly Tier 2.   
SIFI is an abbreviation for ‘systemically important financial institutions’. SIFI surcharge 
may be added to the capital requirement for these institutions.  
Pillar 2 represents the national supervisory authority’s possibility of increasing the 
height of capital requirements. 
Source: European Commission (CRD IV – Frequently Asked Questions, 
MEMO/11/527, 20th July 2011). 
 
The CRD IV directive is implementation of Basel III standards for 
credit institutions and investment firms218 into Union law. It is actually the 
third revision of the Union directive on capital requirements. This new 
legal basis consists of demands concerning financial health, liquidity 
management in financial institutions (the Capital Requirements 
Regulation219), and also rules including the national regulation of 
 
218 The CRD IV uses the general term ‘institution’—in the definition found in art. 3, par. 1, 
section 3 it refers to the art. 4, par. 1 section 3 of the CRR, where institution is defined as a 
credit institution or an investment firm.  
219 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, which forms the basis of the single European 
aggregate for all institutions (capital requirements, capital ratios, the mechanisms for 
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certification for would-be credit institutions together with capital 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms (the Capital 
Requirements Directive IV). The way of harmonisation stated in the 
directives was always seen as the minimum; in other words, member 
countries were given the freedom to toughen up rules along with the 
option to choose from different variations of rules or to avoid the 
application of some rules. This may lead, to a certain degree, to 
considerable inconsistency of capital requirements across member states 
and to emergence of obstacles for international credit institutions and 
investment firms. This was done away with thanks to the Banking Union 
(see below) and the implementation of the Single Rulebook. It must be 
stressed though that the EU is still relatively young and not homogenous 
enough; therefore, it is hardly possible to eliminate all the national 
differences across the EU.  
This directive also asserts that if an institution fails to meet the 
requirements of capital buffers220, the national supervisory authority may 
take action, e.g. it might restrict the institution’s right to pay dividends to its 
shareholders or bonuses to its employees. Among other things, institutions 
are also asked to create a capital conservation plan if they do not satisfy the 
demand of combined capital buffers.221 The actual amount of 
countercyclical capital buffer is determined by the national supervisory 
authority, which must present an instruction how to calculate the buffer 
every three months. The amount of countercyclical buffer is based on the 
credit-to-GDP ratio and its deviation from the long-term trend; 
alternatively, other indicators might be used, but all the data must be 
released to the public. These rules apply to all financial institutions active in 
the given country, including bank branches licensed in a different country. 
 
calculating capital requirements, liquidity rules, mechanisms for calculating leverage ratio). 
Capital Requirements Regulation (hereinafter the ‘CRR Regulation’).   
220 Art. 142, CRD IV asserts that if institutions do not meet the combined capital buffers 
demands, within five days they must submit a capital conservation plan, which must be 
approved by the home supervisory authority. The plan must provide an estimate of 
earnings and expenses, the expected accounting balance, measures to strengthen the capital 
shares, and, finally, it must state by when it expects to meet the capital requirement 
demand. If the authority does not deem the plan adequate, it may order the institution to 
increase its capital to a certain limit for a certain period of time; alternatively, it may also 
order a more restricted pay-out of dividends than art. 141, CRD IV maintains. The 
government’s task is to intervene in the initial phase if the institution breaks (or is likely to 
break) the rules stated in the CRD IV directive. 
221 The CRD IV directive explains the combined buffer requirement in chapter 4, section 1, 
article 128, part 6. It says that the combined buffer requirement ‘means the total Common 
Equity Tier 1 capital required for the capital conservation buffer extended by an institution-
specific countercyclical buffer, other buffers, or a systemic risk buffer’. 
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If the home country’s countercyclical capital buffer is higher than 2.5%, the 
host supervisory authority will decide whether the given institution will 
observe the higher figure or whether it will only have to meet the 2.5% level 
(like all domestic institutions). The ESRB assesses the amount of capital 
buffers and the instructions for their determination (including the necessary 
materials for it); the ESRB is also the body that issues recommendations as 
to how to determine the quarterly amount of countercyclical capital buffer 
in individual EU countries.  
Among other things, Pillar II gives national supervisory authorities 
considerable power to stipulate other requirements than the minimum 
capital requirements for national institutions or conglomerates of 
institutions which undertake a high amount of risk. They may take such 
action based on their supervisory activities which assess whether individual 
institutions are in accordance with Union banking law; they also assess the 
risks undertaken by financial institutions and the risks these institutions 
pose to the financial system. Having assessed the situation, the authority 
decides, for example, whether the sources and their quality is sufficient to 
ensure healthy risk management regarding the risks undertaken by the 
institution and the risks the given institution poses to the system. If the 
supervisory authority finds out that an institution faces higher risk, it may 
order the institution to hold more capital. When making such decisions, the 
national supervisory authorities should take into account the impact of their 
decision on the entire financial system and its stability (not only in the 
particular country but in all the other member states). The supervisory 
authorities may extend their demands to other types of institutions whose 
activities fall into the same category or whose activities undertake or pose 
similar risks.222  
Foreign bank branches must comply with the Pillar II demands stated by 
the home supervisory authority. It is also possible to introduce special 
supervisory demands within Pillar II (including capital requirements) for 
institutions that face or pose similar risks. This enables national supervisory 
authorities to introduce special requirements for bank groups that have a 
low risk weight for mortgage loans.  
As far as other non-credit institutions are concerned, this area underwent 
a similar process of harmonisation by means of the MiFID directive223 and, 
 
222 European Commission, 20th July 2011: "CRD IV – Frequently Asked Questions, 
MEMO/11/527). 
223 The Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21st April 




also, the MiFID II224 directive for capital markets and the Solvency II 
directive225 for insurance.   
In the field of capital market regulation the two documents the MiFID II 
and the MiFIR226 regulation— implemented in 2017227 can be seen as another 
resolute attempt to promote uniformity on the part of the EU; this time the 
aim is to create the European Capital Market Union (the CMU). The 
European Commission presented a consultation material for the CMU (called 
the ‘green book’) on the 18th February 2015. The European Commission has 
long tried to build a single market; likewise, another of its priorities is the 
creation of the capital market union for all member countries. The reason 
behind these attempts is the fact that the industry and commerce (particularly 
in small or medium sized businesses) is largely dependent on the finances 
coming from the banking sector—unlike in the USA, where the capital 
market is more developed. The Capital Market Union is a big project 
involving a high number of regulations, many of which have already been 
approved. These include, above all, the MiFID II, the Market Abuse 
Directive228/MAR229 directive, and the EMIR directive.230 231   
At present, there is a lot of work going on to implement the directives 
and regulations, often called the ‘level 2 rules’. A novelty is the existence of 
more organised markets for financial instruments with a view to increasing 
their transparency and effectiveness. Securities traders that have internal 
 
224 Directive 2014/65 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 
2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Directives 2002/92 / EC 
(hereinafter „MIFID II“). 
225 The Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25th 
November 2009 on the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance 
(Solvency II). 
226 Regulation (EC) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 
May 2014 on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 
648/2012. 
227 The obligation to implement MiFID II for EU Member States was established by 
3.1.2017 and effective from3.1.2018. MiFIR is directly effective from 3.1.2017. In the 
Czech Republic, this Directive and the Regulation were implemented by Act No. 204/2017 
Coll., Which amended in particular Act No. 256/2004 Coll. on the capital market business 
with effect from 3.1.2018. 
228 The Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16th 
April 2014 on criminal sanctions for market abuse (Market Abuse Directive). 
229 Regulation (EU) No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16th 
April 2014 on market abuse (Market Abuse Regulation).  
230 Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4th 
July 2014 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation). 
231 Fynanstilsynet Risk outlook and Financial Trends for 2015. April 2015. p. 47. 
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pairing systems for orders at their clients’accounts will have to possess a 
license like a multilateral trading system. There is also a new type of 
organised market places to trade other financial instruments than those of 
the actual capital, e.g. bonds and derivatives. Since trading derivatives of 
commodities is frequent (especially as far as electricity is concerned), new 
definitions of financial instruments are invented along with new licensing 
exemptions in order that entities trading this way are forced to possess the 
securities trader’s license. Furthermore, information prior to and following a 
transaction must be released for all types of financial instruments in 
organised markets with a view to increasing transparency. There are also 
limits to the size of a transaction in derivatives of commodities—the limits 
are stated by national supervisory authorities along with ESMA. MiFID II 
enhances protection of investors—they have wider access to information, 
particularly prior to entering the business. There are also special 
requirements for independent consultancy—the testing procedure for 
would-be investors has been made stricter and there are special 
requirements that govern receiving rewards from other parties (than the 
client). Higher demands have been introduced to ensure the best possible 
conditions are offered at the current market price. National supervisors and 
ESMA have been authorised to ban or restrict the distribution of certain 
financial instruments. The ban can be temporary or permanent. The sale of 
structured products is governed by requirements for proper performance of 
activities according to the MiFID II directive.  
Apart from capital adequacy for financial institutions, the new regulation 
brought about new rules in accounting, remuneration, and paying dividends; 
it also affected rating agencies and introduced new prudential rules. None of 
these, however, appear to be as significant as capital adequacy regulation, 
which is, in my opinion, the crucial feature of macro-prudential regulation 
and supervision—consequently, it has been covered in such a detail in this 
chapter. Its significance is well illustrated also by the amount of Union 
legislation in reaction to the financial crisis and to the ongoing development 
of financial markets in general.  
What also appears to be positive is harmonisation of private-law 
relations, in particular as regards the provision of credit loans—up until 
2014 only short-term consumer credit loans were regulated in legislation232; 
there was, however, no harmonisation of mortgage loans. The situation 
improved in 2014 with the directive on credit agreements for consumers 
 
232 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23rd April 2008 on credit 
agreements for consumers and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC.   
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relating to residential immovable property.233 Member countries are obliged 
to implement this legislation into their own system by 21st March 2016. 
Mortgage loans are an important part of economy particularly as regards 
financial market stability. Their significance was acutely felt during the 
financial crisis in the USA, where loans were covered by immovable 
properties which were impossible to sell or were strongly overvalued. The 
profit from their sale was therefore not big enough to cover the loans. 
This directive is also of great importance because it provides the stepping 
stone for member countries to create standards for granting loans to acquire 
residential immovable property. It is also important because of its impact on 
supervisory and prudential requirements, including requirements for the 
establishment of credit intermediaries, appointed representatives and non-
credit institutions, and for their supervision.234 Among other things, it 
introduces the obligation to assess the client’s creditworthiness before a 
loan is granted. The standards required are the minimum that member 
countries must accept—they may approve even stricter ones. 
To assess the Basel standards (Basel I, II, and III), which brought about 
the abovementioned European legislation, is to a great extent a rather broad 
question that aims to set regulation in such a way as to maintain protection 
 
233 Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4th February 
2014 on credit agreements relating to residential immovable property and amending 
Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010; in effect 
since 20th March 2014. The preamble states that member countries’ laws are in this area 
(including that of supervision) radically different, thereby creating obstacles and lowering 
the quality of cross-border activities (both supply and demand). As a result, competition is 
limited and the providers’ loan costs are higher. The financial crisis showed that if financial 
market participants behave irresponsibly, it may shake the very foundations of the financial 
system and it may result in a total loss of confidence in it on the part of consumers. 
Needless to say, the social and economic consequences of this are very grave. Many 
consumers lost their confidence in the financial sector and loans became unbearable for a 
lot of debtors, which in turn increased the number of delayed payments and enforced sales. 
Better rules for the provision of loans to acquire residential immovable properties should 
help to eliminate such negative features. The European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union are convinced that it is highly desirable to create a perfectly harmonised 
legal framework in this area, the benefits of which should be a smoothly functioning 
internal market with a solid consumer protection in mortgage loans and a great deal of 
certainty that institutions providing such services (i.e. mortgage loans) behave 
professionally and responsibly.  
234 GLOGAR, M. Směrnice o smlouvách o spotřebitelském úvěru na nemovitosti určené 





for the whole financial system and, at the same time, to avoid over-
regulation.  
The initiatives behind the Basel agreements are absolutely clear: initially, 
the aim was to set right the imbalance between banks from countries with a 
lot of regulation and countries with little regulation. The first international 
financial risk regulation took place. Gradually, a need to cover a wider 
spectre of risks placing higher demands on risk management occurred along 
with the need to promote market discipline. Regulatory rules were then 
toughened up by Basel III, which is currently still in use.  
Basel I was too shallow—it did not reflect the true state of financial 
market affairs and we might say its imperfections can be attributed to the 
fact it was the very first attempt. Basel II’s impact on the financial market 
and its needs was more significant and Basel I did not really bear 
comparison with it in terms of quality and improvement. Unfortunately, 
Basel II still displayed some gaps—e.g. a complete lack of liquidity 
management rules, which is truly important as the financial crisis fully 
revealed in 2007 and 2008. Though Basel III did away with the gaps and 
imperfections found in the two previous documents, we need to ask 
whether its regulation is still feasible and whether it is not too demanding 
and complicated. Needless to say, Basel III entails higher demands on banks 
and their capital, which might eventually lead to an increase in price of 
banking products and fees. All in all, though, I am sure that Basel III is still 
a transparent and feasible enough way of regulating capital requirements. It 
might not guarantee automatic financial stability, but it does lower the risk 
of economic and financial instability. It is possible, indeed quite likely, that 
Basel III will be updated in the future as new times always bring new 
innovations to which regulation must react. It is, nonetheless, necessary to 
respect the naturalness of an economic cycle which can never be fully 
regulated and each regulatory rule should always maintain enough freedom 





THE BANKING UNION 
 
The process of integration of financial market supervision could be viewed 
as a process of changes in the system of financial market supervision 
following the financial crisis. The first step was the de Larosière report 
(analysed above). I would call the report just a preparatory document for 
the real integration, because the powers of the ESFS bodies were rather 
restricted and the direct application of supervisory competence on financial 
market activities was perceived as the ultimate goal (and, frankly, a rather 
extreme one as well). Nonetheless, this first step provided the momentum 
for more dynamic, real and direct supervision in Europe. The reform of the 
system is going on, though—the second step is now under way, in which 
direct supervision across Europe is being constituted: it is called the 
Banking Union.235 
Attempts to establish the Banking Union can be interpreted as a reaction 
to a growing feeling of distrust of the banking system in the Eurozone 
brought about by the collapse of a number of important international 
banking groups from the Eurozone, whose recovery during the recent 
financial crisis turned out to require substantial public expenditure.236 The 
Banking Union was the main answer to financial problems in Europe that 
the field of financial policies offered; yet, it can never be considered a true 
union or an association of banks. I use the capital letters in the phrase as I 
consider it the official name of a project for long-term and intensive 
activities of the EU in the field of financial market supervision. 
 The financial crisis in the Eurozone gradually turned into a debt one. It 
was clear that a deeper integration of the banking system is desirable 
particularly in those EU countries that had accepted the euro as their 
currency, since these countries were even more close-knit and dependent on 
each other. That was the main reason why the Banking Union was 
established according to a plan devised by the European Commission. The 
 
235 The establishment of the European Banking Union with single oversight and resolution 
of banks in the Member States of the euro area created the new legal framework of the 
European financial safety net and European financial market law. See more 
JURKOWSKA-ZEIDLER, A. Banking union: European Union's impact on system of 
financial law in: System of financial law : financial markets : conference proceedings, ed. Jiří 
Blažek, Brno : Masaryk University, 2015, Publications of the Masaryk University, 
theoretical series, edition Scientia, file no. 516, pp. 130-147, Web of Science:  
https://www.law.muni.cz/sborniky/system-of-financial-law/financial-markets.pdf  
236 Ministerstvo financí ČR. Studie dopadu účasti či neúčastí České republiky v bankovní 
unii – shrnutí. 9th February 2015. p. 1. 
119 
 
EU bodies reached an agreement to create a single supervisory mechanism 
and a single banking mechanism. The Banking Union concerns mainly the 
Eurozone countries, but countries outside it can also join in.237  
As I have stated above, the Banking Union is the second (and far more 
important) step towards integration of supervision, because before it was 
established, prudential supervision had been carried out by member 
countries; consequently, supervisory mechanisms and rules differed 
substantially, which was a major obstacle to establishing a single internal 
market with a genuine chance to deal with possible risks.238  
The financial crisis incurred considerable public money expenses to 
recover banks and other financial institutions or to deal with their complete 
bankruptcy. As member countries dealt with the crisis on their own, they 
naturally did so in a number of different ways, thereby increasing 
fragmentation of the single market of financial services. This subsequently 
contributed towards the disruption of real economy. The public support of 
‘bail-out’ from the public funds was an unprecedented attempt to save what 
could have been saved, but the EU now endeavours to disrupt the links 
between the solvency of banks and the indebtedness of individual member 
states, thereby doing away with public financing of financial institutions’ 
debt. From October 2008 to October 2011 the European Commission 
approved a 4.5 trillion euro’s worth of help for financial institutions.239 Even 
at the very start, the Banking Union did include joint insurance of deposits, 
a single supervisory mechanism, joint rules for the supervisory authority and 
a rescue fund in case a systemically important banking institution is 
threatened with insolvency.  
In June 2012 the then President of the European Council Herman Van 
Rompuy delivered a report called Towards the Genuine Economic and 
Monetary Union,240 in which he calls for more attention to be paid to three 
 
237 EU single market, Banking union. European commission. [online]. European Commission 
[qtd. 25th October 2017]. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/banking-union/index_en.htm>. 
238 WYMEERSCH, E., The European Banking Union, a first analysis, In Financial Law 
Institute Working Paper Series WP 2012-07, [online]. 2012 [qtd. 31st  May 2017]. Available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2171785>. p. 3. 
239 MACHELSKI, T. Banking resolution as an economic intervention. Dny práva 2012. 
Sborník z vědecké konference. Brno: Masarykova Univerzita 2013. p. 2. 
240 Towards the Genuine Economic and Monetary Union. Ecb.europa.eu [online]. 2012 
[qtd. 31st May 2017].  Available at < 




areas (or visions): the integrated financial framework, the integrated 
budgetary framework, and the integrated economic policy framework. 
The Banking Union is essentially an integrated financial framework 
resting on three pillars. 
- The first one is the Single Supervisory Mechanism (hereinafter the 
‘SSM’),  
- the second is the Single Resolution Mechanism (the ‘SRM’),  
- the third one is the Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme (the ‘CDGS’).  
They are based on several European directives and regulations.241   
These pillars are supplemented by the Single Rulebook, which provides a 
single set of harmonised prudential rules that must be respected by all 
institutions within the EU. It is, in fact, a unified aggregate of norms for the 
 
241 Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15th October 2013 conferring specific tasks 
on the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of 
credit institutions (hereinafter the ‘SSM Regulation’) 
 - European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 1022/2013 of 22nd October 
2013 amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2013 establishing a European Supervisory 
Authority (European Banking Authority) as regards the conferral of specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank pursuant to Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013.   
- Regulation (EU) No. 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16th April 2014 
establishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
between the European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national 
designated authorities (hereinafter the ‘SSM Framework Regulation’)  
- Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th May 
2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 
2012/30/EU and 2013/30/EU, and Regulations (EU) No. 1093/2010 and (EU) No. 
648/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council. Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (hereinafter the BRRD Directive’) 
- Regulation (EU) No. 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15th 
July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No. 1093/2010 
(hereinafter the ‘SRM Regulation’).  
- CRR Regulation.   
- Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit 
institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, which implements Basel III into Union law. 
Fourth Capital Requirements Directive (hereinafter the ‘CRD IV Directive’).  
- Directive 2014/49/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 




banking sector. It consists of Union regulations and directives accompanied 
by harmonising and implementing technical norms approved by the 
European Commission and prepared by EBA.242 
The Single Rulebook prudential rules are evident, in my opinion, in 
several areas of the Banking Union. They include capital requirements for 
banking institutions (in particular the CRR, CRD IV, and Basel III), the aim 
of which is to strengthen the ability of the EU banking sector to survive 
periods of economic uncertainty, to improve risk management, and to 
ensure standard lending during periods of economic recession. They also 
include recovery and resolution mechanisms of crisis management of credit 
institutions according to the BRRD Directive. Last but not least, there is 
also a system of deposit insurance, which is compulsory in all EU member 
states. All the rules are accompanied by technical norms (the RTS and the 
the ITS) drawn up by EBA and approved by the European Commission, 
along with general rules of EBA and supplementary documents. These are 
arguably the most important European rules applied in all EU member 
countries (i.e. not only in the Eurozone or just the Banking Union). 
Needless to say, the single aggregate of rules is one method of ensuring 
consistent application of the legislative framework of banking regulation 
across the EU. Ideally, it should ultimately bring about financial (economic) 
stability within the EU.  
I do not consider the Single Rulebook another (fourth) pillar of the 
Banking Union243; it seems to be a structure of rules applicable inside as well 







242 KÁLMÁN, J. The reform of financial supervisory system of the European Union. 
International relations Quarterly, Vol. 5. No. 2 (Summer 2014). p. 9. 
243 A different opinion is voiced by e.g.. TOMŠÍK, Vladimír. Bankovní unie: „One Size Fits 
All?“. Cnb.cz [online]. 2012 [qtd. 9th June 2015]. Available at: 
<http://www.cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/pro_media/konference_projevy/vystoupeni_projevy/
download/tomsik_20121029_cep.pdf>. p. 13. He says here that the Single Rulebook 
created by EBA is the fourth pillar of the Banking Union. I believe, though, that it includes 
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Union law and the legal framework for the Banking Union 
 
As far as the Banking Union and its legislative framework according to 
Union law are concerned, the SSM Directive is based on article 127(6) of 
the TFEU, which within the Maastricht Treaty enabled the assignment of 
supervisory authority to the ECB. 244 The SRM Regulation is then based on 
article 114 of the TFEU, i.e. the common core of internal market 
legislation.245 The SRM Regulation is crucial in so far as it establishes a 
supranational authority: the Single Resolution Board. Since EU primary law 
does not recognise such a body, there were some serious reservations raised 
concerning article 114 of the TFEU as the legal basis for the Single 
Resolution Board. These reservations were dealt with by the statements of 
11th September 2013 and of 7th October 2013 of the legislative commission 
of the Council of the European Union along with the decision of the Court 
of Justice of the EU  C 270/2012 of 22nd January 2014. It was eventually 
proposed to drop the decision making power originally envisaged in two 
 
244 This article of the TFEU was, as a matter of fact, first used as late as in 2011, when it 
was used as the legislative basis for the establishment of the ESRB.   


















ways: decisions would either be made by a primary-law EU body (i.e. the 
European Commission or the Council of the EU) or there would be further 
specification of the powers of the Single Resolution Board (which would 
curb its wide margin of discretion). Ultimately, the real decision-making 
body is the Single Resolution Board and primary-law EU bodies can raise 
objections to individual decisions. 
Interestingly enough, the supranational resolution board is not stipulated 
explicitly in EU primary law. It is anchored in the SRM Directive, i.e. in a 
set of regulations for legislative harmonisation. Article 114 of the TFEU is a 
legal anchor of harmonisation—it does not include regulation of the 
European Commission’s authority over the internal market; it only discusses 
health, safety, environment protection and consumer protection issues. That 
is why it does not seem apposite to consider this article the legal basis for 
delegation of authority from the European Commission to the Single 
Resolution Board, providing this body should, together with the 
Commission, participate in crisis management of banks or banking groups 
in a way enabled by administrative discretion.246 
The SRM Regulation also establishes the Single Resolution Fund (under 
the Single Resolution Board but financed via a special document called the 
Intergovernmental Agreement of 21st May 2014; hereinafter the ‘IGA’).247 
The SRM Regulation was supplemented by more harmonising EU legal 
norms approved during the same period (although some of them were 
originally produced even before the establishment of the Banking Union). 
Article 114 of the TFEU also served as the legal basis for the CRR 
Regulation, the CRD IV Directive, the DGSD Directive and the BRRD 
Directive, which stipulates and harmonises special rescue schemes for 
banks in all EU member countries and it also sets up national resolution 
authorities and national resolution funds.248 
 
246 ČUNDRLÍK, L. Právny rámec riešenia krízových situácií úverových inštitúcií v EÚ jako 
bazálny inštrument predchádzenia finančnej nestability. In Finančné a sociálne aspekty 
dlhovej krízy z pohľadu ekonómie a práva. Bratislava: Ekonomický ústav SAV, 2014. 
S 204-226. p. 7. [Makroekonomické aspekty dlhovej krízy – pripravenosť krajín čeliť 
novým výzvam vedecká konferencia. Bratislava, 18th September 2014]. 
247 The Intergovernmental Agreement was signed by 26 member countries (all EU 
countries with the exception of Sweden and Great Britain). In the accompanying 
declaration they stated that they intended to ratify the agreement in such a way as to enable 
the establishment of the Single Resolution Fund by the 1st January 2016. Member countries 
outside the Eurozone that signed the agreement will have to accept the rights and 
obligations only when they join the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single 
Resolution Mechanism. 
248 VÉRON, N. Europe´s radical banking union. Bruegel essay and lecture series. Brussels: 
Bruegel. 2015. p. 11. 
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I am certain that the main benefit and the main raison d’etre of the 
Banking Union is not actually supervisory integration but rather creation 
and maintenance of the single market. The former is, of course, an 
absolutely indispensable instrument that facilitates reaching the goal to 
which the EU and its economic policies direct the effort: the creation of a 
real and effective single market. Supervisory integration (also in the form of 
the Banking Union) aims in particular to maintain stability of the single 
market, which can only really work after its protective measures have been 
implemented and tested in real life—one of such measures is also 
supervisory integration via the Banking Union. Solvency and confidence in 
banks are undermined by disruption in economic competition and by 
political excesses in member countries—the Banking Union is determined 
to eliminate such negative phenomena.     
 
Pillar 1 – The Single Supervisory Mechanism 
 
The proposition to create the Single Supervisory Mechanism was officially 
presented on the 12th September 2012 and later approved by the Council 
comprised of the ministers of finance ECOFIN on 12th December 2012. It 
was called the Banking Union, which was not supposed to come into 
existence in one single step but it was supposed to be built gradually. That is 
what happened. 
The SSM proposition presumed that the complete banking system of the 
Eurozone countries will be realised under the direct supervision of the 
ECB, which would, however, have been unacceptable for the majority of 
the countries involved. There was a compromise to be arrived at—the 
direct supervision of the ECB will be realised only over systemically 
important financial institutions, or rather important249 credit institutions 
 
249 The notion of importance is linked with the size of the bank—the number of assets, its 
influence on the EU as well as the national economy, the importance of cross-border 
transactions, etc. More specifically direct supervision will be realised in case one of the 
following criteria is met: the total number of assets is worth 30 billion EUR; the ratio of 
total assets to the GDP of an EU member is higher than 20% (not applicable if the total 
number of assets is worth less than 5 billion EUR); Having notified the national 
supervisory authority, the ECB labels a particular bank as important;  the ECB upon its 
own initiative labels a bank as important if the bank has subsidiaries in more EU countries 
and cross-border assets or bonds form the majority of their assets or bonds; if a bank has 
asked for or received financial support from the EFSF or the ESM; or, regardless of the 
criteria above, a bank is one of the three biggest banks in a particular member country.   
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(banks), which, however, cover over 85% of the banking assets250 in the 
Eurozone through 123 banking groups251, anyway. Supervision of the other 
banks will be carried out by national supervisory authorities with the option 
to delegate the power to the ECB, if it accepts it. EU emergency funds are 
supposed to offer help to banks in trouble directly and the ECB assumes 
the main supervisory tasks such as granting and revoking the licence, 
supervising risk transactions, issuing directives and recommendations, 
issuing binding decisions along with effective supervision, monitoring and 
enforcing the observation of capital requirements for banks according to 
the CRD Directives252, performing supervision on a consolidated basis and 
sharing supplementary supervisory tasks over financial conglomerates. The 
ECB also possesses a relatively wide range of investigative competence as it 
can impose administrative sanctions, assess mergers and credit institutions 
acquisitions.253  
National supervisory authorities are responsible for the less important 
supervisory tasks such as everyday supervision, consumer protection, 
supervision of money laundering, payment services and setting up branches 
from third countries—they must comply with directives and regulations 
issued by the ECB.  
The newly-established Supervisory Board was created as the executive 
body supposed to fulfil tasks and to perform decision-making activities 
within the SSM, supported by a completely new administrative structure. 
The ultimate decision maker within the SSM is, however, the Governing 
Council of the ECB as is stipulated in the TFEU treaty. The Supervisory 
Board does not have decision-making power as such; it rather does 
 
250 The criterion of total assets suggests that 32% of the banks are French, 22% are 
German, 14% are Spanish, 10% are Italian and Dutch and 13% are from the remaining 
Eurozone countries. There are 3520 less important banks, 48% of which are German 
(1688), 16% are Austrian, and 15% are Italian.   
Source:  VÉRON, N. Europe´s radical banking union. Bruegel essay and lecture series. Brussels: 
Bruegel. 2015. p 15. 
251 NOUY, D. The European banking landscape – initial conclusions after four months of 
joint banking supervision and the main challenges ahead, speech delivered at ‘SZ Finance 
Day’ in Frankfurt, 17th March 2015. 
252 The setting of higher or supplementary capital buffers according to Basel III or the 
CRD IV: systemic risk buffer and counter-cyclical buffer.  
253 More info about the SSM is in ELLIS, F. , VALIA SG B., The European Single 
Supervisory Mechanism. In University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper 10/2013, 
[online]. 2013 [qtd. 2nd June 2017]. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2224538>, or 
NIKNEJAD, M. European Union Towards the Banking Union, Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and Challenges on the Road Ahead In European Journal of Legal Studies,  2014, 




preparatory work in supervisory issues of the ECB and it prepares draft 
decisions for the governing Council of the ECB. Apart from the 
aforementioned activities, the SSM Regulation also introduces detailed 
rules for separation of the supervisory function from the execution of 
monetary policies—the Governing Council of the ECB is actually the 
main decision-making body in both.254 We can liken its position to that of 
the CNB with its monetary and supervisory (financial market) tasks. 
The Supervisory Board started its activities at the beginning of 2014; as it 
is part of the ECB, its place of residence Frankfurt upon Main. It is to be 
found in a different building, though—a clear signal of its separation from 
the remaining parts of the ECB. The Supervisory Board consists of the 
Chair and the Vice-Chair, four ECB representatives and 19 representatives 
of national supervisors (1 from each country).255   
EBA also plays an important role within the SSM because it ensures 
effective and consistent implementation of the single set of rules in the 
banking sector. Moreover, it co-prepares stress testing for banks, carried out 
by the ECB, which co-ordinates stress testing in the whole of the EU.  
 
Pillar 2 – The Single Resolution Mechanism 
 
Unlike the USA, most European countries did not have any special crisis 
mode before 2008. Such modes were introduced in reaction to the crisis and 
they are now being modified so that the BRRD Directive can be 
implemented.256  
The single set of rules harmonised, to a certain extent, internal legal 
norms in member countries and there are now common instruments and 
powers that member countries can make use of. National supervisors, 
 
254 See the following for more information about the separation of monetary policy and 
supervisory functions: KÁLMÁN, J. Towards the European Federation Reform Processes 
in the Financial Stability System of the European Union, especially to the early concept of 
European Bank Union, In US-China Law Review, Vol. 10. No. 1. 2013, pp. 46-67. 
255 At the moment (January 2018) the Chair is Daniele Nouy, a former secretary general of 
the French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (the ACPR); the Vice-Chair is 
Sabine Lautenschläger, who is also a member of the executive board of the ECB, other 
members are Ignazio Angeloni, and Penti Hakkarainen. Two positions are vacant.  
256 VÉRON, N. Europe´s radical banking union. Bruegel essay and lecture series. Brussels: 
Bruegel. 2015. p. 11. 
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nevertheless, do have some freedom to decide how they will use them and 
in what way they will use domestic mechanisms of financing.257 
In comparison with the traditional insolvency proceeding, which is 
governed by national legal norms, Pillar 2 offers a more flexible and quicker 
way of tackling problematic situations during a crisis of financial 
institutions. The resolution approach to crisis management also takes into 
account the fact that it may take place before legal conditions for 
bankruptcy are fulfilled, thereby incurring less damage to creditors in the 
resolution mechanism (if compared with the insolvency proceeding). 
Having accepted the SRM, the EU had to reorganise and liquidate some 
credit institutions (in connection with the Directive 2001/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 4th April 2001 on the 
reorganisation and winding up of credit institutions). 
Insolvency (bankruptcy) proceedings are part of civil lawsuit and its 
legislation is part of civil procedure. Its distinctive feature is the fact that it 
combines action and execution proceedings; it settles disputes and it 
results in the settlement of assets among a number of entities, which is 
typical of some non-contentious suits. The objective of the proceeding is 
to settle property (asset) relations to entities affected by the debtor’s 
bankruptcy or insolvency and to satisfy proportionally the bankrupt’s 
creditors.258  
In the insolvency proceeding is employed either the principle of 
reorganisation (to put it simply, there is an agreement with the creditors to 
lower the debt burden) or the institution is liquidated (liquidation outside an 
insolvency proceeding or bankruptcy within an insolvency proceeding) and 
the losses are divided among creditors, or both. In any case, the creditors 
and shareholders do not get full coverage of their claims. Nonetheless, 
experience from several crises (e.g. the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy—the 
biggest bankruptcy ever) suggests that insolvency laws are not an effective 
way to deal with failures in financial institutions. They do not take into 
account the necessity to avoid disrupting the financial stability; they do not 
ensure the basic services nor do they provide enough protection for 
depositors. An insolvency procedure takes more time and if reorganisation 
is opted for, it entails lengthy negotiations and agreements with creditors 
 
257 The Single Resolution Mechanism.  The European Council. The Council of the European 
Union. [online]. [qtd. 7th June 2017]. Available at < 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cs/policies/banking-union/single-resolution-
mechanism/>. 
258 WINTEROVÁ, A. a kol. Civilní právo procesní. 6th revised ed. Linde Praha, 2011. 
pp. 592 – 598.  
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concerning potential losses of debtors and creditors connected with the 
delay, the costs and the outcome.259 
I would add that I consider reorganisation the most economical way of 
solving the problem of insolvency of financial institutions because it 
promises higher or equal satisfaction of creditors of the same rank when 
compared with bankruptcy (which is only a liquidating solution of a failure). 
Yet, the resolution mechanism of crisis management is overall more suitable 
and effective if it is actually applicable and applied in time. 
The traditional mechanism of insolvency could disrupt the bank’s 
capacity to provide clients with payment services, which could potentially 
lead to far-reaching economic consequences.260  
The Single Resolution Mechanism, created by this pillar of the Banking 
Union, is comprised of two crucial documents and one intergovernmental 
agreement. The IGA agreement has been discussed above in connection 
with the legislative framework of the Banking Union and its relation to the 
resolution fund. This intergovernmental agreement of May 2014 regulates 
some special rules including the system of operation and financing of this 
fund—it is primarily financed by the banking sector. The two documents 
are the BRRD Directive supplemented by the SRM Regulation. These two 
documents determine the basic operation of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (planning, well-timed interventions, resolution objectives – 
remedial solution to crises, a set of instruments to be applied in order to 
achieve the objectives etc.) with its adequate organisational-institutional 
arrangement. This pillar consists of the Resolution Board and the 
Resolution Fund, established by the SRM Regulation. The BRRD Directive, 
on the other hand, opened the door to the establishment of national 
resolution authorities and national resolution funds. 
National resolution authorities are endowed with powers to apply 
resolution instruments and to execute resolution power. They can be set up 
within the central bank, a ministry or even another public institution 
established with the same aim. Resolution funds are established as bodies 
that should finance the resolution policy. The resolution board is authorised 
to decide which resolution instrument to apply in a particular emergency 
situation.  
 
259 Services of European Commission Directorate General Internal Market, Discussion 
paper on the debt write-down tool – bail-in (A working document), Brussels 2011, p. 2. 
260 MACHELSKI, T. Banking resolution as an economic intervention. Days of Law 2012. 
Conference Proceedings. Brno: Masarykova Univerzita 2013. p 3. 
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EBA play an important role, too, for its task is to create binding technical 
norms, instructions and reports regarding the main areas of remedial 
mechanisms and the crisis management of banks.  
 
1. Single Resolution Board (the SRB)  
 
It is an institution with legal personality, which is located in Brussels and 
was established at the beginning of 2015. It became fully operational on 1st 
January 2016. The head of the board is the Chair and there are also the 
Vice-Chair and 4 other members.261  The SRM is responsible for 
centralisation of most of the decision-making process and powers of 
resolution (rescue) measures for insolvent credit institutions (or for those 
credit institutions where insolvency is about to happen). This board plays a 
key role if insolvency has happened or is about to happen because it accepts 
decisions to ensure resolutions of failing banks with minimum costs to 
taxpayers. It is essentially an administrative parallel of a judicial ruling 
declaring insolvency. The SRB is directly responsible for creating and 
realising resolution plans for important banks and is also responsible for all 
resolutions (regardless of the size of the bank) if it is necessary to use 
money from the SRF. It is ultimately responsible for all banks in the 
Banking Union and it can therefore exercise its powers towards any bank. 
In the true sense of the word they are not single and separately acting 
bodies (unlike the Supervisory Board within the SSM) since they must co-
exist with domestic measures to organise and finance the process of 
resolution; in other words, they must strongly co-operate with national 
resolution authorities. 
The resolution board has completed the first phase (January 2015-1st 
January 2016) 262 of creating resolution plans, gathering information and co-
operating with national resolution authorities. At present, it is in the second 
phase, which started on the 1st January 2016 and the SRB is now fully 
operational with a complete set of resolution powers and responsibilities.263 
The final stage will be completed when the transfer and mutualisation of 
contributions to the SRF are applicable according to the Intergovernmental 
 
261 At present, the Chair is Elke König, the former president of the German supervisory 
authority (BaFin), the Vice-Chair is Timo Löyttiniemi and other members are Antonio 
Carrascosa, Mauro Grande, Joanne Kellermann and Dominique Laboureix. 
262 Cf art. 99 par. 3 of the SRM Regulation, which says: the provisions relating to the power 
of the Board to collect information and cooperate with national resolution authorities in 
order to create resolution plans shall apply from 1st January 2015. 
263 A provision relating crisis management, timely interventions, regulations and 
instruments to solve crises, including the involvement of shareholders and creditors.  
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Agreement, which must, however, be ratified by all the participating 
countries first.264  
Mutualisation refers to the process of making use of financing 
mechanisms in member states when solving a crisis at the level of a group. 
A general contribution is paid first through the financing mechanism, which 
is then divided among individual domestic financing mechanisms. The 
financing mechanism is then a system consisting of the national resolution 
fund, other states’ financing mechanisms, possibilities of lending money 
between financing mechanisms of member countries and mutualisation of 
financing mechanisms of member countries.265 
 
2. The supranational Single Resolution Fund (the SRF) 
This institution is going to be used to solve crises in banks which find 
themselves on the verge of bankruptcy with all the other options having 
been tried. Another condition is that the shareholders and private creditors 
have contributed to the recovery attempts. This authority is financed by 
banking institutions and its whole creation takes eight years (i.e. it started in 
2016 and the end is scheduled to 2024). The funds available in the SRF 
should reach at least 1% of covered deposits of all credit institutions of the 
Banking Union member countries. It is expected that the fund will have 
about 55 billion EUR at its disposal. Individual contributions of each bank 
will be calculated according to the ratio of the total amount of its liabilities 
(excluding the capital and covered deposits) to the aggregate liabilities (again 
excluding the capital and covered deposits) of all the credit institutions 
authorised in the participating member countries. The calculation process 
will also take into consideration the risks taken by the given institution.266   
Contributions from banks will be received by the participating member 
countries via their national funds and then transferred to the SRF, which 
 
264 The Agreement will come into effect once it has been ratified by member countries 
taking part in the Single Supervision Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism, 
representing 90% of the total of votes of all participating member countries. This 
agreement has been ratified by all member countries apart from Sweden and Great Britain.  
265 ČUNDRLÍK, L. Právny rámec riešenia krízových situácií úverových inštitúcií v EÚ jako 
bazálny inštrument predchádzenia finančnej nestability. In Finančné a sociálne aspekty 
dlhovej krízy z pohľadu ekonómie a práva. Bratislava: Ekonomický ústav SAV, 2014. 
S 204-226. pp. 22-23. [Makroekonomické aspekty dlhovej krízy – pripravenosť krajín čeliť 
novým výzvam vedecká konferencia. Bratislava, 18th September 2014]. 
266 Single Resolution Mechanism. European Council [online] 2014 [qtd. 6th June. 2017]. 




will be activated only if the principles stipulated in the BRRD Directive 
and the SRM Regulation are observed and if shareholders and private 
creditors take part in the recovery plans. These national funds should 
gradually, during the eight-year transition period, merge, while the 
contributions collected by each national fund will be shared as well. This 
transfer and sharing of finance from the national resolution funds is 
regulated by the abovementioned Intergovernmental Agreement (the 
IGA). Before the SRF has enough finance, the system of financing is 
ensured by thanks to domestic funds based on banking contributions, 
alternatively from the European Stability Mechanism. Another option is to 
transfer money from one national resolution fund to another; if that 
happens, the help is financed from the contributions coming from the 
banking sector.  
Since the beginning of 2016, 1/4 of the contributions has been 
transferred to the SRF. All countries participating in the Banking Union 
have contributed.267  
 
3. The resolution mechanism 
As far as the resolution mechanism is concerned, it is a co-operative effort 
of several bodies within the SRM: the ECB as the supervisory body within 
the SSM, the SRB consisting of national resolution authorities’ 
representatives from the participating countries (it prepares and issues 
resolution decisions), the European Commission and the Council of the EU 
(these two can raise objections to decisions made by the SRB; if the 
decision grants state support or support from the SRF, the Commission 
must supply a positive answer), and, last but not least, the SRF, which 
provides finance for the resolution policy.268  
 
267 The SRF has a total of 17.4 billion euros. See. Single Resolution Board. Press Release - 
Banking Union - Single Resolution Board collects € 6.6 billion in annual contributions to 
the Single Resolution Fund, now reaching € 17 billion in total. [online]. Published 
19.7.2017. Available from <https://srb.europa.eu/en/node/362>. 
268 Cf. art. 19, par 1 of the SRM Regulation: ‘Where resolution action involves the granting 
of State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU or of Fund aid in accordance with paragraph 
3 of this Article, the adoption of the resolution scheme under Article 18(6) of this 
Regulation shall not take place until such time as the Commission has adopted a positive or 
conditional decision concerning the compatibility of the use of such aid with the internal 
market.’ According to art. 19, par. 3, subparagraph 4 of the same document: ‘The 
Commission shall adopt a decision on the compatibility of the use of the Fund with the 
internal market, which shall be addressed to the Board’; (subparagraph no.7 deals with 
negative decisions by the Commission). According to art. 19, par. 10 of the same document 
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The ECB informs the SRB that there is a credit institution on the verge 
of bankruptcy. Even the SRF can make such a decision if it informs the 
ECB and the ECB does not react in any way. The SRB decides whether it is 
in the public interest to apply the resolution mechanism and whether it is 
possible to solve the crisis within the private-law sector. If the conditions 
are not met, the bank is forced into liquidation according to the local legal 
norms. In the opposite case, the SRB accepts a resolution mechanism 
deciding on the instruments to be used and deciding also whether to ask the 
SRF for help. If the European Commission or the Council of the EU do 
not raise any objections and if it is not necessary to raise the finance stated 
in the mechanism, the decision comes into force within 24 hours of 
approval. 
The Council of the EU appoints the SRB members; it determines which 
way the banking-sector contributions to the SRF are made and it raises 
objections to proposed resolution schemes that are supposed to deal with a 
crisis.  
The European Commission confirms decisions made by the SRB or it 
may raise an objection to some of their aspects, which the SRB was 
supposed to consider on its own. If the criterion of the public interest of 
the resolution is not met, or if the amount of finance to be used from the 
SRF has changed, the Commission suggests that the objection should be 
raised by the Council of the EU. If the resolution entails granting state aid 
pursuant to Article 107 of the TFEU or aid from the SRF, it can only be 
accepted once the Commission has adopted a positive or conditional 
decision regarding the compatibility of this aid with the internal market.  
National institutions of the participating member states are responsible 
for creating and accepting resolution plans of those banks which do not fall 
under the scope of the SRB. Decisions made by the SRB are addressed to 
national resolution authorities that put them into practice according to 
instructions issued by the SRB; in case these instructions are not followed 
properly, the SRB can address its decisions to failing banks themselves—in 
other words, the decisions affect the private sector directly.  
This way of solving crises originates in the fundamental principle of the 
Banking Union—it result to the fact that any negative consequences of 
bankrupt credit institutions will be borne by the credit institutions and the 
financial sector rather than by taxpayers. 
 
the SRB may adopt a different decision from the one of the Commission if exceptional 
circumstances justify it. In other cases the link to the Commission is not required.  
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The crucial aspect of the abovementioned mechanism is the creation of a 
single procedure to follow when dealing with international and systemically 
important banks. If there is a crisis, it is undoubtedly more appropriate to 
act identically and to apply the same procedure in all the countries where 
the institution is active—thus, one can avoid disparate decisions within the 
EU which result in longer delays and higher costs. Other benefits include 
restoration of confidence in the financial sector, less panic among 
depositors and, to a certain extent, prevention of diffusion of the crisis to 
those states which do not participate in the Banking Union. The mechanism 
ensures that banks are only a little dependent on the states and their 
budgets; as a result, any resolution adopted should only exert a marginal 
impact on the economy of the given state—in the past, the public method 
used to harm the real economy much more noticeably. The Supervisory 
Board is supposed to link the supranational resolution system with the 
system of supervision of the ECB with a view to centralising and unifying 
supervisory activities and potential trouble solving, which should bring 
considerable benefits to the single internal market and its financial services.  
The establishment of the Single Resolution Board (after the SRM 
Regulation came into effect on the 19th August 2014) and the coming into 
effect of the BRRD Directive (which, from January 2015 onwards provided 
the impetus to establish national resolution authorities) coincide, which 
creates the opportunity to find out the best way of co-operation between 
these two systems and to take into account the tried and tested methods for 
the establishment of national resolution authorities.269 
The SRM Regulation270 also anticipates the establishment of an Appeal 
Panel, which will arbitrate appeals against decisions made by the SRB.  
  
4. The BRRD Directive 
As it was mentioned above, it was no longer acceptable for failing banking 
institutions to receive support from public budgets since such support was 
essentially provided by taxpayers and it constituted a very heavy burden to 
the economy of a particular country. Naturally, the situation greatly 
undermined economic competition because the state provided 
unprecedented support to only those private institutions that had 
problems; problem-free institutions did not receive any finance and were 
thus disadvantaged, to put it another way, they were ‘punished’ for having 
 
269 Deposit Guarantee Schemes. European commission. [online]. European Commission [qtd. 
5th June. 2017]. Available at < http://srb.europa.eu/>. 
270 Cf. art. 85 and 86 of the SRM Regulation.  
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behaved more responsibly. This financial support is colloquially referred 
to as a ‘bailout’—financial help from the outside. Such help is, however, 
unacceptable and from the macroeconomic point of view also unbearable 
even if there is a real danger of systemic failures in economy potentially 
resulting in even greater public expenses should large financial institutions 
become insolvent (for instance the finance accumulated in deposit 
insurance funds would not suffice to ensure mandatory payments and 
states would have to support these insurance funds from public budgets 
again). 
These are the reasons for the resolution mechanism and the regulatory 
framework for crisis management of credit institutions271 (mainly banks, 
credit unions and securities dealers). The objective of the use of resolution 
instruments according to the BRRD Directive is the maintenance of vital 
functions of credit institutions. These vital functions include sets of 
indispensable services and operations whose disruption would upset 
financial stability in one or more EU countries and would disturb the 
services of macro-economic importance. Furthermore, the instruments are 
supposed to prevent negative systemic consequences of problems of credit 
institutions, such as crisis contagion. They strive to protect public financial 
funds, the clients’ finances, credit depositors and investors. As banks are, 
without doubt, the most important credit institutions, I from now on talk 
about banks even in cases where I talk about all credit institutions.  
This directive does not affect only the participating countries of the 
Banking Union—some provisions apply to all member countries (e.g. the 
obligation to set up national resolution authorities that are supposed to 
create resolution plans for crisis management, the obligation to set up 
national resolution funds, the obligation for all EU banks to prepare 
recovery plans). 
The BBRD introduces one extremely important instrument, namely the 
‘bail-in’—financing the resolution plan from the inside, sponsored by the 
shareholders and the main creditors. It is a way of motivating them to 
conduct business in a less hazardous manner as well as a way of forcing 
them to monitor the bank and to prevent any potential financial problems, 
which could possibly lead to financial loss for taxpayers. 
The underlying principle of this instrument is the involvement of certain 
people in sharing financial loss of the bank and in the subsequent 
 
271 ‘Credit institution’ is defined in point (1) of Article 4(1) of the CRR Regulation. A credit 
institution means an undertaking, the business of which is to take deposits or other 
repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account  
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resolution, too—the recapitalisation of internal sources of the bank through 
a very detailed hierarchy of loss bearers: the first are shareholders followed 
by creditors (the priority is assigned according to the size of their claims, at 
the top are senior creditors). Creditors of the same rank are treated in the 
same way (as far as bearing the loss is concerned)—no creditor can receive 
less than what they would receive in an insolvency proceeding and insured 
deposits are fully protected. The shareholders’ share may be partially or fully 
reduced (the so-called ‘haircut’); another option is to reduce the creditors’ 
claims (partial or full debt remission); alternatively, the claims may be 
transferred into business shares for the benefit of creditors, which actually 
results in that reduction of business shares of the shareholders. Only then 
can the national resolution fund step in, and it can finance the costs on its 
own; or, possibly, the finance may come from the SRF for the Banking 
Union members. The last resort is a theoretical possibility of finding 
financial support from public budgets if several criteria are met, as specified 
below. Typically, the statutory bodies and top executives are replaced, if 
their presence is not necessary for the objective of the resolution plan. The 
obligation to cooperate towards reaching the goal of the resolution plan 
applies to the original as well as the newly-appointed executives of the credit 
institution.  
International co-operation is an absolute must in case of banking groups 
whose activities reach beyond the EU. In this case there must be bilateral 
and multilateral agreements regulating co-operation among national 
resolution authorities and their opposite numbers in non-EU countries. The 
proposals for co-operation are submitted to the Council of the EU by the 
European Commission.   
The BBRD Directive deals with three phases:  
- the preventive phase,  
- the early intervention phase and  
- the recovery phase (in case of a failing bank) or the resolution phase (in 
case of an already insolvent bank) 
 
As for prevention, the newly-adopted feature maintains that all banks in 
the EU must prepare their own recovery plans which must be updated 
every 12 months. These plans include a detailed analysis of methods and 
regulations to be accepted in an unfavourable financial situation; they work 
with several variants of macro-economic and financial problems. These 




The authorised bodies together with supervisory bodies keep creating 
resolution plans. A resolution plan stipulates regulations that a particular 
body can adopt when dealing with a crisis; part of it is also an analysis of 
conditions on which a bank can apply for the use of central bank facilities 
and determine assets that should serve as insurance (not as a bailout, 
though).272 
As far as the early intervention and recovery plans are concerned, 
these are sets of regulations and powers given to a national resolution 
authority, which should intervene before the actual insolvency takes place. 
The situation is still solvable—for example via the so-called ‘soft-law’ 
instruments. In order to stabilise and recover an institution, the national 
resolution authority can ask for a reform or debt restructuring in co-
operation with the creditors. An early intervention is often used if a credit 
institution does not fulfil certain criteria of prudential business (e.g. capital 
requirements, liquidity rules, etc.) or if it is very probable that the rules will 
soon be violated because the liquidity situation is getting worse, the loans 
are not being repaid and there is a significant increase in other sources of 
financing. An early intervention and recovery plans attempt to keep the key 
banking transactions in operation and quickly stabilise the credit institution. 
 It is also possible to appoint a so-called special manager, who is 
essentially one of the crisis management instruments, but it is not a 
resolution instrument, which is why it is considered to be an early 
intervention instrument. Also, there is a question whether this would 
actually be a case of receivership for the given credit institution (the kind 
that a national supervisory authority can impose) or whether it would be 
parallel receivership; the question, in other words, might be: would the legal 
concept of receivership not lose some of its importance? While it is evident 
that these are two different instruments to deal with failing banks (the 
appointment is performed by two different bodies); yet, in some ways the 
activities of the special manager and the receiver overlap. It cannot probably 
cause any problems in the Czech Republic, where the local resolution 
authority is, admittedly, an independent body, but it exists within the CNB, 
and in that case it hardly matters whether it is receivership based on the 
current legal norms or an instrument imposed by the national resolution 
authority based on the BRDD Directive. 
 
272 NĚMEC, L., TORNOVÁ, J.  BRRD: Nová regulace krizového řízení bank. Bankovnictví 





The resolution phase273 is applicable if the problem of the bank is so 
grave that any recovery attempt is doomed; the national resolution authority 
may proceed in one of the following ways depending on the plans the bank 
in question has. It may: 
- sell part of its business activities – in the resolution phase it is 
possible to sell a partial or a complete number of shares or assets, rights, or 
third-party liabilities even without the consent of the statutory bodies or the 
bank’s shareholders. The profit from the transaction is paid, after the 
expenses have been deducted, to the shareholders involved; alternatively, in 
case of assets, rights and liabilities, the proceeds from the transfer are used 
to the benefit of the bank in the resolution phase. 
- set up a bridge bank –a bridge bank maintains the most important 
functions within the resolution phase (i.e. it must carry out a temporary 
transfer of assets to a public-owned entity—owned by one or more public 
authorities of the given country) so that the bank can fully recover or its 
liquidation may happen. What needs to be resolved, though, is the issue of 
the public-owned bank. Is the bridge bank supposed to have been 
established prior to the resolution process or can it be established ad hoc? 
The former seems to be the only viable option but this is hardly a popular 
choice. On the other hand, it is not possible to establish a bridge bank 
within a very short period of time due to all Union as well as national legal 
norms and regulations that must be observed so that an institution can 
receive a banking licence. This process typically takes at least a few months.  
- separate good from bad assets - depreciated assets of the 
institution in the resolution phase or in the bridge bank scheme can be 
transferred to an entity for asset management—this entity is again a public-
owned one that ‘consumes’ bad assets so that the bank can fully recover or 
it may be sold. This instrument is only to be used in combination with other 
instruments to avoid unfair competitive advantage for the failing bank.   
 - opt for a bail-in instrument -  as described above, the idea is to get 
shareholders and creditors involved in the process of resolution; to convert 
the debt to shares or to write the debt off. The loss should primarily be 
absorbed by the MREL capital reserve (see below). Subsequently, the loss 
affects the shareholders, whose shares are cancelled, transferred or their 
value is lowered. If the measures turn out to be insufficient, the debt may be 
converted and written off (primarily the subordinated debt) as the capital.  
 
273 Cf. Title IV of the BRRD Directive, where can be found resolution instruments.  
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The process of recapitalisation should involve as wide a spectre as 
possible of unsecured debts of the failing bank—exceptions include secured 
deposits, debts towards the employees, debts for goods, services crucial for 
the operation of the bank, and debts from the pension system.274 
 
The national resolution fund 
It is a body which comes into action as an instrument of prevention, early 
intervention as well as resolution. Every member country must create its 
own resolution fund financed by credit institutions. It can be used if these 
institutions experience serious problems. Each institution contributes to the 
fund according to its obligations and the risks it takes. The total amount of 
finance in the fund is the same as in the SRF: at least 1% of covered 
deposits of all credit institutions in a particular country until the 2024. The 
fund is maintained through regular contributions, one-off contributions, 
gaining money in the financial market, loans from other mechanisms of 
financing the process of resolution, provisions of recoverable financial help, 
and public budget grants.  
- National resolution funds provide temporary support to failing banks 
(loans, collaterals, the purchase of assets or provision of the capital 
for bridge banks); 
- They can only be used to compensate shareholders and creditors if 
the involvement of resolution creates a higher loss than what would 
have been caused in an insolvency proceeding according to national 
legal norms.  
- Under exceptional circumstances the fund can be used to absorb 
losses or to recapitalise banks.   
 
Financial help from this fund can actually be used only after the 
shareholders and creditors have incurred losses of at least 8% of the total 
liabilities of the bank. The help is then restricted to not more than 5% of 
the total liabilities of the bank. Only then, if the support proves to be 
insufficient and if the bail-in instrument has been used as well, is it possible 
to look for alternative ways of financing; e.g. in a situation where a wide 
 
274 NĚMEC, L., TORNOVÁ, J.  BRRD: Nová regulace krizového řízení bank. Bankovnictví 





recapitalisation on the part of the creditors would lead to financial 
instability. It is also possible to apply for public support (a bail-out) but only 
if all the other options have been tried and the amount of bail-in cover has 
reached 8%. Also, it can only happen under extraordinary circumstances 
and the approval from the European Commission is mandatory.  
 
The minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities - MREL 
In November 2014 EBA initiated a public consultation on draft regulatory 
technical standards (RTS) which lay down the minimum requirements for 
own funds and eligible liabilities (hereinafter ‘MREL’). MREL has been set 
up to prevent institutions from structuring their liabilities in such a way as 
to restrict the effectiveness of the bail-in instrument or any other 
instruments introduced by the BRRD Directive, in which it says that banks 
are obliged to fulfil ‘robust’ minimum capital and eligible liabilities 
requirements.275 The proposals made by the RTS also take into account the 
impact of the deposit insurance system and expenses on the resolution plan. 
Technical standards clarify how the capital requirements on institutions 
should be linked with MREL needed to absorb losses, and, if need be, to 
recapitalise banks after the resolution process has finished. National 
resolution authorities base their activities on the supervisor’s assessment of 
the amount of loss (to be absorbed by the bank) and the capital (needed by 
the bank to operate).  
National resolution authorities are supposed to lay down MREL in such a 
way as to ensure the execution of the resolution plan of a given bank. The 
crucial questions connected with this are how robust MREL should be and 
whether adequate MREL is to be determined by trial and error or rather via 
an expert analysis of a specific bank. It is the resolution plan that may state 
when (for which liabilities) it would not be feasible to opt for a bail in (albeit 
it would be legally possible).  In cases like this national resolution authorities 
must increase MREL or adopt other measures (e.g. a measure to change the 
order of liabilities in insolvency).  
It remains to be seen what change MREL is going to cause because 
specific requirements and rules for its calculation have not been issued yet 
and, naturally, there is less and less time for the institutions to create it 
 
275 EBA. EBA consults on criteria for determining the minimum requirement for own 





(the deadline is 2019). It is not possible to start working on it, though, 
without more specific instructions from the SRB.  
It is rather unnecessary that MREL is, to a certain extent, so specific; 
essentially, the document deals with what the FSB in co-operation with the 
BCBS276 stated for global systemically important banks (G-SIB)277 in the 
form of TLAC minimum standards (total loss-absorbing capacity) 
concerning the adequacy of the capital capacity for loss absorbing and 
recapitalisation. The TLAC standards should instil confidence into home 
and host supervisory authorities that the G-SIB has enough capacity to 
absorb loss—both prior to or during the resolution phase. They also allow 
resolution authorities to realise a resolution plan with minimum impact on 
financial stability while ensuring the continuity of basic economic functions. 
It is an instrument rather similar to MREL—the build-up of higher capital 
buffers with the aim of being ready to react to a crisis. Despite both capital 
requirements being rather similar and relying on identical principles, their 
realisation is different and they hardly overlap. European banks whose 
activities are global (e.g. Deutsche Bank, Barclays, Santander) need to build 
the capital buffer twice, thereby accumulating a really vast amount of capital 
that should see them through difficult periods.  
The BRRD Directive brings new and highly effective instruments and 
ways to solve problems. To a certain extent it destroys the traditional image 
of public financing as a means of being rescued if the situation gets from 
bad to worse. The traditional way of dealing with crises did not force 
leading representatives of credit institutions to behave responsibly enough. 
In other words, it did not provide enough motivation to ensure that the 
credit institutions maintain a balanced budget and they refrain from entering 
too risky business. 
Coppola278 has it that shareholders and creditors will always try everything 
they can to avoid using the bail-in instrument since they will not accept the 
loss connected with it. Coppola is convinced that the BRRD Directive, 
which imposes the loss on creditors rather than taxpayers, will eventually 
lead to a high number of lawsuits. In addition, there seem to be a lot of gaps 
 
276 Based upon the initiative of G-20 representatives at the summit in St. Petersburg in 
2013. 
277 At the moment there are 30 such banks, most of which are from Europe (or whose 
licence is based in an EU country). Cf. BIS. G-SIBs as of November 2014. [online] [qtd. 
22nd July 2017] Available at <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/gsibs_as_of_2014.htm>. 
278 COPPOLA, F. When bad banks fight each other. Forbes, 22.5.2015  [online]. 2015 [qtd. 





and exceptional circumstances as far bonds and shares are concerned which 
will undoubtedly prolong the lawsuits. This all will turn to be a very heavy 
burden for the structure of the EU. There have already been some cases 
where the bail-in instrument with cross-border application279 was used and, 
in all likelihood, there will soon be others (Italian and Greek banks). The 
biggest danger for the EU thus might be lawsuits following the application 
of the BRRD Directive and its bail-in instrument.  
I do not think, though, that the situation is going to be that serious. It is 
clear that every new regulation and every new instrument, particularly if it 
demolishes the good old ways, must necessarily arouse a great deal of 
indignation and an increase in media coverage and legal activity. It seems to 
me that these problems are nothing more than an unavoidable reaction 
surrounding the introduction of a new concept. It is all the more 
problematic since a certain group of people might incur substantial losses. 
This regulation, however, appears to be truly necessary in order to maintain 
a stable financial system in the EU and to support the existence of a single 
market. Once the European Court of Justice has been made a major 
decision surrounding the use of the bail-in instrument (particularly if the 
case is international and the practice of the courts clear up any hazy areas in 
the BRRD Directive), the practice will eventually absorb and establish this 
new piece of legislation. This new legal regulation will gradually be accepted 
by both credit institutions and the public and the amount of the 
shareholders’ displeasure connected with the bail-in instrument will 
eventually subside. The instrument will hopefully become so universal that 
creditors and shareholders will always bear it in mind when deciding on the 
next step in investment. Ultimately, the number of lawsuits should decrease 






279 E.g. the Dexia Group, a bank owned by French and Belgian owners, and KA Finanz 
AG, an Austrian bank owned by the Dexia Group. The Dexia Group tried to make 
Austrian taxpayers cover its losses by refusing the bail-in instrument for its subsidiary in 
Austria, which was rejected by the Austrian Supreme Court. Another example is an 
Austrian bank called Hypo Alpe Adria: the Austrian Ministry of Finance announced a debt 
moratorium on the bank’s creditors, most of whom were German and Austrian banks and 
other financial institutions including the World Bank. There is also a great amount of 
pressure from German banks which want their own state to offer as much support as 
possible in their lawsuit against Austria. 
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Pillar 3 – The Common Deposit Guarantee Scheme 
 
Deposit insurance exists to reimburse a limited amount of deposits to 
individual depositors whose bank went bankrupt. For depositors it is a way 
of protecting their property against the consequences of bank failures. As 
regards financial stability, this instrument prevents depositors from panic 
withdrawals from their bank, which would have very serious economic 
consequences.280  This pillar does not attempt to centralise powers, it ‘only’ 
harmonises the rules. 
At the moment the schemes of deposit insurance come from the DGSD 
Directive, which came into effect in June 2014 and cancelled the Directive 
94/19/EC of 1994, which was amended in 2009 in reaction to the financial 
crisis. There was a one-year time limit for the implementation of the DGSD 
Directive for member countries. 
Membership in the scheme of deposit guarantee is compulsory for all 
credit institutions and the aim is to pay out any kind of deposit of all 
clients281 (depositors of credit institutions) in case of bank liquidation or 
failure with the deposits no longer being disposable. The coverage level is 
EUR 100,000 per depositor (a natural or legal person) from the insurance 
system whose member the given credit institution is. The original 1994 
directive set the limit of EUR 20,000, which was later increased to that of 
EUR 50,000 before the limit reached the current level.282  
These schemes are compulsory in all member states and they are financed 
from credit institutions. The level of contributions depends on the risk 
profile and other decisive factors of a specific institution. The higher the 
risks, the higher contributions must be sent to the scheme. In the Czech 
Republic the Financial Market Guarantee System is in charge of the scheme. 
It is an institution that holds the collected money in trust and in case of a 
bank failure or liquidation it reimburses insured deposits.  
 
280 Translated from: Single Resolution Board - Activities. Single Resolution Board. [online]. 
2014 [qtd . 4th June 2017]. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm>. 
281 Other covered deposits include pension schemes of small and medium-sized companies, 
deposits of public entities with budgets up to EUR 500 000, deposits over EUR 100 000 
aimed to provide service in housing or social benefits.  
282Deposits insurance schemes. European Council, The Council of the EU [online]. 2014 [qtd. 




Depositors are to be reimbursed within 20 working days (with the 
possibility of prolonging the deadline by ten days), but by 2024 the time 
limit should shrink to just 7 days (it is already 7 days in the Czech republic 
since 2016). Originally, reimbursement was supposed to be paid within 
three months (with the possibility of prolonging the time limit by another 
six months). 
The funds accumulated in the deposit guarantee scheme of each member 
country should amount to 0.8% of covered deposits by 2025.  Deposit 
guarantee schemes must undergo stress tests at least every three years to 
ensure that their performance is up to the required standard. It is also 
possible to use deposit guarantee schemes as a source of finance for 
resolution of banks, subject to strict conditions.   
As far as the deposit guarantee scheme in the Czech Republic is 
concerned, Financial Market Guarantee System was founded 1.1.2016. Its 
tasks includes management of the national resolution fund (called the 
Crisis Management Fund), which collects finance for resolution of banks. 
The Financial Market Guarantee System plays the role of a caretaker 
institution that administers the Deposit Insurance Fund, the Crisis 
Management Fund and in the future most probably also the Investor 
Compensation Fund. It seems quite logical given the fact that deposit 
guarantee schemes can also be a source of financing resolution—that is an 
option introduced by the DSGS Directive. It should be easier to create 
and administer one central guarantee scheme comprised of all funds that 
cover endangered or already insolvent financial institutions; even though 
this is an issue of organisation rather than function.  
A deposit guarantee scheme is a very useful institution that has justified 
its existence on numerous occasions. What seems to be debatable, though, 
is the specific level of protection and the way of paying out finance in case 
of emergency. The EUR 100,000 limit is, in my opinion, sufficient and 
there are no problems with it these days; the 7-day time limit for 
reimbursement appears, however, rather exaggerated. The CNB does not 
agree with such a radical shortening of the time limit.283 I do not think that 
such a tight deadline is necessary either. While it is true that a healthy 
credit institution should be able to reimburse the majority of deposits 
immediately, I do not think that the 20-day time limit is too long given the 
 







complexity of the task, often accompanied by a kind of public chaos that 
occurs any time an institution is declared insolvent. I doubt that a 20-day 
wait for money should pose an insurmountable problem; even though 
some small difficulties are possible. What one needs to bear in mind is the 
systemic nature of the problem: it is a systemically negative situation and 
the solution must be equally systemic while the operational reality of the 
institution is respected, as is the pressure exerted by the public and other 
financial and public institutions. I am certain that the 20-day time limit is 
sufficient and adequate.  
 
 
The Banking Union - summary  
 
Even in its current (i.e. incomplete) form the Banking Union presents a 
radical change that profoundly modifies the nature of European integration 
and the balance between member states and European institutions. Its full 
impact has not been appreciated due to a weird mixture of healthy 
scepticism, improper cynicism and indolent inattention.284  
The basis of the Banking Union can be seen in the 2013-2014 European 
legislation. The first step was the assessment of 130 banks in the Eurozone 
and the subsequent takeover of the basic supervisory authority by the ECB 
on the 4th November 2014. The process of transition of supervision has not 
yet finished and it is thus very difficult to assess the Banking Union now—
any attempt to do so must inevitably be rather incomplete. The process 
reached the peak in January 2016—the resolution board acquired the power 
to issue binding decisions including the discretion power to impose a 
specific resolution instrument; further, the bail-in instrument of the BRRD 
Directive became applicable: the instrument that makes shareholders, 
creditors and uninsured depositors carry the burden of financial loss of an 
insolvent bank. Even after this date it will take some time before things 
settle down and we can assess the structural organisation of the Banking 
Union. Moreover, a supranational single resolution fund is still being built 
from the original form of equal national resolution funds—this process 
should have finished by 2024. Although the process of building the Banking 
Union started three years ago, it is early days yet. 
Every financial crisis (or even an unpleasant situation) in a way purifies 
the system from undesirable features. How negative the impact of a crisis 
 
284 VÉRON, N. Europe´s radical banking union. Bruegel essay and lecture series. Brussels: 
Bruegel. 2015. p 10. 
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is seems to be a question of legislation, preventive measures and the 
public attitude to it. What it surely brings about is a reaction in the form 
of new instruments and measures that aim to cushion the damage already 
caused and to prevent such a crisis in the future. This chapter on 
European integration of regulation and supervision leading to the 
foundation of the Banking Union describes processes that clearly 
exemplify it. The Banking Union is by far the deepest and most 
comprehensive legal framework of the entire financial market, not only in 
terms of regulation and supervision. As to imperfections, one of them is 
the lack of fiscal union in the EU. Such a union would bring the single 
market project much closer to its ultimate goal.   
To evaluate the Banking Union and its effectiveness is not possible yet 
and it will remain so at least until the SSM and the SRM become fully 
operational and until they are given enough time to show some results of 
their activities. The trend that had been set before the Banking Union was 
established has now intensified thanks to the Banking Union and its 
involvement in the area of regulation and supervision of financial 
institutions—the issue to be resolved is the ideal proportion of regulation 
and supervision to administrative demands and expenses for financial 
institutions, which is then reflected in the services and their prices (e.g. 
banking fees). In the area of supervision and regulation we have not 
witnessed any liberalising attempts; i.e. attempts that would make legislation 
less strict (or at least not stricter any longer). Is it possible at all that we see a 
complete reversal of the trend, though? To my mind, general liberalisation 
of supervision and regulation is not really viable; yet, I am convinced that 
legislation will steady itself as the effects of the recent financial crisis wear 
off and economic growth becomes stable as well. If this stabilisation comes 
after the Banking Union becomes fully operational is uncertain; I presume 
that it will take a little longer and it will probably ‘only’ last until another 
crisis arises—this crisis is bound to happen but we might feel optimistic that 








THE PROCESS OF INTEGRATION OF FINANCIAL 
MARKET SUPERVISION IN NORWAY 
 
The reason why this book includes a chapter on integration of supervision 
in Norway is quite simple and I discussed it briefly in Introduction. Norway 
is the first European country to have introduced integrated supervision of 
the financial market, so it is interesting to find out whether their pioneering 
decision resulted in some specific features or differences in comparison 
with the method or the system of supervision in the EU or the Czech 
Republic. The second reason why I deal with the issue of supervision in 
Norway is the fact that Norway is not an EU member state, but it is a 
member state of the Agreement on the European Economic Area285 (the 
EEA) and it also participates in the European Free Trade Association286 
(EFTA). Moreover, Norwegian banks are very busy in cross-border 
business with EU members, particularly in Scandinavia. The FSB list 
mentions Nordea287 as a global systemically important bank (see below for 
more information). All these reasons, including the closely intertwined 
business relations, make the comparison between Norway and the EU (the 
Czech Republic) worthwhile. 
Because of the existence of the Agreement on the EEA and because of 
the fact that the single financial market evidently falls within the four 
 
285 The Agreement was signed on the 1st January 2004 by the European Commission, EU 
member countries and three EFTA countries that wished to participate in the European 
Free Trade Association. The main objective of the EEA Agreement is to ensure in all 31 
states free movement of goods, persons, services and capital—the ‘four freedoms’. As a 
result of this agreement, Union law is, as far as the four freedoms are concerned, 
implemented into the national legal system of EFTA countries. All new relevant EU legal 
regulations are also implemented into the EEA Agreement so they apply to the entire EEA 
area (not just the EU) and they ensure a unified application of legal norms relating to a 
single market. In this case, we refer to the norms as EEA relevant. EFTA countries are, 
however, not fully responsible, unlike the EU member countries.  
286 European Free Trade Association ‘EFTA’ includes Norway, Iceland, and Lichtenstein. 
287 It is a Nordic financial group active mainly in the North of Europe. This bank is a 
product of mergers and acquisitions of Finnish, Danish, Norwegian and Swedish banks 
Merita Bank, Unibank, Kreditkassen (Christiania Bank) and Nordbanken, which took place 
from 1997 to 2000. The Baltic countries and Poland are today also considered to be part of 
the domestic market. The largest shareholder of Nordea is Sampo, a Finnish insurance 
company with around 20% of the shares. Nordea is listed on the stock exchanges in 
Copenhagen, Helsinki, and Stockholm. Nordea’s headquarters is in Stockholm and it has 
more than 1400 branches. The bank is present in 19 countries all over the world and it 




freedoms this agreement helps to establish, it is clear that financial market 
regulation and supervision in Norway is legislatively extremely similar to the 
system in the EU—in fact, the Norwegian system is based on the system 
used in the EU. 
Essentially, EU regulations become part of the Norwegian legal system 
only after they have become integrated into the Agreement on the EEA. All 
three supervisory authorities in Norway are part of the EFTA Working 
Group on Financial Services, which is a group coordinating opinions of 
EFTA countries on integration of basic financial legal norms into the 
Agreement on the EEA. 
The basic tenet of the Agreement on the EEA is its flexibility and, to a 
certain extent, homogeneity with the EU single market. Amendments made 
to EU legislation and relevant to the EEA are gradually implemented into 
the Agreement on the EEA via decisions of the EEA Joint Committee288 
and subsequent ratification of these decisions in national legal systems. 
Since 1994 more than 7000 EU legal regulations have been implemented in 
this way.289 It is immensely interesting that the legal system in Norway is 
very pragmatic as far as foreign languages and legislation are concerned—a 
large number of EU regulations become part of Norwegian law even before 
they have been translated into the Norwegian language.290 
In this part I focus on macro-prudential supervision in Norway; the 
hypothesis I put forward is that macro-prudential supervision in Norway is 
 
288 The EEA Joint Committee is in charge of the execution of the EEA Agreement. It 
holds regular meetings six (or eight) times a year. It is a forum where problems are 
discussed and decisions are accepted on the basis of a consensus regarding the 
implementation of EU norms into the EEA Agreement. Before the Treaty of Lisbon was 
signed, the EEA Joint Committee was comprised of representatives of EEA and EFTA 
countries and the European Commission. In agreement with the Treaty of Lisbon, 
responsibility for the co-ordination of EEA issues was transferred from the European 
Commission to the European External Action Service after this institution was created on 
the 1st December 2010.  
289 FREDRIKSEN, H.H, FRANKLIN, C.N.K. Of pragmatism and principles: The EEA 
Agreement 20 years on. In Common market law review. Vol 52, No. 3. June 2015. pp. 629-684. 
p. 631.  
290 In view of the fact that such norms are at that time published in English and Swedish; 
both languages are well understood by everyone in Norway. In Norway the only legal 
language is not Norwegian. The EEA Agreement lacks a provision as the one found in 
Article 297 of the TFEU (procedure for the adaption of acts), so decisions made by the 
EEA Joint Committee can come into effect even before their legal translation is published 
in Norwegian or Icelandic in the EEA Official Journal, where all new legislation of the 




based on the same principles as in EU member countries including the 
supranational (European) level. 
It would substantially exceed the scope of this book to analyse legal 
regulation of the entire Norwegian financial market. Since this chapter aims 
to analyse Norwegian law in this area and compare it with Union law, the 
following part will compare regulation and supervision in banking law, 
including the most important parts of general financial market regulation 
and supervision.   
In Norway the process of integration is conceived of as the performance 
of supervision by one main authority, despite the fact that there are three 
bodies looking after financial stability: the Ministry of Finance, the Norges 
Bank and the supervisory authority Finanstilsynet.  
Up until the mid-1980s regulation in Norway had been characterised by a 
high number of very strict rules for the provision of loans. In the 1980s 
financial markets underwent substantial deregulation of credit controls—
political micro-management was replaced by market mechanisms and major 
changes occurred in the area of regulation of financial institutions. The past 
two decades have seen the introduction of an increasing number of EU / 
EEA laws into the legal system in Norway. The important areas of 
regulation display minimum differences if compared with the system in the 
EU; nonetheless, Norway developed an independent national type of 
regulation. The 2007-2009 financial crisis exposed a lot of deficiencies in 
financial market regulation in many countries; global financial markets were 
immediately subjected to stricter regulation, which, of course, left its mark 




As far as financial market regulation is concerned, on the 10th April 2015 a 
new act on financial institutions was approved (Finansieringsvirksomhetsloven), 
which introduced new EU rules for all financial institutions. This act is the 
first one to genuinely integrate regulation and supervision into one norm—
regulation of all financial institutions is governed by this act. Some 
European norms had already been present in the Norwegian legal system, 
though: for example the CRD IV Directive and the CRR Resolution had 
 
291 Macroprudential supervision of the financial system – organisation and instruments. 
Report from a working group consisting of representatives from Norges Bank, the 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway – Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of Finance. 
January 2012. p. 13. 
149 
 
been implemented by the 30th September 2014292 while regulation 
concerning the identification of systemically important financial 
institutions293 had been adopted on the 12th May 2014. With the adoption of 
Basel III (and the CRD IV Directive), more specific (stricter) rules were 
approved to identify systemically important financial institutions particularly 
as regards the conservation capital buffer while determining the capital 
requirements. Having received a recommendation from the Finanstilsynet, 
the Norwegian Ministry of Finance identified (by means of legislative 
regulation) three institutions294 that from the 1st July 2015 to the 1st July 
2016 had to maintain the capital buffer at the level of 1%; on the 1st July 
2016 the level doubled to the current level of 2%.295 
To put it simply, we might say that a financial institution is systemically 
important if problems it encounters may have profound consequences for 
the entire financial system and the real economy. Norwegian law gives two 
criteria, either of which must be met if an institution is to be labelled a 
systemically important one: the total assets reaches at least 10% of Mainland 
Norway’s GDP or a share of credits in non-financial private sector reaches 
at least 5% of all credits into this sector. Apart from the two main criteria, 
Finanstilsynet also takes into consideration the size of the institution, the 
scope of its mainland as well as foreign business, its comprehensiveness, its 
role in the financial infrastructure and the amount of interconnection with 
the remaining parts of the financial system.296  
Regulation of insurance in Norway is governed by the same directive as 
in the EU: the Solvency II Directive and its supplement Omnibus II. 
Norway implemented these European regulations and they came into full 
effect in January 2016. 
The capital market and its legislation are determined by two regulations 
implementing the MiFID Directive: the Securities Trading Act 
(Verdipapirhandelloven) and the Stock Exchange Act (Børsloven). A 
number of changes are expected with the implementation of the MiFID II 
Directive and the MiFIR Regulation, which were in the EU countries 
already implemented. The main aim of the MiFID II Directive is the 
 
292 The overarching capital and reserve requirements were incorporated in June 2013. Cf. 
Finanstilsynet. Annual Report 2014. Published on the 9th June 2015. p. 36.  
293 Basel III and the CRD IV Directive stipulated certain specific rules for these institutions 
including duties for national supervisors so that such institutions could be identified and 
could meet stricter rules—EBA published recommendations for the identification of such 
institutions.  
294 DNB ASA, Nordea Bank Norge ASA and Kommunalbanken AS. 
295 Finanstilsynet. Annual Report 2014. Published on the 9th June 2015. p. 8. 
296 Fynanstilsynet. Risk outlook and Financial Trends for 2015. April 2015. p. 42. 
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provision of further support to create a capital market union, which is one 
of the top priorities of the European Commission. As the future EU rules 
leading to the establishment of a capital market union are also relevant to 
the EEA, they could also greatly influence the Norwegian capital market. 
The situation in Norway provides further justification of the opinion that 
financial market regulation is, barring a few minor exceptions, identical in all 
countries and even Norway is, in a way, on its way to the single market 
within the EU.  
Credit market regulation had systematically been deregulated from its 
heyday in 1965 to the year 1988, when the remaining regulation was 
basically done away with. This was caused by the development of the credit 
market itself, but also by the rapid development of information technology 
that sped up as well as reduced payment expenses. 
As far as the DGSD Directive (the third pillar of the Banking Union) is 
concerned, Norway has already implemented some of its elements into its 
legal system. For instance, individual depositors’ finance is temporarily (till 
the end of 2018) covered up to NOK 2 million (almost three times as much 
as in the EU).297 
Likewise, the BRRD Directive is being implemented under the 
supervision of the banking law commission; a proposal for its 
implementation was created in 2016, but real implementation is expected 
in 2018.298 Two main banks (the DNB and Nordea) have prepared 
recovery plans already before BRRD implementation and other major 
banks should follow suit. Medium and small banks will assess which 
recovery requirements they should fulfil according to the adequacy rule of 
the BBRD Directive—although this will not be done before the proposal 
has been revealed. A draft crisis management rules document for other 
financial institutions (i.e. other than banks) is still eagerly anticipated as the 
European Commission has not issued it yet.299 It seems very likely that 
once the wait is over, the Norwegian legal system will implement this 
European legislation, too.  
 
297 At the end of 2016 the Banks’ Guarantee Fund had more than NOK 32,47 billion at its 
disposal.  Cf. Bankenes Sikringsfond Annual Report 2016. Published on the 7th March 
2017. p. 15. 
298 The implementation will be carried out in a Act called the Lov om finansforetak og 
finanskonsern (finansforetaksloven) / The Act on Financial Undertakings and Financial 
Groups ( "Financial Undertakings Act"), effective as of January 1, 2016. 
299 These rules are likely to be inspired by a consultation document of the European 
Commission from October 2012. It deals with crisis management of central counterparties, 




The institutional structure of supervision 
 
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for monitoring financial stability and 
it creates legal framework in the financial sector. The other two authorities 
help to maintain a stable and effective financial system by monitoring 
financial institutions, the capital market and payment systems, discovering 
features that could potentially pose a threat to financial stability. The main 
task Finanstilsynet has is micro-prudential supervision (i.e. supervision of 
individual financial institutions). It can intervene by means of issuing 
demands and instructions for institutions in case a crisis comes (or is about 
to come). Norges Bank is in charge of macro-prudential supervision—it 
monitors the financial system in its entirety and it is also given the role of 
the creditor of last resort.  
Norway has long attempted to make legislation stable and strong, 
covering the entire financial market (including all institutions that are active 
there) and, at the same time, enhancing reliability and resistance of the 
financial sector. The entire financial market is supervised by a common 
authority that ensures consistent regulation for various types of financial 
institutions while observing the ‘equal risk-equal regulation’ principle. In 
order to decrease the probability of liquidity and insolvency problems in 
financial institutions, new comprehensive requirements were introduced—
they should ensure financial stability, sufficient liquidity, and the right 
amount of supervision of financial institutions. Real-life experience 
confirms that financial stability (even in countries with comprehensive 
regulation and supervision) is threatened by low liquidity ratio and 
insufficient resistance to crises; the situation naturally worsens if there is no 
intervention or if the measures are not applied early enough. That is why 
the Norwegian legal system also pays attention to creating resolution plans 
in case financial stability is under threat. A good way to achieve stability is 
an effective operation of financial markets.300 It is worth pointing out again 
that despite not being an EU member country, Norway closely co-operates 
with EU countries and the EU itself in the area of financial stability owing 
to a lot of cross-border activities of Norwegian financial institutions in the 
EU and vice versa and, of course, owing also to the fact that Norway is part 
of the EEA.  
Financial stability policies are determined by tripartite discussions which 
involve all three authorities responsible for maintaining stability; the main 
 
300 Macroprudential supervision of the financial system – organisation and instruments. 
Report from a working group consisting of representatives from Norges Bank, the Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway – Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of Finance. January 2012. p. 9. 
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reasons for the meetings are exchange of information, determining a 
financial stability outlook and co-ordination of reaction to crises (which 
corresponds with the resolution schemes as envisaged by the BRRD 
Directive). The tripartite meetings usually take place twice a year, but in case 
there are problems with the financial market, their frequency may increase. 
The Finanstilsynet Board and the executive board of Norges Bank also 
meet twice a year; more frequent are the meetings of the Banking and 
Insurance Supervision department of Finanstilsynet and of the Financial 
Stability department of Norges Bank—they meet every six weeks. These 
meetings result in harmonisation of policies in this area and also in a 
number of reports and analyses. Norges Bank’s representative is, moreover, 
a permanent observer in the Finanstilsynet Board. 
Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank are the two main institutions in charge of 
financial market supervision. As for monetary, credit or foreign exchange 
policies, if Norges Bank finds out that other authorities should intervene, it 
informs the Ministry of Finance. It is, however, Norges Bank that is 
ultimately responsible for financial market and financial stability 
supervision. It sends (twice a year) the Ministry of Finance a statement 
concerning a financial stability outlook along with recommendations 
concerning the elimination of systemic risks. It is, of course, also in charge 
of the monetary policy, it supervises liquidity and it provides banks with 
loans. As the creditor of last resort, it plays the most important role in case 
of a liquidity crisis. 
Finanstilsynet prepares all the materials needed in case a crisis is looming, 
but the ultimate decision is made by the King or the Ministry of Finance. 
The latter is the decision-making body in particular in matters of financial 
stability; its decisions are based on recommendations and reports made by 
Finanstilsynet or Norges Bank.   
 
1. Prudential supervision 
The Ministry of Finance in Norway does not differ from its counterparts in 
other countries in so far as it continuously analyses both international and 
local economic development. It issues a report on the financial market 
annually. It goes without saying that also here the financial crisis showed 
how fast financial market problems spread internationally; likewise, it 
showed how important an effective financial market is for the economy as 
such—the financial crisis demonstrated the consequences of an imbalance 
between indebtedness and the value of assets. Economic and financial 
market analyses are based on a detailed examination of international as well 
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as local resources while a vital source of information is also the other two 
supervisory authorities. 
While assessing the entire financial sector, one must pay particular 
attention to future macro-economic development with possible risks and 
threats linked with it. To a large extent, such an assessment is dependent on 
on-the-spot monitoring that financial institutions are subjected to—it is 
there that many potential risks can be spotted. Macro-economic 
supervision, on the other hand, provides information that serves as an 
important source of information for on-the-spot checks. Typically, macro-
economic stability is based on capital requirements and the assessment of 
one’s capital is based on the risks undertaken by the institution in question 
as well as risks that the economy faces. Capital adequacy requirements 
should help financial institutions gain sufficient financial resistance so that 
they can carry on offering loans even during a several-year-long period of 
recession, which is also a criterion according to which financial institutions 
are assessed by the supervisory authority. 
Macro-economic regulation focuses on two crucial areas: it stipulates 
minimum requirements for capital adequacy to maintain financial stability 
and minimum requirements for capital liquidity. In addition, there are also 
rules stipulating standards of professional conduct for financial 
institutions and investment brokers—their observation is supervised by 
Finanstilsynet. One of the characteristic features of supervision is financial 
market uniformity which manifests itself through identical regulation and 
supervision while taking the same risks regardless of what institution takes 
the risk and regardless of the economic situation in the given country. 
Legislation is thus adopted consistently with the aim of avoiding less strict 
regulation during periods of economic stability and stricter regulation 
during periods of instability. While it undoubtedly contributes towards 
preventing risk accumulation and it helps to maintain financial stability, 
there seems to be a fine line between regulation and overregulation. Since 
there is practically only one supervisory authority, regulation and 
supervision are highly consistent within the entire financial market 
including all its sectors; furthermore, there is a full awareness of the 
services offered in the financial sector as well as a sound basis for 
assessment and management of risks in the whole financial sector. 
Originally, capital adequacy requirements were based on the CRD and 
CAD directives301 that follow the rules set by Basel II. In Norway their 
 
301 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14th June 2006 relating to 
the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and the Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 14th June 2006 on the capital adequacy of 
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transposition resulted in legislative changes in the area of capital 
adequacy302 of financial institutions—more specifically, changes concerned 
calculation of risk involvement influencing capital requirements. Other 
legislative changes were made with a view to minimising the amount of 
loss incurred by a financial institution whose counterparty cannot fulfil 
their obligations.303 Finanstilsynet stipulates stricter requirements for 
banks that calculate their capital adequacy according to risk-based internal 
models—these institutions must create countercyclical capital buffers in 
economically favourable periods in such a way as to form a financial gap 
between the minimum capital requirement and the actual capital. It is a 
certain type of a safeguard that should ensure a financial envelope even in 
less favourable periods. 
Norway, as a member of the EEA Agreement, is subject to regulation 
based on Basel III (or rather the CRD IV Directive), which was added to 
the EEA Agreement (and each EFTA state subsequently implemented it 
into their legal systems304). Therefore, also capital requirements in Norway 
are based on this directive as well as capital conservation buffers and 
countercyclical capital buffers. The supervisory authority is, in the 
Norwegian legal system305, authorised to require 
- maintenance of capital requirement higher than the legal minimum 
(according to capital adequacy) 
- restriction or change of business activities 
- reduction of the risk associated with business activities, products and 
systems 
- restriction of the scope of performance-related remuneration 
- disclosure of other information along with a higher frequency thereof 
 
investment firms and credit institutions. Both these directives were cancelled and replaced 
by the CRD IV Directive of 26th June 2013, which enabled transposition of current rules 
into the Norwegian legal system.  
302 Act no. 1506 of 14th December 2006 on capital adequacy for commercial banks, savings 
banks, finance companies, mortgage credit institutions, parent companies in financial 
groups, investments firms, management companies for securities funds etc. (the Capital 
Adequacy Regulations).  
303 Act no. 1615 of 22nd December on large exposures of credit institutions and investment 
firms.  
304 Through the Financial Undertakings Act with effect from 1.1.2016. The CRD IV and 
CRR legal framework has been in force in Norway already, although formal 
implementation has not yet been done. 
305 Finansieringsvirksomhetsloven - Financial-Institutions Act, sections 2-9b, § 4 and 
section 2-9, which implement Article 64 of the CRD IV Directive. 
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- reduction of the difference in maturity between the liabilities and the 
assets 
 
Financial and banking supervision promotes stable financial institutions, 
acutely aware of the risks, their management and checks. The provision of 
financial services must be in full accordance with the regulatory framework 
and in the best interest of the society and of financial service consumers.306  
The banking sector in Norway displays the following particularities: 
- the net profit of a bank is very often used to increase the bank’s capital, 
thereby helping the bank overcome economic obstacles and meet the 
higher capital requirements following the 2008 financial crisis. 
- Norwegian banks find the capital market very important as the biggest 
of them get most of their funding there. Market instability and insecurity 
often lead to an increase in the price of products in financial as well as 
bond markets and it also results in a stock market fall, which might increase 
banking expenses and make funding more difficult.  
- the debt burden of Norwegian households is at an unprecedented high, 
as are property prices. Households are more susceptible than before to 
higher credit rates of mortgages, loss of income and a decline in property 
prices. Consequently, they tend to be more economical and not to consume 
much, which adversely affects commerce and industry. This does not seem 
to be unique to Norway, though—we have seen a similar scenario (barring a 
few irregularities) in basically the whole of Europe. Likewise, another 
universal feature was strengthening of regulation in the area of capital and 
liquidity requirements307 (the CRD IV Directive) while more attention was 
drawn to systemically important banks and resolution schemes.    
In Norwegian law the requirements based on the CRD IV are stipulated 
in the following way: the common equity Tier 1 capital is 4.5%, the whole 
Tier 1 capital is 6% and own sources of finance are 8% in total. The 
capital conservation buffer is 2.5%, the systemic risk buffer is 3%. 
Moreover, systemically important institutions (the DNB and 
Kommunalbanken, it used to be also Nordea, but since 2nd January 2017 it 
is only branch) have exceptional 2% capital buffer requirement since the 
1st July 2016. Furthermore, a counter-cyclical capital buffer of 1.5% is still 
in excess of the Tier 1 equity ratio, the capital buffer, the systemic risk 
 
306 Finanstilsynet Annual Report 2014. Published on the 9th June 2015. p. 31. 
307 By 2014, all Norwegian banks, for instance, met the minimum requirements on CET1 
capital (within the capital adequacy requirements) including buffers at the level of 10%.  
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reserve and, where applicable, the reserve for systemically important 
institutions. This requirement has been raised from the original 1%, 
because of the increasing risk of financial instability caused by increasing 
household indebtedness and property prices (while the banks’ profits 
increase as well). In addition, since December 31, 2017, this counter-
cyclical capital buffer has been raised to 2%. This additional increase is a 
response to the rise in the financial imbalance for the national economy, 
resulting from the rising ratio of loans to GDP, which goes beyond the 
long-term trend and high property price levels. 
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) requirements were also implemented 
into the legal system in Norway. The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
requirements will only be adapted when they will be introduced in the EU. 
It is, nonetheless, necessary to point out that Norwegian investment 
firms are exempt from the obligation to create capital buffers according to 
the capital adequacy as stipulated in the CRD IV Directive and its 
transposition into Norwegian law. In addition, on August 2014 the Ministry 
of Finance transposed beyond the obligations more macro-prudential 
regulatory rules308; Finanstilsynet later revealed (in its 15/2014 circular) that 
it expected financial institutions to abide by the rules in spite of the fact that 
they were not yet  (in 2014) part of the EEA. This illustrates a relatively 
frequent situation where Norway implements many relevant directives even 
though they have not been incorporated into the EEA Agreement. 
Finanstilsynet issues a quarterly (called the Risk Outlook report) for 
financial institutions with analyses of national as well as international 
economic conditions in credit risk, liquidity risk and financial positions. 
Moreover, it publishes analyses of financial institutions, markets and the 
economy in general twice a year, including all other tendencies that could 
undermine financial stability in the Norwegian financial market (the 
Financial Trends report).  
 
 
308 Commission delegated regulation (EU) No. 604/2014 of the 4th March 2014 
supplementing Directive Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council with regard to regulatory technical standards with respect to qualitative and 
appropriate quantitative criteria to identify categories of staff whose professional activities 
have a material impact on an institution’s risk profile. 
Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 527/2014 of 12 March 2014 supplementing 
Directive (EU) No 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council with 
regard to regulatory technical standards specifying the classes of instruments that 
adequately reflect the credit quality of an institution as a going concern and are appropriate 





Norges Bank issues recommendations based on detailed analyses of weak 
points in the financial system and the risk factors outside the financial 
system while using statistical compilations and data from balance sheets, 
financial positions of firms and households and, lastly, from indicators of 
the real economy and financial market development in Norway as well as 
abroad. Recommendations issued by Norges Bank help introduce measures 
against the increase in systemic risk. Regular (quarterly) surveys of bank 
credits provide information about the current situation in the credit market 
whilst liquidity surveys in banking institutions offer information about the 
sources of finance banks use and their quality. 
 What appears immensely interesting is the way of analysing national and 
international economic situation on the basis of various models. Norges 
Bank produced a special set of models to analyse interaction between the 
financial sector and the real economy as well as to analyse resistance of the 
banking system to shocks. These models involve interaction between prices 
of assets, indebtedness of households and the real economy. From the 
macro-economic perspective they present a projection of property prices, 
household indebtedness and their interest burden. This model also projects 
the capital adequacy of banks and it includes micro-prudential schemes in 
banking, household and company sectors. The models help to carry out 
macro stress tests of the banking system against undesirable situations that 
may occur.   
 
Finanstilsynet 
This body performs micro-prudential supervision of individual financial 
institutions with particular focus on analyses of economic shocks that may 
wreak havoc on the financial sector. Currently the biggest risks are 
connected with the so-called ‘bubbles’ in credit and property markets. 
Supervision is predominantly based on a group of indicators and analyses 





309 Macroprudential supervision of the financial system – organisation and instruments. 
Report from a working group consisting of representatives from Norges Bank, the Financial Supervisory 
Authority of Norway – Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of Finance. Januray 2012 p. 12. 
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1. Economic development in Norway and abroad. 
2. Market development, particularly in housing and commercial 
properties, commodities, currency and securities.  
3. Development in local and corporate sectors.  
4. The financial sector (banking and life insurance) with analyses of 
profitability, liquidity and solvency of individual institutions, groups 
of institutions and the industry as a whole.   
5. Structural and competitive elements in the financial sector and the 
financial markets. 
6. Ad hoc studies, stress tests, etc.  
 
Finanstilsynet states four strategic supervisory instruments that include: 
supervision and monitoring, issuing licences, regulatory development, 
information and communication. The release of information is primarily 
aimed at financial institutions and the areas of supervision, but it also 
includes the media and the general public.310 
Finanstilsynet devises four-year-long strategies in its annual reports and 
2015 was the first year of the 2015-2018 period. Regardless of strategic 
aspects of specific periods, the general aim is the maintenance of fully 
operational financial markets and their financial stability, which is a 
necessary part of consumer protection. It naturally follows then that the 
elementary goal is consumer protection achieved by means of financial 
stability. The new strategy places particular emphasis on a/ healthy and 
liquid financial institutions, b/ resistant infrastructure, c/ investor 
protection, d/ consumer protection, e/ effective crisis management.  
 
a/ Finanstilsynet assesses financial systems and their risk of instability 
and it uses political instruments to reduce systemic risk. Further, it 
compares information from inspections of financial institutions with that 
from macro-prudential monitoring, taking any necessary action based on 
the comparison. Through licensing requirements it makes sure of high-
quality personnel in financial institutions and it precludes credit, liquidity 
and operational risks. It contributes to maintenance of adequate capital and 
of a wide range of financial sources, which helps to preserve confidence in 
 
310 Finanstilsynet Annual Report 2014. Published on the 9th June 2015. p. 24. 
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capital markets—credit institutions must maintain standard credit activities 
even during periods of capital and/or money market instability. 
b/ It promotes strong infrastructure ensuring fully operational systems of 
payment, trade, price setting and agreements in this area. It makes sure that 
any risks and potentially weak points in the system are covered via 
maintenance of high management and control standards in financial 
institutions.  
c/ It contributes towards maintenance of sufficient and regular 
information available to investors and towards high-quality annual audits 
and financial statements. It promotes appropriate market discipline by 
means of effective and prompt enforcement of compliance with rules. 
d/ As far as consumer protection is concerned, it promotes maintenance 
of sufficient information for providers and consultants while also 
supervising them. It checks whether financial products and property are 
sold traded in the proper manner taking into account the capability of 
customers to understand the risks and details thereof. Proper consumer 
protection is as important for individual customers as it is for public 
confidence in financial institutions. 
It is noteworthy that as regards consumer protection in Norway, 
Finanstilsynet co-operates with the Consumer Ombudsman, the Consumer 
Council and the Norwegian Competition Authority to ensure better 
consumer protection in the financial sector. The Ministry of Finance even 
had a competition policy forum established—it is comprised of 
representatives of the abovementioned bodies and its objective is better 
consumer protection achieved by means of an open exchange of 
information and views on financial market competition. It deals with both 
specific and general issues within the competence of each member of the 
forum. In addition, Finanstilsynet closely co-operates with the public 
information portal for financial services—consumers can find advice and 
warnings there concerning financial markets. They are issued by the 
supervisory authority, which also provides (via the portal) information 
about any breach of rules, e.g. the obligation to disclose prices for services. 
Such strong consumer protection in Norway clearly reveals the primary 
regulatory and supervisory orientation of the country with the top priority 
being reliability of financial institutions. Furthermore, new regulatory and 
supervisory rules are being drawn up so that the position of financial market 
consumers and customers is increasingly better and better. 
Strong consumer protection is undoubtedly present in EU member 
countries as well; yet, I am convinced that in the EU there is not such a 
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widely and firmly integrated primary goal of consumer protection as there is 
in Norway. On the other hand, the EU lays down new requirements 
regarding concise and precise information about risks and expenses that 
various investment products involve (the so-called ‘key information’). Key 
information must be enclosed with invitations to investment in securities 
funds and similar requirements will soon apply to other products, too.      
I would like to mention that legislation ensuring a certain amount of 
consumer protection has existed in the EU for some time. Provision of 
investment financial services in the capital market, in particular, is 
accompanied by standardised investment questionnaires which must be 
adhered to by financial institutions in their relation to customers and their 
(i.e. customers’) capability to comprehend investment financial products 
and the issues involved. It seems to me that in other financial market areas 
(except for the capital market) there are few problems and provision of 
services, including relevant information, is more than satisfactory. I think 
that both the European and the Norwegian legislation is too elaborate, 
stipulating an overwhelming number of detailed duties that financial 
institutions must fulfil; this, however, will never offer perfect protection—
when a customer admits (in the investment questionnaire) to being a 
professional in this area or when he agrees with risky investments, there is 
no way of defence against a loss and they then cannot accuse the financial 
institution of improper conduct because the institution followed the 
investment questionnaire and provided the customer with all the 
information. The problem is that a completely lay customer can hardly fully 
appreciate the possible loss they might incur if they entrust the institution 
with full power to manage their portfolio after just a single face-to-face 
meeting with a professional who helps the customer to fill in the 
questionnaire and assures them that the financial institution knows best 
what to do and what the best option for the customer is. Nevertheless, 
everyone who is involved in investment has legal capacity and it is hard to 
envisage even more regulation (providing more information still) in this 
area.  
e/ It maintains alertness to deal with crises in such a way as to prevent 
harmful consequences of a domino effect and subsequent permanent 
problem consumers might experience in the financial sector. Moreover, it 
ensures the ability to face unpredictable problems in individual institutions, 
markets and the infrastructure including more general crises of the financial 
system as a whole.  
Macro-prudential rules for financial institutions are set here (e.g. the 
capital adequacy rule) as the rules stated in the BRRD Directive, which 
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order the given resolution authority and financial institutions as well to 
create resolution and recovery plans—this is also going to be implemented 
into the Norwegian legal system.311 
Norway, in particular via Finanstilsynet, is a member country of several 
global organisations whose activities involve financial markets. As far as 
international supervision is concerned, apart from its participation in the 
Agreement on the EEA and in EFTA, Norway also co-operates with the 
EU via ESA bodies—a number of internationally valid norms (including 
EU ones) are being implemented into the legal system in Norway. These 
activities were deferred a little due to the fact that it was necessary for 
Norway to give up part of its sovereignty in favour of EU financial bodies, 
which possibly was dealt with in the agreement of October 2014. The 
agreement states that the competence to adopt binding decisions 
concerning supervision of financial institutions of the EEA Agreement 
countries is delegated to the EFTA Surveillance Authority; yet, the decision 
will be subject to subsequent legislative process because of the 
constitutional order in Iceland and Norway. Having reached this agreement, 
the EU as well as EEA/EFTA countries initiated the process of clarifying 
technicalities—a necessary step enabling full implementation of the three 
ESA bodies into the EEA Agreement.  
In my opinion, this does not improve the situation at all, for EU norms 
are primarily implemented into legal systems through the EEA Joint 
Committee, which issues a decision that later becomes part of the EEA 
Agreement and EEA countries implement it into their own legal systems. 
Thus, the competence has been transferred from the Joint Committee to 
the EFTA Surveillance Authority and the only benefit it may bring is that 
binding decisions issued by the ESA authorities will not have to become 
part of the EEA Agreement since the ESA authorities will be part of the 
EEA Agreement. That is not the end of the problem, though, because the 
constitutional orders of EFTA countries are rather sensitive and there is 
also the potential risk of the European Commission or the European 
Council intervening in the decision-making process of the ESA authorities 
(the former could be solved by the EFTA Surveillance Authority’s decision 
on the same thing)—there might then be an infringement of the EEA 
Agreement due to influence of an outside body (the European Council). 
This issue will be further dealt with below. 
Since the establishment of the ESA authorities in 2011, Finanstilsynet has 
been invited to take part (as an observer) in the meetings of the ESA 
 
311 The Bank Law Commission was entrusted with the proposal of legal changes to the 
transposition of the BRRD Directive. 
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Management Boards (except the ESBR) and it actively takes part in 
activities of the boards and its subgroups—the activities are concerned with 
regulatory development and financial market supervision including financial 
institutions. Since 2013 Finanstilsynet has also been involved (as an 
observer again) in the meetings of the ESRB Advisory Scientific 
Committee.312 Furthermore, Finanstilsynet participates in activities of the 
European Commission and ESA working groups (especially with a view to 
facilitating the process of transposition of European norms to the legal 
system in Norway) while also identifying and enforcing Norwegian interests 
and playing not an insignificant role in preparing those legal norms. Thanks 
to participating in the EU bodies and working groups, unification of 
regulation is achieved in Norway as well as the right setting of supervisory 
mechanisms. Of course, one needs to bear in mind that we talk of 
participation here, not a full membership with the right to vote.  
There is also close co-operation among countries in the Nordic-Baltic 
Stability Group, which consists of representatives of ministries of finance, 
central banks and supervisory authorities from nordic-baltic countries. This 
group has already adopted, for example, a legal framework for co-operation 
among international financial institutions when dealing with a crisis.  
Generally, all the countries in this region closely co-operate in order to 
ensure financial stability and fully operational markets—to achieve this, they 
supervise financial institutions, monitor potential risks to financial stability, 
development of regulation, enforcement of law and development of 
supervisory mechanisms. Another group is the Nordic-Baltic 
Macroprudential Forum, whose members are senior management 
representatives of central banks and supervisory authorities. Its aim is to 
discuss macro-prudential supervision and other supervisory activities in the 
Nordic-Baltic region.  
 
Problems related to participation of EFTA countries in EU 
authorities   
 
As it was mentioned above, a lot of problems arise in connection with the 
fact that Norway is not an EU member state and it, nonetheless, 
participates in EU authorities, such as the highly relevant ESA authorities. 
The reason is that the secondary legislation of the EU (which is, among 
other things, produced by the ESA authorities) is incorporated into the 
 
312 Finanstilsynet Annual Report 2014. Published on the 9th June 2015. p. 71. 
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EEA Agreement through a rather complicated procedure in case the 
legislation is relevant to the principles and rules stipulated in the Agreement 
(in other words, if it is EEA relevant). There is no denying that in the 
financial market area most regulations are EEA relevant—they then get 
through the EEA Agreement into the legal system of EFTA countries, 
including Norway.  
In the financial market area co-operation between EFTA countries and 
the EU is extremely close since both parties are keen to make sure that the 
financial market is as effective as possible. The ESA authorities are 
essentially fundamental European authorities producing relevant regulations 
and the fact that Norway does not have full membership of these 
authorities causes considerable problems. These authorities adopt various 
EEA relevant decisions and regulations that are later adopted by Norway as 
well, but, crucially, Norway has no fully-fledged representative there (it only 
has a kind of an observer) and it therefore cannot voice its opinion 
regarding the adopted acts—the capacity of Norwegian representatives is 
solely advisory. Another obstacle is the fact that once the EEA Joint 
Committee decides to implement an act into the EEA Agreement, it must 
then be adopted via a legislative procedure into Norwegian law—the 
Norwegian Constitution does not allow any other option. Such a process of 
implementation is rather awkward and it causes a significant number of 
problems. The biggest problem, however, is the delay in implementing 
Union acts into the EEA Agreement and, subsequently, into individual 
national legal systems—this may lead to considerable overload of the EEA 
Joint Committee; more often than not, the delay is caused by one country 
that obstructs or intentionally impedes the process of transposition in the 
EEA Joint Committee.313 EFTA Countries have attempted to solve the 
problem several times by accepting unilateral transposition of some 
regulations into their national legal systems, but these are nothing more 
than provisional solutions with a rather unclear legal foundation.314 
The easiest option is accepting EFTA countries’ representatives 
(including those representing Finanstilsynet) as fully-fledged members of 
 
313 EFTA countries can delay the effect of the implementation of Union norms even after 
an agreement has been reached in the EEA Joint Committee. The can do so by claiming 
that they need to implement the norm into their own constitution (e.g. by means of 
parliamentary ratification). Subsequently, the transposition deadline is six months; yet, if it 
is announced that the time needed is going to be longer than six months, the EEA Joint 
Committee’s decision remains ineffective.  
314 Mainly because they do not guarantee that the EU and member countries accept such 
acts as equal to the legally binding EU/EEA norms; likewise, they do not grant economic 
entities from EFTA any rights they could claim within the EU pillar regarding the EEA.    
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the ESA authorities including the right to vote and co-decide. From the 
perspective of Norwegian constitutional law, this enables to transfer 
sovereignty to these authorities that could be accepted as joint EEA 
authorities.315 316  
This solution appears to have been applied on 30 September 2016 when 
the EEA Joint Committee decided to implement the directives establishing 
the ESA Authorities (EBA, EIOPA, ESMA and ESRB);317 that used to 
leave Norway, to a certain extent, in a tight spot. However, the parallel 
structures (the EU and the EEA) have not created problems only for 
Norway and the other EFTA countries, but also for the financial 
institutions in those EU countries that make business with EFTA countries. 
In June 2017, the EEA Joint Committee adopted a package of decisions 
to incorporate 31 EU legal norms establishing the European Financial 
Supervisory Authorities, including the regulations establishing ESA 
authorities. 
The issues surrounding the EEA Agreement and European legislation 
(and its implementation in EFTA countries) is naturally a much deeper 
phenomenon that far exceeds the scope of this book. It seems that the 
solution to the most pressing problem outlined above has perhaps been 
found. I am certain that there was no possible solution other than to make 
EFTA countries representatives equal to their European counterparts to 
prevent any delays in the transposition of EU norms into national legal 
systems while enabling EFTA representatives to take part in the very 
creation of these norms (issued by authorities like the ESA ones). Secondary 
problems of the constitutional orders of EFTA countries are, however, 
within the competence of individual countries—so Norway, as well, needs 
to tackle the problem of setting the system of accepting EU norms once its 
members are fully-fledged members of the ESA authorities. 
 
315 In this case, there would have to be a solution to the problem concerning what to do in 
cases when the European Commission or the Council can influence decision making of the 
EU authorities; most probably the best option is to transfer this competence to the EEA 
Joint Committee. Even this would be far from ideal, particularly in urgent situations when 
national interests at are stake—yet, one can hardly find a better alternative in the structures 
of the EEA.  
316 FREDRIKSEN, H.H, FRANKLIN, C.N.K. Of pragmatism and principles: The EEA 
Agreement 20 years on. In Common market law review. Vol 52, No. 3rd June 2015. pp 629-
684. p. 680.  
317 However, this solution addresses to a certain extent only the problems associated with 
ESA authorities, but the EU authority is far more. A more comprehensive solution is 
needed—one that involves all EU authorities that make decisions and is EEA relevant. 
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All EEA Agreement countries are interested in a fully operational single 
market to which the EEA Agreement contributes; that is why all parties 
involved (including EU member countries) benefit from co-operation as 
effective as possible. I am convinced that just the close cooperation and the 
relatively prompt implementation of the regulations relevant to the EEA 
will be effective enough to bring Europe (closer) to a single market.  
 
Supervision in Norway – summary 
 
The 2014 report of Finanstilsynet talks about a steady economic growth but 
it also warns that decreasing investment in oil and natural gas industry and 
falling prices of oil make the prognosis a little uncertain and, as a result, 
Norwegian economy might actually suffer a decline. Similarly, the report 
warns of increasing indebtedness of households and an increase in property 
prices.318 The supervisory authority concludes that Norwegian banks should 
increase the ratio of long-term financing and build more liquidity buffers. 
The trend of capital adequacy requirements is satisfactory and all banks in 
Norway fulfil the minimum requirements—they should be able increase the 
capital adequacy providing the economic growth is not disrupted. The credit 
growth of retail customers keeps exceeding the income growth, which 
underlines the need of a prudential credit policy.319 
It is also interesting to take a closer look at the conflicting opinions of 
Finanstilsynet and The Competition Authority in Norway—the dispute 
over bank profits. Finanstilsynet as the supervisory authority approves of 
high financial profits for banks since they ensure financial stability; the 
Competition Authority, on the other hand, expresses its disapproval—it 
does not like high bank profits at the expense of customers because it is 
certain that high fees and high rates of interest impede competition and 
banks could do with a lower income from these sources. It is a prime 
example of conflicting views of two different authorities in two different 
areas, which, however, very often get blurred as far as the public is 
concerned. Such disputes are difficult to settle—one can only try to find 
(and recommend) a reasonable compromise in order to sustain financial 
market stability and, at the same time, to prevent potential threat to rules of 
economic competition or excessive financial burden on customers.  
If supervision is to be carried out properly, it crucially relies on data from 
individual institutions—relevant data requirements were stipulated in the 
 
318 Fynanstilsynet Risk Outlook and Financial Trends for 2014. April 2014. 
319 Fynanstilsynet Risk Outlook and Financial Trends for 2015. April 2015. p 20. 
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binding technical standards of the CRD IV Directive, adopted by Norway, 
too. All financial institutions must perform standard reporting; in addition, 
all credit institutions must report their capital adequacy and liquidity 
position to the ORBOF database320 (collecting accounting information 
about banks and financial institutions, which report capital adequacy and 
liquidity position). This information from Norwegian financial institutions is 
then passed on to EBA by Finanstilsynet.  
As far as EU supervisory colleges are concerned, what is worth pointing 
out is the intersection of Union law with Norwegian supervision, because 
Finanstilsynet is the main supervisory authority in the DNB supervisory 
college—the DNB is a Norwegian bank operating internationally including 
the EU (the majority shareholder is the state, which is, given the bank’s 
rating, an enormous advantage). The main task of the college is the 
preparation of a common assessment of risk and capital of the entire DNB 
Group and the college is also responsible for the application of recovery 
plans that deal with capital adequacy and liquidity failures, proposing 
measures in compliance with the BRRD Directive. Recovery plans and their 
application must be assessed by the college, resulting in further comments 
and statements. Also, this supervisory authority is involved in nine 
supervisory colleges for foreign banks active in Norway. 
We can see the evident interconnection among member and non-member 
EU countries. Financial market (and its institutions) is so interconnected 
internationally that it is not of such importance whether or not a specific 
country is an EU member—a financial institution licensed in a country like 
that is usually active in other countries as well, and that is why it is beneficial 
to co-operate internationally and to unify supervisory rules to a certain 
extent. In this case a supervisory authority outside the EU is the main 
authority in one supervisory college and a member of other supervisory 
colleges whose other members are predominantly from the EU, which 
brings about acceptance and harmonisation of EU rules in a non-EU zone 
as well. The crucial aspect is the existence of the EEA Agreement between 
EFTA and EU countries, which means that most financial market 
regulations are EEA relevant; as a consequence, EFTA countries are 
obliged to implement such regulations into their own legal systems. 
 
320 Financial Market Statists. They contain monthly financial reports from banks and 




The interconnection also manifested itself during the stress tests of the 
biggest European banks in 2014321, which was carried out by national 
supervisors together with EBA and the ECB (the EU-wide stress test in 
2014), who simultaneously checked the asset quality of these banks. The 
DNB Group and the Nordea Bank Group along with many Norwegian 
branches of foreign banks underwent these tests, too. This fact (Norwegian 
banks taking part in activities organised by EU authorities with the 
Norwegian supervisory authority involved as well) bears testimony to the 
real participation of financial institutions licensed outside the EU in the 
single market, which seems to be a direction that the EU with its activities 
in the area of supervision and regulation is very keen to see. If the markets 
in the EU and Norway are intertwined to such an extent as sketched out 
above, it is evident that supervision of the local market must be performed 
in a way harmonised with the EU, because all the countries involved long 
for financial stability that is best achieved via identical or very similar rules 
and mechanisms while making allowances for some national differences 
that, needless to say, will never disappear completely.   
To conclude this chapter, I would like to say that the hypothesis put 
forward at the beginning of this chapter has been confirmed. Whilst 
Norway is not an EU member country, it is a European country 
nevertheless and its geographic location (sharing a common border with 
both Sweden and Denmark) cannot isolate Norway completely in any 
area—the economy is no exception. The financial market has long been 
global in its character, all the more interconnected within individual 
continents like Europe—it is surely in the best interests of all European 
countries (EU members or otherwise) to make sure that financial market 
rules are, at least in its most fundamental aspects, unified. Only by enabling 
local institutions to enter global markets without barriers can we achieve a 
better and a more stable economic environment, and it is exactly the 
process of harmonisation of the legislative environment that removes legal 
barriers to make it easier for companies to do business in other countries 
than just their home country or the country where they got the 
licence/permission.   
 
321 These tests involved, among other things, an estimate of future losses of credit 
revenues, changes in revenues and expenses of interest rates and the market risk. The DNB 
Banking Group showed the smallest change of the CET 1 capital in these stress tests. The 
conclusions from these stress tests were interpreted by Finanstilsynet and it advised 
Norwegian banks to increase their capital adequacy by keeping hold of their net income, 
thereby allowing them to offer loans also in periods of economic pressure. Cf. 




Another point stressing the interconnection even more is the EEA 
Agreement322 that defines the form and mechanism of acceptance and 
subsequent application of EU norms and regulations in Norwegian law (if 
they are EEA relevant). Of course, a prerequisite to the transposition of 
European norms (EEA relevant ones) is a decision-making process in the 
EEA Joint Committee. It is true that in most areas under the supervision of 
Finanstilsynet Norwegian legislation largely includes a transposed EU 
legislation (since it is mostly EEA relevant), which is yet another proof of 
international harmonisation even outside the EU and it stresses the 
importance of a Europe-wide (not just EU-wide) single market. Moreover, 
Norway goes in some areas even one step further than the EU in terms of 
strictness. We might say that a national financial market does not really exist 
(given the intertwined international structure of the economy and the 
financial market as its part, too), hence the need to see the financial market 
as a global entity that is comprised of national financial markets. I am sure 
that any other way of regulation and supervision in member as well as non-
member countries (other than Norway) is neither suitable nor feasible, 
because a national financial market presently cannot operate in a way 
isolated from financial markets in other countries. Norway (in spite of some 
problems that I deal with above) is a relatively successful example of 
international co-operation, implementation and harmonisation of ‘external’ 
or supranational legal norms that deal with financial market regulation and 
supervision. Norway thus contributes not only to its own financial stability 
but also to international financial stability, too, due to the high number of 
supranational interconnections in the financial market that, we might say, 
seems to fail to respect borders completely —whether those of the EU, 







322 I am certain that one of the greatest incentives for the EEA Agreement is strong 
European interconnection and close co-operation as well as existence of a supranational 
financial market (mentioned in the previous paragraph) and an enormous Europe-wide 




INTEGRATION OF SUPERVISION IN THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
 
Like in almost all developed countries, the financial market (in particular 
money markets and capital markets) in the Czech Republic underwent rapid 
development during the 1990’s, which was caused by a growing 
interconnection of national markets and a gradual reduction of differences 
between individual financial sectors. Due to international financial 
globalisation, big financial groups’ influence and importance grew even 
bigger. Attempts to integrate the regulation of credit and non-credit 
financial institutions have been apparent for some time now. One can 
assume that such attempts are spurred especially by the development of 
information technology and overall globalization that has naturally affected 
financial markets as well. It remains to be seen whether this approach is the 
most suitable one—whether it is, indeed, desirable to integrate the 
supervision of credit and non-credit financial institutions or whether there 
should some degree of independence in the area of regulation as well as 
supervision of non-credit institutions, given the fact that their status is, in 
comparison with credit institutions, rather different.  
Since the Czech Republic is an EU member and its financial market is, to 
all intents and purposes, wholly connected with the European market, it is 
hardly surprising that the current trends in financial market supervision in 
the Czech Republic reflect the trends set in the EU. Further, the 
overwhelming majority of financial institutions operating in the Czech 
financial market are part of big international financial groups. One could say 
that the Czech financial market is a subset of the international financial 
market (particularly the European one), which only allows a few national 
differences.    
 
Historical Overview  
 
1. 1990-1998 period  
At the beginning of the 1990’s, the Czech financial market with its banking 
entities supervised by the Ministry of Finance was born. In the period prior 
to this, banking entities (or rather just one banking entity) did exist, but one 
could hardly call this environment a financial market. Gradually, in the 
1990’s, supervision was being carried out by the Czechoslovak State Bank 
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(latter changed to the CNB), where a specialised department for banking 
supervision was established in 1994. As regards the creation of the capital 
market, it was a rather slower and more complicated process because it was, 
to a certain extent, a transformation tool; therefore, the creation of the 
Czech capital market was a product of the voucher privatisation. The 
following points in this historical overview concern the capital market since 
it seems that capital market supervision in the Czech Republic is the most 
interesting type and it truly illustrates the process of creation of financial 
market supervision—in the other financial market sectors the process was 
not as dramatic.  
Capital market regulation is an area which has undergone rapid 
development. From the legislative point of view, the situation in the Czech 
Republic was truly interesting. In 1993, shortly after the capital market had 
been established, there were five acts, three regulations and one 
governmental order regulating the capital market. Today, there are as many 
as 19 acts, 20 regulations, 3 governmental orders, 35 Official Comments of 
the CNB and other orders from the Ministry of Finance.323   
When the Czech Republic was founded in 1993, the stock market in the 
Czech Republic was regulated by the Securities Act, the Commercial Code, 
the Act on Investment Companies and Investment Funds, the Stock 
Exchange Act, and the Bonds Act. These constituted the main part of 
financial market regulation as such. The chief regulator at that time was the 
Ministry of Finance, which also performed the role of the administrative 
body. The capital market area was governed by Division 10, also called the 
Securities Authority. All these legal norms were adversely affected by 
insufficient knowledge of this sector and an acute lack of experience; that is 
why they have all been amended or replaced by new legislation. 
The Ministry of Finance carried out state supervision over the emission 
and trade of publicly tradeable bonds and the activities of the Securities 
Authority. In addition, it also performed the role of an organiser of the 
public market, a trader, a broker, the operator of the state printer of tokens 
of value and the institution that settles deals with securities.324 However, the 
ministry’s authority was limited and rather ineffective, largely due to the fact 
that the officers dealing with this agenda lacked experience. As a result, this 
 
323 The Ministry of Finance. Právní předpisy upravující kapitálový trh v ČR [online] [qtd. 
11th July 2015]. Available at < http://www.mfcr.cz/cs/soukromy-
sektor/regulace/kapitalovy-trh/pravni-ramce>. 
324 HLÚBIK, M. Aplikace Basel II na obchodníka s cennými papíry, Praha, 2008. 67 pages. MA 
thesis. University of Economics, Faculty of Finance and Accounting. Supervisor Petr 
MUSÍLEK p. 12. 
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period saw the establishment of many obscure companies in the capital 
market—their business practices were somewhat dubious and they often led 
to financial scandals especially in the area of investment funds. These 
problems could not be prevented even though the supervisory body gained 
more authority: it could impose sanctions up to CZK 10 million, proclaim 
enforced administration or replace the executives in investment companies 
and funds. Real supervisory authority, however, came with the 
establishment of the Czech Securities Commission. 
As it was stated above, the Czech capital market as a source of finance is 
not as important as credit from credit institutions. This is a rather usual 
thing in Europe in comparison with the USA, where the capital market 
plays a far more important role in money acquisition for further 
development of individual companies.   
 
2. 1998-2004 period  
The crucial event in the financial market in this period was the 
establishment of the Czech Securities Commission (hereinafter just ‘the SC’) 
on the 1st April 1998 under Act no. 15/1998 Coll., the Securities 
Commission Act. The SC became the major administrative body with all the 
powers previously held by the Securities Authority (within the Ministry of 
Finance), from which it essentially broke free.  
When the Securities Commission Act was proposed, it was stated that the 
then situation in the Czech capital market had proved beyond doubt the 
institutional, procedural and substantive inadequacy of the legislation as well 
as of the supervision carried out by the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, the 
Securities Commission was proposed as a flexible institution endowed with 
extra authority to immediately and expertly deal with problems in the capital 
market.325 
From the very beginning, the SC declared its desire to bring Czech 
legislation into line with European legislation, which can be illustrated in the 
Securities Act in the form of an increasing number of demands on securities 
traders (hereinafter also just ‘traders’). 
The SC with its regulatory and supervisory authority over financial 
market participants intended to increase the credibility of the financial 
 
325 KLÁŠTERECKÝ, J.D. Dohled nad kapitálovým trhem…dnes ČNB. [online] [qtd. 11th 




market. It could sanction participants if they failed to fulfil obligations 
arising from the financial market legislation. Equally, it was supposed to 
cooperate with the police and courts and, in certain cases, it could also exert 
its authority to block a transfer of securities or money from one account to 
another.  
Originally, the SC did not have the power to issue statutory instruments. 
It could impose interim measures, i.e. it could freeze money or securities, it 
could impose sanctions up to CZK 100 million, and, crucially, it could also 
revise all the licences granted by the Ministry of Finance within one year of 
their existence (the so-called ‘relicensing’). Relicensing led to a number of 
licences being revoked—licences belonging either to companies no longer 
in operation or to companies that had done harm to customers and/or the 
capital market. The requirements issued by the SC were much stricter than 
those of the Ministry of Finance—the aim was to maintain the standards of 
conduct found in the countries of the European Union. Overall, relicensing 




The number of traders with securities had dropped from 131 (1st January 2000) to 112 
(1st January 2001) and further down to 97 (31st December 2001). A similar decrease 
also occurred in collective investment, where the number of active investment companies had 
dropped from 79 (31st December 1999) to 65 (31st December 2001). Likewise, the 
number of investment funds had changed from 85 to 74. As of 30th September 2003, the 
number of traders was 72 (21 banks, the others non-banking ones), 6 investment funds 
and 17 investment companies operating 78 open common funds; there were also 12 
pension funds.327 
A significant benefit was expected from the SC’s activity against the 
misuse of insider (i.e. publicly inaccessible) information. Furthermore, the 
SC was asked to follow and check suspect deals, to punish offenders and to 
initiate prosecution against them. Gradual integration was supposed to 
 
326 JAKUB, F. Analýza modelů regulace a dozoru nad finančním trhem, Praha, 2011. 179 pages. 
Dissertation thesis. University of Economics, Faculty of Finance and Accounting. 
Supervisor Petr MUSÍLEK p. 108. 
327 PAVLÁT, V. KUBÍČEK, A. Regulace a dohled nad finančními trhy. 2nd rev. ed. Praha: 
University of Finance and Administration, o.p.s., 201,. p. 154. 
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broaden the scope of activity of the SC, which would eventually change its 
name to the Financial Market Commission.328 
The new legislation settling the regulation of traders contained (for the 
first time) especially the obligation to set up the registered capital worth 
CZK 10 million and to maintain the capital adequacy. Also, it stipulated 
more requirements regarding the inner organisation of the trader and 
stricter separation of customer accounts so that these could not be used for 
transfers on one’s own account.  
The capital adequacy regulations329 were only issued by the SC in 2003, 
and it included the so-called Basel Capital Accord, often labelled as Basel I. 
It ordered the Czech Republic to incorporate Council Directive 93/6/EEC 
on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions. 
Prior to joining the EU, the Czech Republic was forced to bring its 
legislation into accord with EU law—it had to adopt European directives330, 
i.e. to transpose them into the Securities Act.  
Investment services were divided into primary and secondary ones. 
According to Council Directive 93/6/EEC on the capital adequacy of 
investments firms and credit institutions traders were divided into three 
categories based on the investment services provided and on whether they 
were entitled to accept financial funds or investment instruments from 
customers. Depending on which category the given trader found 
themselves in, the registered capital was at least CZK 2 million (the trader 
could not accept financial funds or investment instruments), CZK 5 
million (the trader could offer some investment services and accept 
financial funds), or CZK 27 million (the others).  
The SC defined, in accordance with the directive331, insider information 
and it forbade people to use such information directly or indirectly.  
 
328 Klášterecký, J.D. Dohled nad kapitálovým trhem…dnes ČNB. [online] [qtd. 11th July 2017] 
Available at< http://trhy.mesec.cz/clanky/dohled-nad-kapitalovym-trhem-dnes-
cnb/?_ga=1.143564661.1130367641.1403871224>. 
329 Regulation no. 64/2003 Coll., on the capital adequacy of securities traders that is not a 
bank or a branch of a foreign bank on an individual basis and Regulation no. 73/2003 
Coll., on  announcing the capital adequacy of securities traders that is not a bank or a 
branch of a foreign bank. 
330 Council Directive 88/627/EEC of 12 December 1988 on the information to be 
published when a major holding in a listed company is acquired or disposed of, Council 
Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, 
Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 on investment services in the securities 
field, Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of 
investments firms and credit institutions. Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes. 
174 
 
Another milestone in this period was the establishment of the Investor 
Compensation Fund based on both Council Directive 97/9/EC on 
investor-compensation schemes and the amendment332 of Act no. 591/1992 
Coll, on securities. 
The Fund’s main task is to create a guarantee system that can be used to 
pay compensation to customers of those securities traders that cannot fulfil 
obligations to their customers. It essentially safeguards customers against 
improper conduct from traders, which could otherwise result in the loss of 
all the funds entrusted to a particular trader.   
It is worth pointing out that the most important hedge fund is the 
Deposit Insurance Fund. This independent legal person was established 
according to Act no. 156/1994 Coll., which amends and supplements Act 
no. 21/1992 Coll., on banks; the main task is to insure deposits (receivables 
of depositors, both legal and natural persons) at banks, buildings societies, 
and savings and cooperative banks 333. It is the end of the Guarantee Fund 
of Cooperative Banks and the transfer of its agenda within the Deposit 
Insurance Fund that can be seen as a sign of integration; in this case it is the 
unification of the guarantee system within the financial market, which 
reached its climax in the form of the Financial Market Guarantee System, 
which comprises both the Deposit Insurance Fund and the Crisis 
Resolution Fund. On top of that, in the future the Investor Compensation 
Fund should be added as well.   
The main role of the Deposit Insurance Fund is the protection of bank 
deposits, thereby increasing the credibility of the banking system, 
particularly in economically insecure periods.  
 
3. The Czech Republic in the EU 
When the Czech Republic had joined the EU, new legislation linked with 
capital markets came into effect; it saw the transposition of virtually all EU 
directives. 
 
331 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on 
insider dealing. 
332 Act no. 362/2000 Coll., amendment of act on securities. 
333 The Guarantee Fund of Cooperative Banks was an independent legal person according 
to Act no. 87/1995 Coll., on savings and cooperative banks. However, on 1st April 2006 
came into force Act no. 57/2006 Coll., on amendments in connection with integration of 
supervision over the financial market; from then on deposits in active cooperative banks 
are treated according to Act no. 21/1992 Coll., on banks, as amended and they are insured 
at the Deposit Insurance Fund. 
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The rules stipulated in the Securities Act were transferred into a new legal 
norm, namely Act no. 256/2004 Coll., on capital market undertakings. The 
Securities Act was only left with the rules stipulating contractual aspects of 
securities. Among other things, a host of regulations were cancelled and the 
Act on Investment Companies and Investment Funds was replaced by Act 
no. 189/2004 Coll., on collective investment.  
More changes were brought in with Basel II directives. 334 They were 
made via amendments to the Act335 that stipulates capital requirements of 
banks, savings and cooperative banks, securities traders and via the 
institution of electronic money along with a statutory instrument336, which 
resulted in unified regulation for banks and traders alike.  
When Act no. 57/2006 Coll. came into effect, the SC ceased to be. 
Naturally, the term in office ended for the head and the members of the 
executive board. The previous agenda stemming from the acts and other 
legal regulations was passed on to the CNB. This institution was also 
entrusted with the unified supervisory role over the entire financial market. 
From the legislative point of view, I am convinced that the financial 
market has gone through a series of major changes that, by means of 
transposition of European directives, identified Czech legislation with that 
of the EU, thereby increasing the credibility of the Czech financial market. 
The capital market, in particular, needed such a boost given its more 
dramatic development marked by a high number of legal norms connected 
with supervision. Had the regulation of capital market institutions not 
intensified, such a high degree of credibility and transparency could not 
have been  reached, even though the number of tradeable securities 
lowered and the development of the securities market slowed a little. 
At the present time, there seems to be a lot of effort to stabilise capital 
markets and this can be demonstrated on the legislation adopted after the 
Czech Republic had joined the EU. Before the Czech Republic became an 
EU member country, the regulatory aim had been to stipulate rules for 
investors and increase market transparency. Now that the aim has been 
reached (in my opinion, the rules and norms for the operation of capital 
market institutions and customer protection are wholly satisfactory), the 
 
334 Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 
relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions Directive 
2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 on the 
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions. 
335 Act no. 120/2007 Coll., on amendments to some acts. 




effort has shifted towards the enhancement of capital market stability, cf. 
the latest EU attempts to create the Capital Markets Union and the Banking 
Union. All this helps to reach the ultimate goal of the EU economy, namely 
the existence of a single market. 
 
Institutional development of the system of supervision 
 
From the beginning of financial market supervision in the Czech Republic, 
it was carried out by means of a sectoral model, in which each sector of the 
financial market had its own supervisory authority. For banks it was the 
CNB, for non-banking financial institutions and dealers (such as investment 
companies, investment and common funds, securities traders, financial 
dealers, securities registers and securities market organisers) it was the 
Securities Commission. Supervision of pension funds and insurance 
companies remained within the authority of the Ministry of Finance (from 
1st September 2000 in the ‘State supervision in insurance and supplementary 
pension insurance’ department). In 1997 the ‘Supervision in credit unions’ 
was founded, while, as a matter of fact, credit unions had existed for a 
year—this delay in supervision brought about bankruptcy of some 
institutions, thereby weakening the credibility of the whole sector. 
The sectoral model was no longer tenable owing to the costs it required 
as well as due to the ever-increasing financial market. Yet, it was still true 
that the biggest share of the market was occupied by the banks, which in 
2004 possessed almost 75% of all assets; even though the share and 


















Financial institution/Share of assets 
of the financial sector in % per year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
1. Banks 78.8 82.1 81.4 80 81 77.5 75.9 74 74.1 
2. Credit unions 0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 0 0.1 
3. Insurance companies 5 4.8 4.9 5.4 5.8 6.3 7.2 7.6 8.3 
4. Investment companies, 
investment and common funds 8.1 6.3 4.2 4.8 3.4 2.8 3.9 3.3 3 
5. Pension funds 1 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.9 
6. Financial leasing companies 4.1 3.9 4.6 4.5 4.1 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.3 
7. Other non-banking financial 
institutions 3 2 3.6 3.7 4.2 6.1 5.1 6.5 5.4 
 











Source: CNB, Erbenová M.: Globalizace finančních trhů a integrace dozoru nad finančním trhem 
České republiky, Sborník z mezinárodní konference VŠFS 2005, Aktuální vývoj finančních trhů, jejich 
regulace a dozor, p. 26. 
 
    Originally, integration (as it is understood at the level of individual 
member countries, i.e. the unification of supervision within one institution) 
was supposed to be realised in two separate stages. This was the 
governmental strategy from May 2004: from 1st July 2004 the CNB was 
asked to start supervising credit unions whilst the SC (under the name of 
the Financial Market Commission) would supervise insurance companies 
and pension funds. The second stage in the form of complete integration 
would follow along with the admission of the Czech Republic to the 
European Monetary System. Supervision would either be carried out by the 
CNB or the Financial Market Commission. 
The door was open to accept either of the two options: integration of 
supervision within one independent and separate supervisory authority was 
only possible if the issue of its proper financing was dealt with while its 
integration within the agenda of the CNB was only feasible providing the 
issue of autonomous supervision of the capital market was addressed.337 The 
laws vital for this reform were passed by the government in June 2005 and 
they were sent to the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Parliament for 
further discussion and eventual approval. The main motivation behind this 
 
337 HOLLMANN, P. Aktuální vývoj finančních trhů, jejich regulace a dozor, Conference 
Proceedings, VŠFS 2005, pp. 34 a 35. 
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reform was the desire to increase the effectiveness of supervision over big 
financial groups and to minimise the dangers that threatened the financial 
stability of the system. The supervisory approach would be identical in all 
the financial sectors and any supervisory overlaps in the sectors would be 
prevented. There was considerable hurry to solve the following problem: 
insurance companies and pension funds were supervised by the Ministry of 
Finance while the international obligations of the Czech Republic and the 
requirements of foreign institutions called for an independent supervisory 
authority. Last but not least, the reform was expected to reduce costs of 
supervision and to be financially beneficial for the supervised as well as their 
report obligations would be dealt with more effectively using the latest 
information technology. 
In June 2005 there was a dramatic change as the Ministry of Finance 
announced its decision to cancel the first stage. Instead, there would only be 
one stage and supervision would be integrated within the CNB. It was, 
without any doubt, a political decision because an expert assessment insists 
that it was all announced and realised far too hastily and without sufficient 
reasons for such a radical step. The legislative process, including the 
preparation of a complex amendment, was extremely quick and the whole 
process of integration only took 7 months; as a consequence, some issues 
were only dealt with ex post, e.g. the shift towards the functional model of 
supervision, which took place in January 2008.  
Integration of supervision within one single institution also took place in 
Slovakia roughly at the same time. Nonetheless, the period from the 
acceptance of the proposal (March 2002) to its actual realisation (January 
2006) lasted almost 4 years. Such a radical reform clearly needs some time 
for the preparation of legislation, the setting of its organisation and of the 
system of finance so that everything runs as smoothly as possible and 
problems are not tackled ex post. It is not entirely clear why such a dramatic 
change happened in the first place, particularly when so much money, time, 
and effort had been spent on preparing the reform of supervision. I believe 
that the two-stage model of integration would have made a more effective 
and quicker impact in the long run. In this way, it would have been possible 
for everybody concerned to get ready for the reform. The outcome, i.e. 
integration within the central bank, was naturally always one of the options 
because of the infrastructure, a stable source of finance, the personnel, but 
also due to the fact that it is typical of the financial system in the Czech 
Republic (the financial market) that the dominant position is occupied by 
the banks. The Ministry of Finance remained the regulatory body, i.e. the 
proposer of primary legislation, while the CNB became the producer of 
secondary legislation. The CNB also got help from the newly-created 
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Financial Market Committee—an advisory body of the CNB Bank Board, 
incorporated within the structure of the central bank. Its job is to discuss 
the strategic and conceptual aspects of regulation, supervision and the 
financial market as such. Moreover, it can issue recommendations in the 
report on financial market supervision, which is created by the CNB and it 
is submitted to both chambers of the parliament. 
 The entire integration reform was thus carried out in a single step and 
since 1st April 2006 the single supervisory authority in the Czech Republic is 
the CNB.338 
The following are the chief reasons why supervision was integrated 
within one authority only:339 
- greater transparency of the system of integration and supervision 
- reduction of overlapping competence among supervisory bodies 
- creation of suitable conditions for a more effective financial market 
monitoring 
- application of equal regulatory requirements in all sectors of the 
financial market 
- reduction of costs thanks to sharing the working infrastructure 
- removal of competition among individual supervisory bodies 
Although such an institutional arrangement (i.e. where one institution has 
such a vast scope of authority) may pose some risk, I am convinced that 
such fears have been allayed by the present model and its activities, 
especially given the fact that the supervisory policy of one single body is 
more unified and effective. Furthermore, another advantage is that reactions 
to problems in one part of the financial market may lead to immediate 
prevention in another part. 
As it has been said before, in January 2008 the up-to-then sectoral model 
with three sectors (supervision of banks, insurance companies and the 
capital market) was replaced by a functional model with three supervisory 
departments that acquired new competence. The newly-created departments 
were: the Financial Market Regulation and Analyses Department, the 
Licensing and Enforcement Department, and the Financial Market 
Supervision Department.   
The choice of the CNB as the body with the complete authority over the 
Czech financial market seems perfectly logical as even in the period before 
 
338 By means of Act no. 57/2006 Sb., on amendments of acts in connection with 
integration of supervision over the financial market.  
339 JENÍK, I. Dohled a regulace finančního trhu. 1st ed. Prague: Vyšehrad, 2011, p. 81.  
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supervision was integrated, the CNB (with its supervisory authority over the 
banks) had had, compared with the other supervisory bodies, by far the 
biggest share of supervision in the financial market. 
A necessary part of every integration process is the revision of the 
present legislation with vital changes being made so that the existence of a 
single supervisory body is enabled. The process of integration is linked with 
unavoidable implementation of European directives—annually, there are 
several of them and they set the legislative framework in this area.  
The biggest change within the ongoing process of integration was the 
organisational shift from the sectoral model to the functional one in January 
2008—the change was motivated by the aim to achieve better results in the 
integration process. This is demonstrated by the attempt to integrate 
supervision in all parts of the financial market (not only in supervisory and 
control activities, but also in administration). 
The main motivation behind the change of the organisational structure of 
the supervisory departments was the need to do away with conflicts 
between different legislative norms. These were acts that applied to one 
sector only and they dealt with things separately despite the fact that the 
things could be dealt with in the same way. Prior to this, there had been 
some conflicts that then had to be settled at the level of the Bank Board. 
Today, the change has resulted in them being tackled at several levels lower 
than before, e.g. at the level of CNB officers.340 
This is exactly the chief benefit of the functional model, i.e. problems are 
dealt with at the lower levels of both legislative and executive power within 
the authority of the CNB. In addition, the next big benefit is the wider 
scope of functional supervision within one institution—it is no longer 
effective to have several supervisory bodies due to the ever-increasing 
globalisation and a wide range of activities of global financial corporations. 
The drawbacks of the previous model appear to be linked with the 
sectoral orientation of the supervisory bodies. Now that every big banking 
group comprises entities belonging to all sectors of the financial market, it is 
not viable any longer to pursue just a single goal while performing 
supervision. Banks perform all the activities under one roof and the 
supervisor must reflect this trend. The supervisory authority should take 
charge of all the entities operating in the market, which the new model 
 
340 KUCHTA, D. SINGER, M. Podle MiFIDu jsem...´babička z Orlických hor´, 





enables. The functional model can thus be interpreted as a reflection of the 
outside world, the activities of which call for an integrated system of 
supervision within a single supervisory authority341. 
More changes were made on 1st March 2011 with a view to making the 
system even more effective. The individual supervisory departments are 
now defined by their functional specialisation and within their own 
competence they supervise all the financial institutions across all the sectors 
of the financial market. The previous number of five divisions was reduced 
by one, the existing four are: the Prudential Supervision Division, the 
Conduct of Business Supervision Division, the Prudential Control Division, 
and the Conduct of Business Control Division. This change of the structure 
of financial market supervision reflects the long-term positive experience of 
the functional model in the CNB.342 
What benefits does (or should) the integrated model bring about? Firstly, 
one can expect a more effective detection of possible risks against the 
stability of the financial system. Other benefits include better coordination, 
more effective communication, prompter reactions to changes in the 
financial market and more responsibility within a single institution. While 
the risks (mentioned above) have been present ever since the very start of 
integration, the advantages have only been made visible slowly, and several 
years must elapse before it is possible to say whether it was a step in the 
right direction. Arguably the biggest danger of integrated supervision is the 
aforementioned concentration of authority in one single institution. This 
danger has always been manifest, but the expected benefits of simpler and 
more effective supervision integrated in a single institution outweighed the 
doubts and dangers. 
Integration of supervision in a single authority, however, is not the only 
step—it is rather a factual and external sign of integration. Other important 
aspects include the unification of supervisory rules applied in various 
sectors of the financial market and a higher quality of supervision over big 
international institutions of the financial industry. 
 
341 KUCHTA, D. SINGER, M. Podle MiFIDu jsem...´babička z Orlických hor´, 
Investujeme.cz [online] 2008 [qtd. 20th June 2017]. Available at 
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Another important feature is the unification of existing as well as future 
legislation—the current system should prevent undesirable duplications 
and gaps whilst increasing the transparency and effectiveness of 
supervision and reducing the costs. The ultimate objective of single-
authority integration should be national as well as global integration across 
financial market sectors. 
The desirable goal of integration is not unification within a single 
authority343, but rather (as it has been stated in the chapter about integration 
of supervision in Norway or as integration is understood in the EU) 
unification of supervisory activities, practices and methods including mutual 
cooperation not only at the national level, but at the global level as well. 
Supervision must thus be maintained in the hands of a limited number of 
institutions (ideally just one or two) to ensure that it is unified and very 
effective, too.  
 
Supervision of the CNB over financial market entities 
 
The status of the CNB is stipulated in Act no. 6/1993 Coll., on the Czech 
National Bank, which asserts in Article 1, par. 3 that the CNB is entrusted 
with the competence of a supervisory authority as defined by this Act and 
other legal norms.344 The CNB supervises the entire financial market in the 
Czech Republic—at the moment, supervision is performed over 276 








343 Integration of supervision in a single institution is what integration is usually understood 
in individual member countries.  
344 E.g. Act no.  21/1992 Coll, on banks, as amended (hereinafter also just the Bank Act, or 
the BA), Act no. 219/1995 Coll., the Foreign Exchange Act, Act no. 256/2004 Coll., 
Capital Market Undertakings Act, Act no. 87/1995 Coll., on credit unions, as amended, Act 
no. 240/2013 Coll., on investment companies and investment funds, Act no. 277/2009 
Coll., on insurance, Act no. 426/2011 Coll., pension saving, Act no. 427/2011 Coll., on 
supplementary pension saving. 
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Table 7: Number of financial market entities as of 30th March 2020. 
Source: Own processing based on CNB data statistics 
 
The exact numbers in the table above are purely illustrative because they 
keep changing, of course. Admittedly, the changes are not as dramatic 
though as they were some twenty years ago. 
The CNB also has its say in planning long-term strategies of regulation 
and supervision in the EU, whether it is the capital adequacy directive 
(including the implementation of Basel II and III), Solvency II rules, the 
regulation of credit rating agencies and collective investment, or the new 
framework of financial market supervision, including the Banking Union. 
The basic rules vital for the maintenance of financial stability (especially 
the macro-prudential ones in the form of capital adequacy) are observed in 
accordance with CRD IV. 
The banking sector as the crucial part of the Czech financial market 
keeps making profit and is in good shape. Singer345 claims that the capital 
adequacy of the banking sector is sufficient and its capital is of a high 
quality; further, he says that the liquidity of the banking sector is excellent 
and this sector does not pose any risk. As regards the new framework of 
supervision in the EU, the CNB is convinced that the structural changes of 
supervision in the EU must keep the balance between authority and 
responsibility. Whilst authority in the process of integration of supervision 
in the EU is now in the hands of the European supervisory authority, 
responsibility is still with the national supervisors. According to the CNB, 
the biggest danger in the area of supervision lies in mistakes made while 
introducing new supervisory rules or, alternatively, in their hasty 
implementation without the consequences having been properly discussed. 
 
345 SINGER, M. Dohled nad finančním trhem. Paper delivered at Den otevřených dveří ČNB. 
Prague 12th June 2010. 
Banks and branches of foreign banks 49 
Savings and credit unions 9 
Investment companies 36 
Investment funds with legal persons 164 
Securities traders and branches of a foreign securities trader 79 
Insurance companies and branches of foreign insurance companies 48 
Reinsurance companies 1 




The CNB is rather sceptical about some of the proposed changes in 
supervision—the reason for its scepticism is the possible appearance of 
systemic risks and uncertain results of some international proposals. 
 
Granting and taking away licences and permits at the financial 
market 
 
It is clearly believed that one of the most important parts of financial 
market regulation and supervision is the stipulation of conditions on which 
one may gain access to the financial market as a financial market entity with 
subsequent monitoring ensuring that the conditions are met and business is 
conducted in the proper way. These are macro-prudential rules stipulated 
for the entire financial market—if one wants to become a financial market 
entity, a licence (banks) or a permit (all the other financial market entities) 
must be gained. It is far beyond the scope of the present book to analyse 
the licencing procedure for all financial institutions so only two are 
discussed here: banks and securities traders, arguably the second most 
important financial market entity after banks. 
This subchapter aims to confirm or refute the hypothesis that a proper 
and consistent procedure of taking away licences supports the general 
objective of regulation and supervision, namely the maintenance of 
financial market stability. The hypothesis only applies to the termination 
of financial market entities because when licences are being granted, it is 
crystal clear that a proper procedure observing all the conditions necessary 
for the licence to be granted helps to maintain financial market stability. 
There are two reasons why only two entities (banks and securities traders) 
are discussed here in connection with licences and permits. Firstly, the two 
are undoubtedly the most important institutions conducting business in the 
financial market (especially banks and their conduct is essential for the 
stability of the entire system). Secondly, legal norms linked with these 
entities are rather specific (this is especially true of banks) and they thus 
illustrate the issue very well.  
Taking away licences and permits is further analysed here at a more 
general level, i.e. in connection with all financial institutions, and not just 
banks and securities traders. This is justified by the fact that the end of 
licences and permits is more or less the same (barring a few irregularities), 
regardless of which financial institution’s licence or permit is cancelled.   
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1. Licencing procedure for banks 
If anybody wants to offer banking services (i.e. conduct business as a bank 
in the Czech Republic), there are two options according to Act no. 21/1992 
Coll., on banks (hereinafter the Banks Act).  
- The first option is to gain a banking licence from the CNB or a 
permit to offer banking services, i.e. accept deposits from the public 
and offer credit.  
- The second option is to offer banking services in the Czech Republic 
by banks whose headquarters is in another EU member country by 
means of a branch thanks to the so-called single licence in the 
banking market; two conditions are necessary: the foreign bank must 
own a valid licence from the country of its headquarters and it must 
follow the procedure stipulated by EU law.  
In accordance with the international contract, the CNB can issue a 
directive raising the number of countries whose banks have the same 
advantages while doing business in the Czech Republic as banks that are 
from EU countries. Whoever conducts business under the single licence in 
another country, is supervised by the domestic supervisory body, with the 
exception of a few clearly defined legal norms of the home country. If a 
bank wants to offer services via its branch, it must go through the so-called 
notification procedure, in which it presents information regarding its 
business plan, its list of services, its headquarters, its organisational 
structure, and its head. These branches only need to comply with the 
registering obligation of taxable entities stipulated in a special legal norm346. 
Banks with the headquarters in EU member countries are entitled to 
conduct business even without setting up a branch if their business is not 
permanent. 
However, this book only goes on to discuss the granting of a banking 
licence (hereinafter just ‘licence’) in a licensing procedure—when a new 
banking institution under the supervision of the CNB is established. 
The licence application (the required form) is submitted to the CNB 
along with a proposal of the association articles. The minimum capital for 
would-be banks is CZK 500 000 000, and this is also the required minimum 
amount of money gathered by deposits on a pre-arranged account. The 
licence requirements are stipulated by the CNB directive no. 233/2009 Coll. 
The application must be submitted in writing and it must include basic 
information about the applicant, the reason(s) for the application, the 
 
346 Cf. § 33, Act no. 337/1992 Coll., on tax and fees administration, as amended. 
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objective of the bank, a business plan and a market analysis, plus a number 
of other documents. All of these are considered in the licensing procedure.  
The licensing procedure formally begins when the CNB informs the 
applicant that the procedure has commenced. This is, of course, only 
possible once the application form has been submitted. Along with the 
commencement of the licensing procedure, the CNB asks the applicant to 
comment on/make a complaint about the documents submitted in the 
application form or the method of their assessment. Typically, the licensing 
procedure lasts 6 months unless it is interrupted because the CNB requires 
supplementary information. In such a case, the licensing procedure can last 
up to 12 months. The CNB assesses especially the capacity of the main 
shareholders regarding their financial stability and power, but is also looks 
into the level of expertise and the moral standards of persons proposed to 
form the statutory and executive boards of the bank. Moreover, technical 
and organisational equipment necessary for the services to be offered is 
examined as well as the feasibility of the economic plans for the future 
liquidity and profitability of the bank. The applicant must pay an 
administrative fee of CZK 200 000.347 
Provided that all the necessary conditions are met, the CNB grants the 
licence. Typically, the category of administrative discretion is applied here 
because while some aspects and conditions affecting the decision to grant 
the licence may be objective, others appear rather subjective and their 
assessment is thus left to the discretion of the assessor. For instance, in 
some cases it might be disputable whether a given person reaches the 
required level of expertise or moral behaviour, or whether the technical 
background is appropriate enough for the type and range of services that 
the banking institution plans to offer. In order to prevent such unclear 
situations that may result from some rather vague categories, the CNB 
issues official notices that provide more information about the categories 
and they specify the requirements that applicants should meet. The 
assessment of such categories as expertise or credibility is thus hopefully 
clearer and more predictable.348 
If the application is successful, the licence is given for an indefinite 
period. The licence stipulates the activities that the bank is allowed to 
perform; alternatively, it provides a list of conditions that must be met 
before another type of activity is initiated or that must be observed during 
the performance of this activity. Some activities present in the licence may 
 
347 Item. 65/1, letter a) of Act no. 634/2004 Coll., on administrative fees, as amended. 
348 Based on the CNB Official Notice, issued on the 3rd December 2013, explaining the 
notions of credibility and expertise.  
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be conditioned by the granting of a special permit (e.g. a permit for services 
in the investment industry which is granted under Act no. 256/2004 Coll., 
Capital Market Undertakings Act). 
In a nutshell, before a bank comes into existence, there must first be a 
joint-stock company which, sooner or later, manages to meet the 
requirements of the Banks Act; only after the company has been granted a 
banking licence, can the company call itself a bank349. The purpose of 
business activities listed in the List of Company Registers is banking 
services or all the services that the applicant is entitled to perform according 
to the licence. 
If the CNB’s decision is negative, the applicant may file a remonstrance, 
which is a regular remedial measure present in the administrative order; the 
decision (which is irrevocable) is then made by the Bank Board of the CNB. 
The remonstrance, however, has no suspensory effect and the provision 
about the possible conclusion of the remonstrance proceeding cannot be 
applied.350 
 
2. Granting permits according to the Banks Act 
In a number of cases the Banks Act demands that banks, prior to making a 
certain step, ask for permission or inform the CNB of what they are going 
to do. A prior permission is required in the following cases: 
a) a person intends to obtain direct or indirect share of the bank worth 
at least 20%, 30%, or 50% of the voting rights of the bank, including 
a person who wants to reach the above-mentioned limits of the basic 
capital of the bank, including a person who will become an executive 
member due to a contract to control the bank. This obligation also 
applies to persons acting in compliance,351  
b) prior to a contract about the sale of the bank ort its part,352 
c) prior to a bank merger, a division of a bank, or a transfer of funds to 
another bank as a shareholder,353 
 
349 Cf. Article 3, par. 1 of the Banks Act. 
350 Cf.  Article 152 par. 5 Act no. 500/2004 Coll., the administrative order. 
351 Cf. Article 20 par. 3 of the Banks Act. 
352 Cf. Article 16 par. 1 letter a) of the Banks Act. 
353 Cf. Article 16 par. 1 letter c) of the Banks Act. 
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d) when a decision to terminate a bank is reached at the level of the 
general meeting or when the decision affects the activities which can 
only be performed by a licence holder,354 
e) when the basic capital is reduced, unless it is a case of loss 
compensation,355 
f) when an auditor is about to chosen.356 
Within two days after receiving the application, the CNB must confirm in 
writing its acceptance, and it must inform the applicant of the deadline by 
which the CNB must reach a decision. The CNB must do so no later than 
60 working days after sending the confirmation notice. If this deadline is 
missed, the applicant can act as if the licence has been granted.  
It should be stressed, though, that if there is an increase in the qualified 
interest in the bank or if there is a takeover without the consent of the 
CNB, this does not mean that such a legal act is automatically nullified. Yet, 
the voting rights linked with this act cannot be exercised until the 
permission from the CNB is granted. Legal acts and resolutions of the 
general meeting made without a prior consent are invalid. 
The participant in the prior consent proceeding is only the requesting 
bank; in the following cases it is also the second contractual party: when the 
bank or its part is transferred according to letter b), or when there is a bank 
merger or a bank division, or the funds are received according to letter c) .357  
The notification duty is applicable in the following cases: 
- the reduction of the direct or indirect share of the bank under 20%, 
30%, or 50% of the voting rights—this duty also applies to persons 
acting in compliance. After the Banks Act amendment, the duty also 
applies when the share in the basic capital is reduced below the 
above-mentioned limits or when there is a loss of control over the 
bank; further, if there is a proposal to transfer such an amount of 
share or other rights that constitutes qualified interest in the bank,358 
- a change in the association articles,359 
 
354 Cf. Article 16 par. 1 letter b) of the Banks Act. 
355 Cf. Article 16 par. 1 letter d) of the Banks Act. 
356 Cf. Article 22 par. 4 of the Banks Act. 
357 Cf. Article 16 par. 1 of the Banks Act. 
358 Cf. Article 20 par. 14 of the Banks Act. 
359 Cf. Article 16 par. 2 letter a) of the Banks Act. 
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- a change of personnel in the statutory body of the bank or in the 
executive board,360 
- an intent to open a branch abroad361--having received the notification 
about the branch abroad, the CNB decides in an administrative 
proceeding whether the conditions stipulated by EU law are met 
(according to Article 5c – 5m of the Banks Act)362  and if the decision 
is negative (the conditions are not met), it is reviewable in court. 
- the acquisition of qualified interest of another legal person.363 
 
3. Licensing procedure for securities traders 
The establishment and conduct of business of securities traders is governed 
by Act no. 256/2004 Coll., the Capital Market Undertakings Act 
(hereinafter just ‘the CMUA’). Before the application is submitted, it is 
necessary for the applicant to clarify its business intent since it is a key 
aspect in determining the line of business, particularly as regards the scope 
of investment services. This also determines the minimum capital 
requirements, the capital adequacy requirements and other material, 
personnel and organisational requirements. 
The only participant in a permit procedure is a joint-stock shareholder or 
a limited liability company with its headquarters in the Czech Republic; the 
application must be submitted in the form prescribed by the CNB including 
all the compulsory supplements. The application can be submitted by a 
company even before the company is listed in the List of Company 
Registers, but it must meet all the criteria required for the permit before its 
entry in the List—the company must be able to prove them in a trustworthy 
manner. During the permit procedure it is possible to order a hearing in 
which the CNB officers specify what additional information is needed to 
complete an imperfect application. The CNB decides whether the permit is 
granted or not within 6 months from the day it received the application, 
unless there have been delays caused by an incomplete or imperfect form. 
This deadline became stipulated by law in accordance with the MiFID 
Directive.    
 
360 Cf. Article 16 par. 2 letter b) of the Banks Act. 
361 Cf. Article 16a par. 1 of the Banks Act. 
362 It is a provision connected with the principle of a single licence, i.e. the possibility to 
provide banking services in the member countries of the EU, without the need to acquire 
the licence in every single one of them. 
363 Cf. Article 16 par. 2 letter c) of the Banks Act. 
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In case an existing securities trader plans to make a change in their scope 
of business, there needs to be a new permit procedure, which is, to a certain 
extent, similar to the original procedure. The CNB must assess all the lawful 
requirements as when a new permit is about to be granted; though in this 
procedure the applicant only provides that information which is relevant for 
the change in question. Of course, the applicant may refer to the documents 
that have been submitted in the past three years, providing the relevant data 
have not changed.  
The application seeking to gain a permit or a permit expansion (including 
all the relevant documents) is purely the responsibility of the applicant and 
the CNB is in no way obliged to look for documents that are necessary for 
the applicant to meet the legal requirements. 
The administrative fee, payable before or along with the application, is 
CZK 100 000364 for a permit, or CZK 10 000 for a permit extension. If the 
fee is not paid, the CNB informs the applicant and sets an extended 
deadline; if even this deadline is missed, the CNB terminates the 
administrative procedure. 
It is interesting to note that along with a permit application (or even 
later), the applicant may apply for the registration of another business 
activity (i.e. other than investment services). Such a registration is for free 
and it is not decided in an administrative procedure365. If the conditions 
linked with this business activity are met (i.e. they do not prevent the offer 
of investment services and they do not prevent efficient supervision of the 
securities trader), the CNB registers the activity and issues a registration 
notification366. This registration certifies that the conditions stipulated by 
law have been met. Yet, such a registration can ‘modify’ itself into an 
administrative procedure, if the applicant fails to give evidence that the 
lawful conditions have been met—the CNB then initiates an administrative 
procedure with the applicant and cancels the registration application 
providing the applicant does not meet the criteria even during the 
administrative procedure.      
 
 
364 Item 65/2 letter b) of the Tariff of administrative fees, amendment to Act no. 634/2004 
Coll., on administrative fees, as amended.   
365 Registration in the administrative procedure does not follow part two of the 
administrative code, but it follows part four (Articles 154 to 158); more specifically it is a 
different act according to Article 158 of the administrative code.   
366 If the trader’s activity which should be registered involves a direct link to their own 
property (Article 8a, par. 1 to 3 of the CMUA), the CNB dismisses the application unless 
there extraordinary circumstances (Article 6a, par. 6 of the CMUA). 
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4. Taking away licences and permits of financial market entities 
Miroslav Singer, the CNB former governor, asserted367 that by close of 
observation of liquidation rules the CNB helps to increase the transparency 
of the financial market for its participants, which is why I deem it apposite 
to include the matter of taking away licences and permits in this subchapter. 
I attempt to analyse what happens when a financial institution is being 
liquidated or when it is declared insolvent; in other words, when preventive 
measures and lawful requirements aiming to prevent the bankruptcy of 
financial institutions fail.  
The licence to conduct business in the financial market is revoked in the 
following ways: 
- revocation of a licence or a permit as a sanction. 
- revocation of a licence or a permit at the request of a financial market 
entity. 
- revocation of a licence or a permit resulting from the decision of a 
financial market entity to close down.  
- revocation of a licence or a permit resulting from the decision of a 
financial market entity to terminate the activities for which the licence 
or the permit is needed. 
- revocation of a licence or a permit after it has expired.  
Once the licence or the permit has been revoked, the institution enters 
liquidation unless it enters a different type of market where the licence 
(permit) is not required; alternatively, an insolvency proceeding may also be 
initiated. 
 
5. A company in liquidation 
Generally, liquidation of a legal person is treated in Act no. 89/2012 Coll., 
the Civil Code (hereinafter also just ‘the CC’), which states that the primary 
objective of liquidation is to settle and distribute the property of the legal 
person, to settle its debts to creditors and lawfully dispose of the property 
that remains after liquidation.368 The ultimate objective of liquidation is the 
expungement of the institution from the Commercial Register. A legal 
person enters liquidation the day it is cancelled or declared invalid. Once the 
 
367 SINGER, M. Dohled nad finančním trhem. Paper delivered at Den otevřených dveří of the 
CNB. Prague 12th June 2010. p. 40. 
368 Cf. Article 187 and the following of Act no. 89/2012 Coll., the Civil Code. 
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legal person has entered liquidation, the liquidator, without unnecessary 
delay, makes an entry about it in the public register.369 
As far as the liquidation of a financial institution is concerned, the crucial 
thing is the appointment of a liquidator. There are only a few particularities 
in comparison with general legal norms. Natural or legal persons can 
become potential liquidators for all financial institutions apart from banks, 
where the liquidator must only be a natural person.370 Such a provision is 
motivated by the unquestionable importance of banks and the extremely 
high level of responsibility that their liquidation entails—a natural person is 
liable for unprofessional conduct with all their property as collateral. What 
is important is the fact that the liquidator is appointed or removed by the 
court, which follows the proposal of the CNB—the court has 24 hours to 
announce its decision.371 The CNB plays a prominent role in the process of 
liquidation since it is not only a supervisory authority—it actually also 
determines who will be appointed or removed as the liquidator (the court is 
the institution ultimately responsible for the decision but it always follows 
the proposal from the CNB). Furthermore, the CNB also determines the 
liquidator’s remuneration, which is paid from the property of the liquidated 
institution. If the property does not cover the total remuneration, it is 
covered by the state. The liquidator is obliged to act with due managerial 
care372, hence their liability for any damage; an exception is the liquidator of 
an investment company or an investment fund—they must act with 
professional care373. The liquidator’s obligation to act with due managerial care 
can be inferred from Article 159, par. 1 of the Civil Code, which maintains 
that whoever ‘accepts the office of a member of an elected body undertakes 
to discharge the office with the necessary loyalty as well as the necessary 
knowledge and care. A person who is unable to act with due managerial 
care although he must have become aware thereof upon accepting or in the 
discharge of the office and fails to draw conclusions for himself is presumed 
to act with negligence’.374 
What is the difference between the two notions? Professional care is 
generally perceived to entail a higher level of expertise, higher requirements 
 
369 KURKA, R., PAŘÍKOVÁ, A. Subjekty finančního trhu, Vybrané aspekty likvidace a 
insolvence. 1st ed. Prague: C.H.Beck, 2014. p. 60. 
370 Cf. Article 8 par. 9, the Banks Act. 
371 Cf. e.g. Article 36 par. 1, the Banks Act. 
372 It can be inferred from Article 159 par. 1, the CC. 
373 Cf Article 348 Act no. 240/2013 Coll., on investment companies and investment funds, 
as amended. 
374 KURKA, R., PAŘÍKOVÁ, A. Subjekty finančního trhu, Vybrané aspekty likvidace a 
insolvence. 1st ed. Prague: C.H.Beck, 2014. p. 62. 
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and, inevitably, a higher amount of liability for a breach of the professional care 
rule. If the rule is violated, it is a case of an administrative offence with all 
the administrative and legal consequences (administrative punishment) with 
the CNB acting as the administrative body. If the due managerial care rule is 
violated, the consequences are ‘only’ in the area of civil procedure—the 
given institution can only demand a loss compensation via a lawsuit. With 
the exception of the liquidator of investment companies and investment 
funds, the CNB does not currently have the power to sanction liquidators 
who fail to adhere to the rules. 
As for the liquidators of financial institutions, the CNB chooses them 
from persons who are on a special list of trustees in bankruptcy; these 
persons have passed a specific exam for trustees and they are expected to 
possess a high level of expertise in this area. The same requirements that 
apply to the choice of trustees in bankruptcy also apply to the choice of 
liquidators, which seems wholly logical. 
Once it is known who the liquidator is going to be, the CNB submits a 
proposal of their appointment to the relevant Commercial Court in charge 
of the Commercial Register. The court then officially appoints the liquidator 
and the appointment comes into effect the moment it is disclosed either on 
the official noticeboard of the court or on its electronic noticeboard. When 
this happens, the liquidator acquires the competence of a statutory body 
and one of their main duties is to announce in the Official Business Journal 
that the institution has entered liquidation. The announcement also contains 
an appeal to potential creditors of the institution to submit their claims. The 
deadline for the creditors cannot be shorter than three months.375 A 
problem may arise if there are more creditors than previously expected and 
the financial situation of the institution reveals that there is, in fact, no other 
option but to initiate an insolvency proceeding of the financial institution. 
In my opinion, it is reasonable not to conclude the process of finding out 
creditors too soon, and the insolvency proceeding submission should also 
be considered carefully. The reason is that liquidation is closely supervised 
by the CNB (the CNB can even remove the liquidator, i.e. it submits such a 
proposal and nominate another liquidator). In contrast, an insolvency 
proceeding is not supervised to the same extent because the CNB can only 
demand information from the trustee in bankruptcy; this, however, is not 
even enforceable. I am convinced that liquidation is fairer, more carefully 
controlled and more transparent because of the CNB’s intervention and 
because of the requirements placed on liquidators. 
 
375 Cf. Article 198 of the Civil Code. 
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6. Insolvency proceeding of financial institutions 
There are several substantial differences that apply to financial institutions 
in insolvency proceedings compared to other entities. Financial institutions 
are not even subject to the same legislation; or rather, the type of insolvency 
proceeding is determined by the fact whether it concerns a credit institution 
or not. It is worth highlighting that unlike in a typical list of financial 
institutions, Act no. 182/2006 Coll., the Insolvency Act, as amended, states 
that a financial institution is a bank, a savings or credit banks, an insurance 
company or a reinsurance company.376 The bankruptcy of financial 
institutions is dealt with in the Insolvency Act (Article 2, section IV), which 
explicates the differences in comparison with a ‘regular bankruptcy’. While 
there are, admittedly, certain differences between banks and (re)insurance 
companies, these seem to be rather minute and I thus treat the insolvency 
of all financial institutions as one group here. 
A big difference from the usual insolvency proceeding under the 
Insolvency Act, is the fact that for financial institutions the trustee in 
bankruptcy may only be a trustee with a special permit.377 
What has been mentioned so far clearly suggests that there are, as a 
matter of fact, two schemes of bankruptcy. On the one hand, there are 
financial (credit) institutions, on the other hand, there are other institutions 
such as securities traders, investment companies, investment funds, pension 
companies and pension funds. If these non-credit institutions go bankrupt, 
they are dealt with in the ‘regular bankruptcy’ scheme. It is not even 
necessary that their licence or permit be revoked; unlike with financial 
institutions where licence revocation is a prerequisite for the application of 
the Insolvency Act. 
What is then the main difference between the two schemes? Apart from 
the above-mentioned necessity to revoke the licence before an insolvency 
proceeding may begin, it is also people who can submit the insolvency 
proposal—for financial institutions, the proposal may be submitted by, 
except for creditors and debtors, the CNB as well. Another unique option 
is a solution via liquidation. Yet another important option is the 
announcement of the crucial parts of the insolvency decision in the 
Official Journal of the European Union as well as the fact that the claims 
of creditors resulting from the accounting of the debtor are registered 
 
376 KURKA, R., PAŘÍKOVÁ, A. Subjekty finančního trhu, Vybrané aspekty likvidace a 
insolvence. 1st  ed. Prague: C.H.Beck, 2014. p. 150. See also Article 2 letter k) of the IA.  
377  Cf. Article 3 par. 2 of Act no. 312/2006 Coll., on trustees in bankruptcy, as amended.  
195 
 
automatically, of which the creditor is informed by the trustee in 
bankruptcy within 60 days of the company going into liquidation.  
These exceptions are quite logical and straightforward. As the CNB 
supervises these institutions and it has a large amount of highly relevant 
information about them, it is desirable that it should have the right to lodge 
an insolvency proposal. It is also wholly logical to include automatically all 
the creditors present in the accounting because the insolvency of a financial 
institution is always of such a scope and magnitude that one cannot expect 
all the creditors to be informed of the insolvency and to submit their claims; 
this is especially true of foreign creditors. This would also undoubtedly 
result in an immense administrative overload for the trustee in bankruptcy 
and the insolvency court—it would be neigh impossible to process such a 
vast number of documents. Naturally, problems may arise if the accounting 
is badly kept or even missing—this means a considerable load for the 
trustee in bankruptcy that must do their best to obtain the relevant 
information. If the information is still unavailable, there is no other option 
but to include those creditors that have been found out—either from the 
accounting or by means of applications submitted after the announcement 
in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
I have suggested above that liquidation is more favourable for creditors 
than bankruptcy. What happens, though, if, theoretically speaking, these 
two clash? The CNB may revoke a licence or a permit and suggest a 
liquidation entry while submitting a proposal to the relevant Commercial 
Court with a proposal as to who the liquidator should be. The court has 24 
hours to decide and in this interval a debtor or a creditor may submit an 
insolvency proceeding proposal. The insolvency proceeding commences the 
day the proposal physically appears at the court.378 The insolvency 
proceeding is thus opened and, a few hours later, the court opens 
liquidation and appoints a liquidator. Thus, the two clash and the institution 
is both insolvent and in liquidation. Insolvency is, of course, stronger and 
the court must deal with the insolvency proposal and possibly declare a 
bankruptcy. If the court dismisses bankruptcy, the insolvency proceeding is 
cancelled and liquidation may go on. However, if the insolvency proposal is 
justified, then the institution is declared insolvent and liquidation is put on 
the back burner—the role of the liquidator is purely formal. I believe that 
liquidation is beneficial for all the parties involved. One of the reasons why 
I think so is the fact that if the decision is based on a proposal made by 
such an institution as the CNB, then there should be no problem with loss 
compensation. One may assume that if the CNB proposes liquidation, it 
 
378 Cf. Article 97 par. 1 of the IA. 
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knows very well why, and it is then up to the liquidator and his integrity to 
submit an insolvency proposal if need be. Of course, there is still the court 
that assesses whether all the requirements for declaring bankruptcy have 
been met; if the court decides so and the requirements have actually not 
been fulfilled (i.e. it would have been possible to deal with the situation by 
means of liquidation), then the state must compensate the loss.  
 
7. Termination of financial market institutions--assessment 
The CNB performs the role of an administrative body as far as investment 
and banking services are concerned; a bank that also wants to offer 
investment services according to the Capital Market Undertakings Act, can 
thus submit only one application and the CNB only makes one decision—if 
it is a positive one, it enables the bank to offer the services. Banks present 
in the Czech banking market take part in other financial services by means 
of creating financial groups that might include, for example, an insurance 
company, a pension fund, an investment company, an investment fund, a 
financial leasing company, a factoring company, etc.; the CNB carries out 
supervision over the whole group. The dangers that a bank faces may be 
caused by its presence in the financial group. That is why some rules of 
prudential business (especially the capital adequacy, the commitment, and 
the inner control system) are applied to the group as a whole. 
It may be concluded that it is a correct decision to entrust a single body 
with administrative procedures permitting an activity or granting a licence as 
well as subsequent supervision of financial institutions owing to the fact 
that financial services are globalised to such an extent that many financial 
institutions are active in a number of financial areas. If supervision were 
carried out separately (including the granting of licences and permits), it 
would take more time and there would be a greater danger of imperfections 
because the administrative bodies would have to share information and the 
decision-making process would be more complicated and time-consuming. 
This is hardly acceptable these days. 
As regards the termination of business activities, it is clear that the 
current legislation (based on EU law) considers liquidation and insolvency 
of financial institutions a serious issue; it is, after all, to everyone’s benefit to 
make sure that these proceedings affect the stability of the economic system 
as little as possible. Except for the specific issues of liquidation and 
insolvency, there are also ‘buffers’ such as the Deposit Insurance Fund and 
the Financial Market Guarantee System, which provide a certain form of 
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guarantee that deposits or other entrusted finance will be paid out should 
financial institutions be declared insolvent. 
In case there is a potential clash between liquidation and insolvency, I am 
convinced that liquidation should be given preference (the reasons are 
outlined above); all the more so because, occasionally, insolvency proposals 
are submitted without a proper reason. I also believe that the liquidator, 
carefully chosen by the CNB, provides a sufficient guarantee of an objective 
assessment of the debtor’s financial situation—the insolvency proposal will 
be filed if the conditions stipulated by law are met. 
I can certainly confirm the hypothesis set at the beginning of this 
subchapter, namely that the right and consistent method of terminating the 
activities of financial institutions supports the general objective of 
regulation and supervision: the maintenance of financial market stability. It 
is evident that without clear rules and their consistent application the 
financial market can barely be kept transparent. If there were any doubt 
surrounding the end of a financial institution (whether it be an enforced or 
a voluntary decision) by means of liquidation or insolvency, financial 
institutions would be left in relative uncertainty as to how to conduct 
business in the financial market. Without realising and accepting the 
negative consequences of improper conduct of business activities (e.g. 
taking excessive risk without sufficient safety measures), financial 
institutions might find it difficult to avoid such conduct that could result in 
terminating their business. 
 
Attitude of the CNB towards the European system of supervision 
 
In the process of integration supervision and its future shaping, the CNB is, 
like the supervisory authorities from other countries, rather active in helping 
to shape international processes that stabilise the financial market and make 
it more transparent. The CNB is known to be among the more conservative 
ones regarding the European single supervision system, and it has published 
its viewpoints as reactions to individual steps that the EU proposed with a 
view to integrating supervision. The majority of the views mentioned below 
are connected with the establishment of the Banking Union, so it is not 
surprising that some of them have been revised as more information and 
more experience became available. Generally speaking, the CNB is not an 
advocate of a quick entry into the Eurozone or the Banking Union, largely 
because of the fact that the main supervisory authority will be centralised 
under the ECB. 
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As far as the coordination of functions via ESA authorities is concerned, 
the CNB accepts and then approves their recommendations, it also agrees 
with sharing the information, but it rejects extensive data collection. The 
CNB supports the attempts to increase financial market transparency, to 
harmonise rules and to reduce discretion in the EU, and it calls for more 
detailed impact analyses that should justify the proposed changes, measures 
or even completely new regulatory frameworks. On the other hand, the 
CNB does not support the transfer of authority to the European level, nor 
does it want interventions in the fiscal sovereignty of the member countries. 
However, the main point of criticism of the new system of European 
supervision is the gradual transfer of authority from the national supervisory 
authorities to the level of the EU, with the EU authorities having little 
responsibility for the approved course of action. Such a system could easily 
lead to the Czech Republic not being able to control properly its own 
financial market.379   
I think that this fear of not being able to control one’s own financial 
market is rather unfounded—I actually believe that there is no longer such a 
thing as a fully independent national financial market anyway. Financial 
markets are more European than national in their character, in spite of 
some national particularities. I cannot see a more efficient way than to 
centralise and harmonise regulation and supervision (especially as regards 
macro-prudential rules) with the national supervisory authorities 
maintaining their positions at the micro-prudential level, i.e. when 
controlling individual financial institutions. 
The CNB does agree with both the implementation of the common 
equity Tier 1 capital and the core Tier 1 capital as well as with strengthening 
the regulatory capital and its quality with the aim of simplifying the structure 
of capital and of increasing the importance of Tier 1 capital. Further, the 
CNB supports the plans to strengthen the liquidity risk and to implement 
new liquidity standards with liquidity being supervised at the national level. 
The CNB does not refuse the leverage ratio to supplement risk-based 
minimum capital requirement; yet, the CNB would like to see it as one of 
the tools for the supervisory review within Pillar II.380 
 
379 TOMŠÍK, V., ČNB. Regulace a dohled nad finančním trhem v EU – aktuální otázky. 
[online] 2010 [ qtd. 15th July 2017] Available at: 
<http://www.cnb.cz/miranda2/export/sites/www.cnb.cz/cs/verejnost/pro_media/konf
erence_projevy/vystoupeni_projevy/download/tomsik_20101122_komora_auditoru.pdf.> 
380 TOMŠÍK, V., ČNB. Regulace a dohled nad finančním trhem v EU – aktuální otázky. 




The CNB, of course, fully cooperates with the central banks of other 
member countries as well as with other supervisory authorities; moreover, it 
is part of the European system of financial market supervision and it closely 
collaborates with the ESBR and ESA authorities. 
What is also interesting is the negative attitude of the CNB towards risk 
management in the financial sector, where it opposes the integration of risk 
management at the level of the EU, the establishment of compulsory risk 
management funds and the European stability fund, and, finally, the 
harmonisation of insolvency rules. One may think that this attitude is 
justified insofar as it could lead to a potentially more hazardous behaviour; 
i.e. such funds could make financial institutions believe that possible 
financial loss in the future is, in a way, pre-paid. While this is a valid 
argument, I do not believe that the management of a financial institution 
should feel encouraged by the existence of resolution funds to behave more 
irresponsibly—future loss may be pre-paid but at what cost? The cost could 
be a change of personnel in the statutory bodies, enforced receivership, or 
far more thorough supervision. Last but not least, there could be substantial 
damage to the reputation of the institution. In my view, the resolution funds 
are, without doubt, beneficial and there is not much danger of their being 
misused; they serve the role of a safety net for the periods of economic 
crisis. In Pillar III of the Banking Union the CNB supported the 
harmonisation of disbursed sums and insured persons, but, as it has been 
mentioned before, it protested against the reduction of the period for 
compensation payments to just 7 days—this is, indeed, an absurdly short 
period, which in most cases cannot really be observed. The CNB also 
disliked the option to use money from the fund for early intervention, crisis 
resolution or the calculation of fund contributions from credit institutions 
on the basis of risk susceptibility, where, according to the CNB, member 
countries should be given the freedom to determine the reputational risk. 
 
1. Attitude towards European integration and the Banking 
Union 
The Czech Republic is not part of the Banking Union and it does not seem 
likely that it will become a member country of the Union in the foreseeable 
future. Naturally, the Czech Republic, as an EU member country, does 
implement all the norms of Pillar II and III of the Banking Union, but it is 






the Supervisory Board in Pillar I or the Single Resolution Board in Pillar II. 
The moment the Czech Republic joins the Eurozone, it will automatically 
become part of the Banking Union as well; however, it is possible to join 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism even before joining the Eurozone. Since 
2015 the Czech Republic has been issuing annual reports on its readiness 
and willingness to join the Banking Union before its admission into the 
Eurozone, but this option has not been taken yet. This is, nonetheless, no 
exception as no country outside the Eurozone has done it yet. 
Because of some unique mechanisms in the Eurozone, those countries 
that are outside it do not have the same conditions in the Banking Union as 
the other ones, which have already accepted the euro. With the aim of 
disrupting the internal market as little as possible, the system was set in such 
a way as to enable even countries outside the Eurozone to join it on 
comparable conditions. Still, the position of these countries does not seem 
to be equal, especially because of the fact they are not represented in the 
Governing Council of the ECB. This may play an important role for the 
Czech Republic and its representatives, who insist on observing equal 
opportunities principles in the internal market.381    
I dare say that as far as Pillar II of the Banking Union is concerned (i.e. 
the Single Resolution Mechanism), the CNB approves of the BRRD as the 
guiding document in crisis resolution—the experience in this area has been 
largely positive, e.g. in Portugal, where this mechanism along with the SRM 
and some public money helped to save Banco Espirito Santo. The CR as yet 
does not participate in international crisis resolution, nor does it make any 
contributions to the Single Resolution Fund. Thus, the CNB has the 
advantage of being essentially the only decisive body in the crisis resolution 
of credit institutions in the Czech Republic. There is the other side of the 
coin, needless to say: if a decision needs to be made regarding a financial 
institution with a subsidiary active in the Czech Republic, the CNB cannot 
influence the decision at all and its supervisory power is therefore extremely 
limited. 
The CNB has already established the Resolution Department, which 
represents the third sector of the CNB authority (along with monetary 
stability and financial market supervision). Essentially, it is an administrative 
body with the authority of first-instance decisions, while second-instance 
decisions are in the hands of the Bank Board of the CNB. 
 
381 The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. Studie dopadu účasti či neúčastí České 
republiky v bankovní unii – shrnutí. 9th February 2015. p. 2. 
201 
 
The Resolution Department makes resolution-related decisions in 
administrative proceedings against financial market entities and issues 
general provisions. Its other functions include carrying out activities relating 
to the resolution of crises in relevant financial market entities separately 
from the performance of supervision by other CNB bodies, the preparation 
and a regular update of resolution plans on a solo or a group basis, and 
cooperation with European resolution and supervisory authorities. Last but 
not least, this department also decides on the use of appropriate resolution 
instruments and procedures. In case the Czech Republic joins the Banking 
Union, the majority of essential resolution powers will be passed to the 
central body, namely the Single Resolution Board. 
This department also takes charge of the national resolution fund, called 
in the Czech Republic the Resolution Fund. The fund was established on 1st 
January 2016 (Act no. 374/2015, Coll., Act on Recovery and Resolution in 
the Financial Market, which transposed the BRRD directive) and it receives 
contributions from credit institutions. The amount to be paid into the 
Resolution Fund is determined by the institution’s size and the risk 
profile382. The calculation, prescription and exaction of these contributions 
is within the competence of the CNB.383     
The finance in the Resolution Fund is managed by the Financial Market 
Guarantee System and it can be used to finance resolution of financial 
institutions (e.g. to top up their capital, to purchase their assets or to 
provide a loan). It can also be used to pay compensation according to the 
“no-creditor-worse-off” principle if the results of the application of 
resolution tools lead to the institution’s owner (or creditor) being entitled to 
lower payment compared to liquidation or insolvency. As the funds are 
public, their use is subject to prior approval by the European Commission 
under the public support rules.384 
The Ministry of Finance has assessed a number of international studies 
and it seems that there is no incentive for the Czech Republic to enter the 
SSM now; it appears advisable to wait until more information and data is 
available, then assess the new data again and decide what should happen 
 
382 This is specified in Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2015/63 of October 21st 
2014 supplementing Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council with regard to ex ante contributions to resolution financing arrangements.  
383 In 2016 the total sum gathered was CZK 3 024 946 568, in 2017 CZK 2 958 854 930. 
and in 2020 it is CZK 3 763 175 596 Kč. Source: www.cnb.cz. 
 
384 Czech National Bank. Stanovení příspěvku do mechanismu pro financování krize 




next. According to a number of pre-selected criteria, the Czech banking 
sector is more stable than the banking sectors in many EU countries; hence 
the recommendation to stay out of the Banking Union and avoid sharing 
the burden of financing resolution plans in other countries.385 
There are three main reasons why this hesitant policy has been favoured: 
firstly, it is the loss of supervisory authority over big credit institutions; 
secondly, one may fear the danger of financial problems abroad affecting 
Czech subsidiaries of big financial groups with the CNB having no effective 
measures to adopt its own solution; thirdly, the Czech Republic seems 
reluctant to participate in financing supervision at the level of the ECB. 
Joining the Banking Union involves centralisation of supervision 
especially over important credit institutions in the EU and a major 
administrative shift—if the Czech Republic does join the Banking Union 
eventually, a large amount of administration will be transferred under the 
ECB, and the CNB will only carry out the remaining duties in close 
cooperation with the ECB. This change of supervisory authority would 
concern primarily large and influential credit institutions. The supervision 
over medium-sized and small-sized institutions would remain in the hands 
of the CNB, which would, however, have to follow the instructions and 
directives of the ECB in order to maintain the integrated approach to 
supervision in the Czech Republic, and with special attention paid to 
potential danger in the periods of instability. If the Czech Republic joined 
the Banking Union before becoming part of the Eurozone, the ECB 
would carry out supervision via the CNB because the ECB does not have 
direct power over institutions outside the Eurozone. This means, among 
other things, that every country outside the Eurozone must take such 
adequate legislative steps to ensure that its national supervisory authority 
acts in accordance with the directives of the ECB. 
From the political point of view, joining the Banking Union would be 
of a considerable benefit for the Czech Republic as it would officially 
declare and support Czech participation in the process of integration, 
from which follows a better chance to enforce one’s own (i.e. national) 
interests at the level of the EU. Furthermore, it would also increase the 
competitiveness of Czech credit institutions in the European financial 
market and, possibly, there could be a positive impact on the stability of 
the Czech financial market. As far as the countries outside the Eurozone 
are concerned, the SSM has been joined by Bulgaria and Romania, whilst 
 
385 The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. Studie dopadu účasti či neúčastí České 
republiky v bankovní unii – shrnutí. 9th February 2015, pp. 3–4. 
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Denmark has been talking about its intention to join in for a long time as 
well (perhaps even more so after Brexit).  
Taking into consideration the above-mentioned points, the Ministry of 
Finance stated in 2015 that the current conditions prevent joining the 
Banking Union from being beneficial. Some features of the Banking Union 
had not been completed and only the following months and years would 
reveal whether the single supervisory mechanism really worked as expected 
and hoped. Another important aspect was the political side of the problem, 
including the attitudes of the EU countries outside the Eurozone386. The 
pros and cons were assessed again in May 2016. A rather large report stated 
that, compared with 2015, 2016 had not brought any significant 
improvement in the areas that had been followed and analysed. The study 
repeated the points that had been made in the 2015 study: the Banking 
Union with its conditions did not make the entry worth it, it was necessary 
to keep monitoring the Union and a new assessment would be made at the 




Some people claim that the Banking Union does not solve the real problem 
and only partially eliminates the danger of moral hazard. Indeed, it may 
seem that stable and profitable banks will cover the losses of less successful 
banks. The Czech banking structure, albeit governed by foreign capital, is in 
the long run one of the most stable and profitable banking structures in 
Europe.388 
Despite all the doubts and negatives, the Banking Union seems an 
inevitable destination for the Czech Republic, and one that is 
overwhelmingly positive. I believe that political interests outweigh the 
economic ones and greater financial costs linked with the membership will 
be more than matched by the equal position in international partnerships 
not only in the area of financial markets, but in all areas of the EU. Czech 
 
386 The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. Studie dopadu účasti či neúčastí České 
republiky v bankovní unii – shrnutí. 9th February 2015, p. 12. 
387 The Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. Aktualizace studie dopadu účasti či 
neúčasti české republiky v bankovní unii. 30th May 2016, p. 29. 
388 KOVANDA, L. Vstup do bankovní unie není pro Česko výhodný, varuje ministerstvo 





credit institutions are, in the vast majority, subsidiaries of big international 
financial groups, therefore the influence of the Banking Union is now 
profound anyway—we could even say that it is more important than the 
influence of the national supervisory authority, which may be of great 
importance as well, but globally it is rather relative. 
Admittedly, the Czech financial market is stable and the profit from 
joining the Banking Union would not be as great as it would be for 
countries where the situation is far less stable. The current situation of 
stability would probably not improve through the funds available in the 
Banking Union; on the contrary, it seems likely that Czech credit 
institutions would be asked to provide financial help to less stable 
institutions abroad. From this point of view, it appears logical to adopt a 
hesitant stance. What will happen if the financial market in the Czech 
Republic gets hit by a crisis, though? In case there is such a crisis, are we 
going to ask for immediate admission to the Banking Union so that we can 
apply for resolution funding to save our own credit institutions? Problems 
may arise even if the Czech financial market remains stable and in good 
shape, though. Given the fact that the international financial market is so 
interconnected, what is the point having a stable financial market in the 
Czech Republic if the rest of the EU is in a state of deep crisis? It would not 
help at all even if all the credit institutions active in the Czech Republic had 
Czech owners and even if they were not linked (through their capital or 
owners) with foreign institutions because national financial markets do not 
operate in a vacuum and they are heavily dependent on the international 
market. There is little chance that there can ever be a stable financial market 
in a particular country surrounded by international instability. Joining the 
Banking Union at the time of financial stability may be relatively 
disadvantageous, expensive, administratively demanding and linked with all 
sorts of fears regarding the transfer of authority to a federal level, but the 
key word is always prevention. Possible losses in tougher times are far worse, 
more difficult to deal with and more permanent than the disadvantages 
which go hand in hand with admission to the Banking Union. Naturally, 
once the Czech Republic is part of the Banking Union, it will have the 
chance to influence its agenda and help to identify its priorities. 
I recommend joining both the Banking Union and the Eurozone—the 
crucial question seems to be when. It should not be later than 3-5 years 
from now particularly because of political reasons: it seems apposite to 
confirm the Czech government’s pro-European stance by showing genuine 
willingness to cooperate in European issues, thereby becoming yet firmer 
part of European integration. 
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POTENTIAL FAILURE OF FINANCIAL  
MARKET ENTITIES 
 
This chapter is present mainly owing to the fact that I would like to carry 
out not only an analysis of what regulation and supervision aims to achieve, 
but also of some negative phenomena that regulation and supervision aims 
to eliminate. There are naturally other types of failure that might happen to 
a financial market entity, but the ones I chose for this book are, in my view, 
immensely interesting even for readers who are not familiar with financial 
markets at all. Every entity doing business in the financial market assumes a 
certain amount of responsibility—general legal responsibility or specific 
financial-law responsibility. This chapter deals with two negative 
phenomena connected with financial markets: market abuse. The former is 
defined in a more general framework of financial law—law abuse. 
    
Responsibility in financial law 
 
Legal responsibility is defined in the general theory of law as the application 
of unfavourable legal consequences stipulated by a legal norm against 
anyone who violates a legal obligation.389 
In private law responsibility is delineated as unfavourable legal 
consequences, stipulated by a legal norm, that arise on legally defined 
conditions as a result of illegal action or an illegal state.390 
These definitions make it clear that legal responsibility is a new legal 
relation that comes into existence whenever a legal obligation is violated. 
Apart from the fact that it is new, it is also a sanction for the entity 
involved. Responsibility is not only about negative consequences but also 
about possible enforcement of it (e.g. by the state), because responsibility 
without the possibility of enforcement is undoubtedly rather toothless. 
Responsibility is also preventive since it determines, to a large extent, 
acceptable behaviour (i.e. behaviour within legal norms) for an unspecified 
group of people. Responsibility is not just a legal term, though; it is present 
in a wide range of various social relations of various entities and, therefore, 
we might approach the notion of responsibility also from a sociological 
 
389 HARVÁNEK, J. a kol. Právní teorie. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 2000, p. 234. 




and/or political perspective. The latter is very important in the fiscal part of 
financial law as the systems of tax and social burden are always crucial 
topics for every political party; they are, after all, topics that are of some 
importance to all of us. There are two types of responsibility: primary (legal 
responsibility here coincides with primary obligation) and secondary (this 
responsibility appears once a legally binding primary obligation is 
unfulfilled). Because of the legal character of responsibility that we discuss 
here, primary responsibility is of relatively little interest (it is less legal than 
moral, actually); secondary responsibility, on the other hand, is very 
relevant. It constitutes a new relation—a commitment as a result of an 
unfulfilled primary obligation. Legal responsibility performs several 
functions: prevention, protection, sanction, repressive satisfaction, 
reparation, and education. Every legal order consists of several branches 
and responsibility is divided systemically according to these branches. 
Individual branch responsibilities form a whole as demonstrated e.g. by 
linking the responsibility in case of a theft when there is some material 
damage. The damage would be very difficult to prove and, therefore, the 
person in question is referred to a civil lawsuit. As far as financial and legal 
responsibility is concerned, some financial-law offences are, if they 
demonstrate a certain level of gravity, considered criminal offences within 
the framework of criminal law—then, for example, tax evasion is not dealt 
with in a tax proceeding where the sanction is a fine.  
Financial and legal responsibility is defined for individual branches of the 
system of financial law both in the fiscal and the non-fiscal part. The former 
deals with responsibility at the level of tax regulations, the latter involves 
insurance (insurance fraud), banking, currency, and foreign exchange law. 
All these responsibilities shade into one another in financial law, 
administrative law and criminal law—the last is needed in case of gross 
misconduct violating obligations stipulated in financial-law regulations.  
Since the whole book is concerned with financial markets (which, as was 
demonstrated above, belong to the non-fiscal part of public financial law), 
then responsibility in this part of financial law is, above all, of public-law 
character, with only some overlap with private law—it is linked with 
financial-law, civil, administrative and criminal regulations.  
 
Market abuse as law abuse 
 
This subchapter attempts to answer the question whether market abuse can 
be viewed as law abuse. Is law abuse the right label in cases of market abuse; 
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in other words, does market abuse entail law abuse as defined by the theory 
of law and judicial practice? Before I can classify the specific part of 
financial law dealing with market abuse under a more general term ‘law 
abuse’, I need to clarify first what the two expressions (law abuse and 
market abuse) refer to.    
 
1. Law abuse 
Law abuse is a rather general legal term related to both private and public 
law. In the realm of private law it is defined by legal theory and case law. 
Relevant judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic 
suggest391 that law abuse can be defined as behaviour that is admittedly in 
compliance with law but in reality it is only seemingly so: the purpose is not 
to observe law but to do harm to another person. Such behaviour is 
contrary to good manners and is a direct attempt to inflict harm on the 
other participant, while the legal norm and its purpose and objective remain 
secondary—the offender completely disregards them.  
Law abuse refers to a situation in which someone exercises his own rights 
and causes unjustified harm to another person or the society; such 
behaviour is only seemingly lawful, for it brings about an unlawful result. 
We must call it ‘seemingly lawful behaviour’ because law does not recognise 
behaviour both lawful and unlawful at the same time. The lex specialis 
derogat legi generali doctrine maintains that prohibition against law abuse 
prevails over what is permitted by law—therefore, such behaviour cannot 
be interpreted in any other way but unlawful conduct. It holds that if a legal 
norm permits a certain type of action and another norm (if abused in the 
way shown above) prohibits it, then this action cannot be accepted as the 
exercise of a right, but it must be labelled as unlawful action.392 Such 
exercise of a right, which is, as a matter of fact, an example of law abuse, 
cannot be condoned by the court.393   
Judicial decisions of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic394 
specified law abuse—it no longer refers to and includes the term ‘good 
 
391 Cf. Judgement of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic of 28th June 2000, case no. 
21 Cdo 992/99 and Judgement of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic of 22nd April 
2003, case no. 21 Cdo 1893/2002.  
392 Cf. KNAPP, V. Teorie práva. C. H. Beck, Praha: 1995, pp. 184-185. 
393 Cf. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic of 10th 
November 2005, case no. 1 Afs 107/2004.  
394 Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic of 10th 
November 2005, case no. 1 Afs 107/2004-48. 
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manners’ as the necessary element of what constitutes law abuse. It goes 
without saying that good manners cannot work as a magic formula and that 
is what influenced another decision of the Supreme Court, which says that a 
corrective of good manners cannot be a detriment to the principle of legal 
security and it also cannot unfairly weaken participants’ rights guaranteed by 
legal norms.395    
It is clear that law abuse is not only part of private law but also of public 
law; the difference lies in the fact that the focus widens to include not only 
harm caused to another entity but also to the society.396 This is particularly 
relevant to tax law—every taxable person tries to achieve a lower tax burden 
by means of tax optimisation. It is, of course, logical that everyone tries to 
save as much money as possible on taxes; it was also decided by the Court, 
though, that this cannot be the only goal of tax optimisation. In other 
words, tax optimisation is permitted but a taxable person must pursue other 
significant business goals.397 
Together with the law abuse principle there are also two other principles 
that counterbalance it: namely, legal certainty and protection of legitimate 
expectations, both of which are enshrined in article 1, paragraph 1 of the 
Constitution of the Czech Republic. These principles may have a direct 
bearing on specific cases because each legal entity, while pursuing its cause, 
is entitled to a certain amount of legal certainty and legal expectations—
typologically very similar activities of such legal entities should thus bring 
about very similar results; in other words, it is extremely important to 
 
395 Cf. Judgement of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic of 22nd August 2002, case 
no. 25 Cdo 1839/2000.  
396 Cf. Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic of 23rd 
August 2006, case no. 2 Afs 178/2005-64, which says that law abuse is a situation in which 
someone exercises their own rights causing groundless harm to another person or the 
society. 
397 Ibid. There are two cumulative conditions that constitute law abuse:   
a) relevant economic activity has no other objective explanation than gaining claim to the 
tax administrator [judgement  Halifax (-Judgement of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21st 
February 2006., C-255/02 - Reference for a preliminary ruling: VAT and Duties Tribunal, 
London - United Kingdom)-Halifax plc, Leeds Permanent Development Services Ltd, 
County Wide Property Investments Ltd v. Commissioners of Customs & Excise], this 
condition is, contrary to the opinion of the general advocate, softened by claiming that the 
main objective of realised performance is gaining a tax advantage, cf. in particular section 
86 of the Opinion) and 
b) legal adjudication would go contrary to the sense and purpose of the relevant legal 
norms on the GDP. Economic activity satisfying both conditions a/ and b/, even if it were 
not illegal, would not merit any protection based on the principle of legal predictability and 




standardise interpretation of the term ‘law abuse’ for legal frameworks and 
entities active in them. For example in tax law, a given entity has the right to 
know what its taxation is going to be—it must exercise its right to rely fully 
on the legal norms regulating this area. From the description follows that 
law abuse has some general notions but in every specific case there must be 
a deep legal analysis in which are weighed up individual legal principles and 
tenets; to put it another way, one must as objectively as possible assess 
whether a particular activity constitutes an example of law abuse or not. 
  
2. Market abuse 
Generally, market abuse is a forbidden and intolerable activity in the 
financial market. Such activities are banned as a way of ensuring a level 
playing field for all economic entities that enter the business. While it is 
certain that an absolute equality is imaginary, it is desirable to make every 
effort to get as close to this imaginary ideal as possible.  
Market abuse legislation applies in particular to issuers of financial 
instruments, including new investment instruments regulated under MiFID 
II, i.e. emission allowances, commodity derivatives, investment instruments 
traded on over-the-counter markets and the use of benchmarks (reference 
rates / indicators).398 
Market abuse is dealt with in two ways.  
- The first way deals with the treatment of inside information about 
people whom the information concerns (issuers). This way is, as a 
matter of fact, preventive in its character.  
- The second way deals with actual market abuse by someone who has 
or could have access to inside information.399   
 
Today, market abuse is regulated by MAR – Market Abuse Regulation,400 
which has modified the legal framework in particular by repealing the 
 
398 HUSTÁK, Z. Nové nařízení o zneužívání trhu – záplava povinností v parném létě. In: 
Epravo.cz [online]. Published  June 20th 2016. Available from 
https://www.epravo.cz/top/clanky/nove-narizeni-o-zneuzivani-trhu-zaplava-povinnosti-
v-parnem-lete-101826.html. 
399 According to Art. 7 of MAR: Inside information is information of a precise nature, 
which has not been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to 
one or more financial instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to 
have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of 
related derivative financial instruments. 
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MAD.401 A directive on market abuse402 was published and approved 
together with MAR—it harmonises criminal law in connection with market 
abuse (hereinafter also as the Market Abuse Directive). This legislation 
including implementing measures has been in effect since 3rd July 2016.403  
In the Czech legal regulation, we find the appropriate legal regulation in the 
Capital Market Undertakings Act, Part IX, Title IV. 
There are generally three conditions that constitute market abuse. We can 
talk about market abuse if someone directly or indirectly inflicts damage on 
investors. It is someone who: 
- used inside information (i.e. information that is not publicly 
available)—it is a case of insider dealing with insiders being people 
who have access to inside information   
- manipulated the mechanisms of price setting of financial instruments  
- spread incorrect or misleading information 
 
Such behaviour can undoubtedly ruin the general level playing field 
principle for investors. It goes without saying that investors in possession of 
inside information have a much better starting position than the others, 
hence the need to use public instruments to redress the imbalance, even 
though a complete equilibrium remains purely theoretical.  
 
400 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
April 2014 on market abuse and repealing Directive 2003/6 / EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124 / EC, 2003/125 / 
EC and 2004 / 72 / EC. 
401 Directive 2003/6 / EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 
2003 on insider dealing and market manipulation (Market Abuse Directive). 
Commission Directive 2004/72/EC of 29th April 2004 implementing Directive 
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards accepted market 
practices, the definition of inside information in relation to derivatives on commodities, the 
drawing up of lists of insiders, the notification of managers' transactions and the 
notification of suspicious transactions.  
Commission Directive 2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the definition and 
public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation. 
Commission Directive 2003/125/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 
2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the fair presentation 
of investment recommendations and the disclosure of conflicts of interest. 
402 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 
on criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive). 
403 Act No. 204/2017 Coll., which amended in particular Act No. 256/2004 Coll. on the 
Capital Market Undertakings Act with effect from 3.1.2018. 
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Market abuse can be divided into several areas:  
- insider dealing – it is a situation when an insider404 (a person in the 
know) has a piece of inside information that is not known to the 
public (e.g. before a big acquisition is made with which only the 
company management are familiar, and it is more than likely that 
such an acquisition will increase the price of the company’s shares 
because it solidifies its financial position; a member of the 
management then uses the information to their own benefit and 
buys, for instance, a significant number of shares). This person uses 
such an information and gains a certain advantage by negotiating a 
transaction (purchase or sale) with a financial instrument on his / 
her own account or someone else's. This also applies to the situation 
where an insider has already issued an instruction for a market 
transaction and has changed or canceled the instruction as soon as 
he has learned the inside information. The special regulation of 
insider trading deals with the trading of persons with managerial 
authority (who are also supposed to be consecrated persons), which 
is discussed below.   
- market manipulation – again, it is a situation when an insider 
spreads untrue or misleading information about, for example, the 
financial situation of a company while (s)he is in such a position that 
other people treat the information as completely reliable (it is, for 
instance, a member of the company’s management); the insider can 
thus influence the share price of the company to their own benefit. 
These include the closing of transactions and related negotiations, 
the dissemination of false information through mass media, and the 
transmission of false or misleading information to benchmarks.405 
The MAR appendix lists indicators that suggest manipulative 
behaviour associated with false or misleading signals, pricing, use of 
 
404 According to art. 8 of MAR is an insider person possessing inside information is 
presumed as a member of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies of the 
issuer, or has a share of the issuer's capital, or has access to inside information in 
connection with the performance of a job or in connection with the performance of duties. 
It could also be a person involved in crime. 




fictitious means and other forms of misleading or misleading 
behaviour.406 
- Illegal disclosure of inside information - This is a situation, where a 
person with inside information makes this information available to 
others if it is not a job or fulfilling the duties. This is regulated by 
Articles 10 and 14 c) MAR. It can also be a recommendation or 
guidance by an insider. 
In all examples of market abuse people seek their own benefit. They use 
information that is true but unavailable to others or it is untrue information 
but from a person who could have access to it. 
The fundamental point of the ban on information abuse is at least partial 
redress of the inequality of access to information; it should help an ‘ordinary 
investor’ to improve their position (i.e. their access to relevant information). 
It is not really possible to forbid employees as well as executives from 
companies that issue financial instruments to trade in financial instruments; 
nonetheless, since they could have (and often certainly do have) inside 
information, their business should be transparent by making it public.  
Market abuse refers to an advantage gained because of better access to 
inside information. EU regulations and legal regulations in member 
countries attempt to redress this imbalance—there are rules for using, 
handling and treating inside or misleading information, which constitutes 
the first legislative way to tackle market abuse, as was stated above.  
As far as the proper treatment of information about issuers of financial 
instruments is concerned,407 they must, without delay,408 disclose 
information about themselves.409  
 
406 A detailed definition is set out in Commission Regulation (EU) 2016/522 of 17 
December 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council as regards an exemption for certain public authorities and third country 
central banks, market manipulation indicators, disclosure thresholds, competent authority 
for notifying postponement of disclosure, authorization of trades during the closed period, 
and types of trades of regulated entities subject to reporting. 
407  A financial instrument is according to Article 124, par. 1 of the Capital Market 
Undertakings Act defined as an investment instrument admitted to trading on a regulated 
market of a Member State of the European Union or the admission of which to trading on 
a regulated market of a Member State of the European Union has been applied for. 
408 ‘without delay’ is according to the accepted interpretation by the courts seen as a 
sufficient period of time in which the issuer of a financial instrument is able to announce 
the inside information under the given circumstances and while remaining operational.  Cf. 
the Constitutional Court decision of 15th August 2005, case no. IV. US 314/05 and the 




In addition to such information, the issuer prepares and regularly updates 
the list of insiders, which it provides to the relevant authority (in our case, 
the CNB). The reason for this obligation is quite clear and serves in 
particular to trace and investigate individual violations of MAR, as it 
contributes to the identification of persons with access to internal 
information and the time from which they have access to such information. 
Using this tool, issuers can also generally control the flow of internal 
information, and thus streamline internal processes such as communication. 
Each person on the list confirms in writing his / her familiarity with the 
duties he / she has through access to inside information, including the 
acceptance of possible sanctions resulting from violations related to insider 
trading, or the unauthorized disclosure of inside information.410 
The European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA) publishes 
implementing and recommending technical standards also in relation to the 
publication of insiders' lists in order to ensure that acts adopted by the 
European Commission are applied under the same conditions.411 
Given that only some persons come into contact with inside 
information, the rationale for the existence of the obligation to publish 
lists of such persons is quite clear. 
If an issuer shares inside information with a third party while performing 
the usual business related to the job, this information must be disclosed to 
the public. The requirement for immediate disclosure of inside information 
significantly reduces the risk of its abuse; there might, however, be a delay 
before the information available to someone is announced publicly—that is 
why there is a legal regulation for insiders regarding inside information.  
The regulation says that each person in possession of inside information  
- is forbidden on insider trading or attempting to do so 
- is strictly forbidden to share the inside information with someone else 
unless it is part of the person’s practice of profession.  
 
409 Publication is mainly on the issuer's website. Then, certainly, the requirement of Article 
17 (1) MAR will be a rapid approach to correct and timely assessment of information by 
the public. 
410 See Art. 18 par. 2 of MAR 
411 The format of the Insider List and its update was prepared by ESMA: ESMA / 
2015/1455 Final Report on draft technical standards on Market Abuse Regulation. [on-





- is forbidden to recommend the acquisition or disposal of financial 
instruments related to the information,  
- is also forbidden to manipulate the market or attempting to do so.  
 
These bans do not apply to trading own shares within buy-back schemes, 
nor do they apply to measures aimed to stabilise financial instruments.  
Every member country is asked to nominate one regulatory and 
supervisory authority with a common minimum set of obligations. These 
authorities apply convergent methods to fight market abuse and they should 
be able to help one another with adoption of preventive measures, 
especially in cross-border cases. Subsequent administrative co-operation 
could represent a positive contribution to the fight against terrorism. These 
authorities are also supposed to co-operate with ESMA.412  
It is important to mention here also sanctions that can be imposed for 
market abuse. The European Union attempts to enforce equal sanctions in 
all its member countries; therefore, in 2014 was adopted a market abuse 
directive. 
By accepting MAR and market abuse directive, the EU laid down a 
common definition of actus reus of crime related to market abuse, e.g. insider 
dealing, market manipulation and illicit disclosure of information. A new set 
of criminal sanctions is being created: heavy fines and imprisonment for at 
least four years are possible sanctions for insider dealing or market 
manipulation while imprisonment for two years is the punishment for illicit 
disclosure of confidential information. Furthermore, legal persons are fully 
liable for market abuse. Member countries are also required to conduct the 
judicial proceedings for these crimes if the crime is committed inside their 
borders or if the offender is their citizen.413 
 
3. Market abuse as law abuse  
If someone buys a big number of shares of a particular company, it is 
completely within the rules and it is not illegal; if it turns out, however, that 
 
412 Europa.eu. Market abuse [online]. Europa.eu. [qtd. 10th May 2017] Available at 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/internal_market/single_market_services/financi
al_services_transactions_in_securities/l24035_en.htm>.  
413 První zprávy. EU stanoví trestní sankce za zneužívání trhu, a může to bolet! [online]. 





the person bought the shares having learned that the price of the shares 
would go up, then it is a case of inside (private) information abuse (since 
other investors do not have access to this piece of information) and it can 
be viewed as law abuse, too. It might, of course, be quite difficult to prove 
that the person did have the information at their disposal (they might have 
followed their instinct for good investment); hence the legal obligation to 
make insiders’ transactions public (i.e. those people who are somehow 
related to a specific issuer of financial instruments). 
Law abuse is generally not easy to prove (all the more so if it is in the 
form of market abuse), so every case is hugely specific and one cannot 
honestly say whether it is a case of law abuse unless there has been an in-
depth examination of the case and of all the relevant circumstances.  
Market abuse is characteristic by the use of special and private 
information to one’s own benefit. Generally speaking, everyone can treat 
information in any way they like if the information was obtained legally; in a 
way, the person exercises their own right. However, if the nature of the 
information handicaps the others of the same rank (other investors in this 
case) and if the use of the information is legally restricted, we have a case of 
general law (the use of legally acquired information) against specific law 
(maintenance of a level playing field for all investors and a proper and fair 
operation of a financial market).  
Law abuse refers to permissible behaviour with a 
prohibited/unintentional result to the detriment of another person or 
another company. At the same time, it is maintained that if one legal norm 
permits a certain type of behaviour while another norm forbids it, then the 
behaviour in accordance with the first norm is not an exercise of a right, but 
it is actually unlawful conduct. Market abuse, to my mind, could also be 
seen as permissible (disregarding, for the sake of the argument, the fact that 
it is prohibited by legal regulations); yet, a deeper analysis reveals that 
though it seems permissible, it brings about unlawful results to the 
detriment of other financial market participants—it is thus an unlawful 
operation. We can conclude that market abuse appears to correspond with 
the theoretical elements and the definition of law abuse; in other words, law 
abuse can be applied as a theoretical foundation introducing analyses of 







Director’s dealing – dealing of managing persons 
 
The term directors dealing with so-called managerial deals are terms that the 
current European regulation does not use, but I believe that they still 
express what the MAR is referring to as a trading of the managing persons, 
and for this reason I will use these terms for the purposes of this chapter. 
This adjustment is based on Article 19 of the MAR and was implemented in 
2017 do the Czech legal system, as well as in the law of other EU countries. 
No one would surely like to trade in securities if the trading could be 
influenced from the inside. Equal treatment of capital market participants is, 
therefore, an inevitable condition for its successful operation. The legal 
regulation of directors dealing notification duty is a specific adjustment in 
the context of anti-market abuse measures, because in many cases, insider 
trading is just about the director's dealing. The difference is that insiders are 
those who have the inside information, whereas the directors/managers are 
only very likely to receive inside information. Director’s dealing without 
inside information is therefore not insider trading and is subject to certain 
obligations. 
Legal regulation regarding director’s dealing primarily attempts to do 
away with unfair dealing in the capital market. This unfair activity consists in 
using (or rather misusing) inside information that is not available to all 
capital market participants. Director’s dealing refers to an obligation that 
applies to people with a specific relation to the issuer of securities, who 
must notify others of dealings related to the issuer and their securities, 
including details thereof. Information that people with managing power,414 
as amended are required to make public, supplement the notification and 
information duties that issuers have in general.  
Regulation regarding director’s dealing is supposed to ensure availability 
of information about transactions with securities and their derivatives made 
by people related to a securities issuer. These people have access to inside 
information about the issuer that is not freely available. While they do not 
necessarily have to use the information they have got to get some benefit in 
the securities market, they do have an advantage that can potentially be used 
in investment dealings.   
 
 
414 In the Czech legislation, the group of persons with managerial authority is mentioned in 
§ 2 par. b) Capital Market Undertakings Act 
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1. Roots of regulation abroad  
The director’s dealing regulation comes from the United States.415 Managers 
or other employees of the issuer that also possess at least 10% of the 
issuer’s shares are required to register their name and their  position at the 
issuer with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In case they make any 
securities transaction, they must report it by the end of the second working 
day following the day of the transaction. They report the transaction to the 
Commission and the relevant stock market. The report includes, among 
other things, the type of transaction, the number of traded securities, the 
price at which the transaction was realised, and the number of securities that 
remain in the possession of the person who files the report. Both the report 
and its subsequent announcement are done electronically. Any profit made 
from the purchase or the sale of securities—if they have been in possession 
of the director, the officer or the major stockholder for less than six 
month—belongs to the company, regardless of the reason behind the 
transaction. There is one exception, though: if the transaction is made in 
bona fide, i.e. in good faith.416  
In the EU law was director’s dealing regulated within directive 
2003/6/EC (cf. art. 6, par. 4), which has since been replaced by MAR (cf. 
art. 19) and the market abuse directive. Persons with managerial powers at 
an issuer and persons closely associated with them are supposed to notify 
the competent authority of transactions on their own account relating to the 
securities of that issuer. Individual states must announce this information 
and make it accessible as quickly and as easily as possible. 
2. Obliged persons 
Notification duty applies to the managing persons listed in § 2 par. 1 b) of 
Capital Market Undertakings Act: 
- A managing person, defined in § 2 par. 1 a) as a member of the 
statutory body, statutory body itself, executive director of the 
company or other person actually directing the activities of the legal 
entity. When the statutory body or member of statutory body is a 
legal person, than managing person is the person, representing the 
legal person  at statutory body. 
 
415 Section 16 (a) Securities Exchange Act. 1934 (SEA). This is followed by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 16a-3. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
was created on the basis of the Securities Exchange Act. 1934. 
416 Goldstein, E. Corporations – Securities Exchange Act. 1934. In Michigan law review, 
vol. 51, No.1, 1952. 
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- supervisory body or member of the supervisory body;  
- member of the statutory body, statutory body itself, executive 
director of the company or other person actually directing the 
activities of the legal entity. When the statutory body or member of 
statutory body is a legal person, than managing person is the person, 
representing the legal person  at statutory body; 
- a person who, within the issuer, makes a decision that may affect the 
issuer's future development and business strategy and who has the 
access to inside information 
Before the CNB took over supervision of the capital market417, this area 
had been under control of the Czech Securities Commission (hereinafter 
the CSC), which was heavily involved in these activities at that time. The 
classification of persons who have the notification duty (according to art. 
125, par. 5 of the Capital Market Undertakings Act) was dealt with by the 
CSC in its statement no. 12/2005. The statement followed Article 6, Section 
4 of the 2003/6/EC directive418, which maintains that the notification duty 
applies to persons discharging managerial responsibilities within an issuer of 
financial instruments and persons closely associated with them.  
Persons discharging managerial powers are specified in MAR (Art. 3 par. 
1, pt. 25):  
- a member of the administrative, management or supervisory bodies 
of the issuer;  
- a senior executive who is not a member of the bodies referred to in 
previous point, who has regular access to inside information relating 
directly or indirectly to the issuer and power to take managerial 
decisions affecting the future developments and business prospects 
of this issuer.   
Persons discharging managerial powers have also notification duty for 
their closely associated persons. According to MAR (Art. 3 (1), pt.  26) are 
persons closely associated with persons discharging managerial powers:  
- the spouse of the person discharging managerial responsibilities, or 
any partner of that person considered by national law as equivalent 
to the spouse; 
 
417 The CNB took over the agenda of the Securities Commission on the 1st April 2006.  
418 The Securities Commission followed the European legislation in view of Article 1 of the 
Capital Market Undertakings Act, which says that law regulates capital markets in harmony 
with Union norms.  
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- dependent child in accordance with national law;419  
- other relatives of the person discharging managerial responsibilities, 
who have shared the same household for at least one year on the 
date of the transaction concerned;  
- a legal person, trust or partnership the managerial responsibilities of 
which are discharged by a person discharging managerial 
responsibilities. It could be also the case, when these entities are set 
up for the benefit of such a person, or whose economic interests are 
substantially equivalent to those of such persons. The provisions also 
apply to persons referred to previous points 
 
3. Which transactions must be made public and how?  
Obliged persons according to art. 19 of MAR shall notify to the issuer or 
the emission allowance market participant, and to the competent authority 
at the same time, every transaction conducted on their own account relating 
to the issuer's shares or debt instruments or derivatives or other financial 
instruments linked thereto; It is also an obligation to notify the suspension 
or lending of investment instruments. 
Previous mentioned shall apply to any subsequent transaction once a total 
amount of EUR 5 000 has been reached within a calendar year.420 This 
amount includes all the trades of a person with managerial powers, 
including trades of closely associated persons. Such notifications shall be 
made promptly and no later than three business days after the date of the 
transaction. This obligation is also extended to the suspension or lending of 
financial instruments by a person with a managerial powers or by a closely 
associated person.421 
 
419 The term ‘dependent children’ should be interpreted according to Article 20, par. 4 of 
Act no. 155/1995 Coll. on pension insurance, as amended. The dependent child is defined 
here until the end of compulsory education and after, not exceeding 26 years of age, if the 
person is continually preparing for their future profession, or cannot prepare for their 
future profession or cannot perform employment activities due to a disease or an injury, or 
due to an unfavourable long-term state of health.   
420 A competent authority may decide to increase the threshold set out in paragraph 8 to 
EUR 20 000 and shall inform ESMA of its decision and the justification for its decision, 
with specific reference to market conditions, to adopt the higher threshold prior to its 
application. 
 
421 The Trade Notice should contain the elements set out in Article 19 (6) MAR. 
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If an issuer trades on multiple markets, the competent authority is the 
place of the issuer's registration. The way in which director’s dealing is to be 
reported is again based on the MAR. 
The issuer or emission allowance market participant shall ensure that the 
information that is notified is made public in a manner which enables fast 
access to this information on a non-discriminatory basis in accordance with 
the implementing ESMA technical standards. The issuer or emission 
allowance market participant shall use such media as may reasonably be 
relied upon for the effective dissemination of information to the public 
throughout the Union.422 Alternatively, national law may provide that a 
competent authority may itself make public the information. 
Issuers and emission allowance market participants shall notify the 
person discharging managerial responsibilities of their obligations in writing. 
Persons discharging managerial responsibilities shall notify the persons 
closely associated with them of their obligations under this Article in writing 
and shall keep a copy of this notification. 
This provision is a bit skewed in my opinion, but on the other hand, the 
transfer of the obligation to a particular person is certain administrative 
relief for both the competent authority and the issuer himself, who already 
keeps lists of insiders. 
Besides above mentioned MAR states, that a person discharging 
managerial responsibilities within an issuer shall not conduct any 
transactions during a closed period of 30 calendar days before the 
announcement of an interim financial report or a year-end report which the 
issuer is obliged to make public. There is an exception of such a ban on a 
case-by-case basis due to the existence of exceptional circumstances, such as 
severe financial difficulty, which require the immediate sale of shares; or due 
to the characteristics of the trading involved for transactions made under, or 
related to, an employee share or saving scheme, qualification or entitlement 
of shares, or transactions where the beneficial interest in the relevant 
security does not change. Clarification of these exemptions is provided by 
the European Commission Implementing Regulation.423 
 
422 See art. 19 (3) MAR. 
423 Exceptions to this obligation are specified in the European Commission's Implementing 
Regulation. Specifically, it is the European Commission's delegated Regulation (EU) 
2016/522 of 17 December 2015 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council as regards an exemption for certain public 
authorities and central banks of third-countries, market manipulation indicators, disclosure 
thresholds, competent authority for notifying postponement of disclosure, authorizing 
trades during a closed period, and types of trades of regulated entities subject to reporting. 
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The duty to notify managerial dealings enables, at least partially, to erase 
the differences between various levels of inside knowledge about securities 
issuers. Legislators thus try to create equal opportunities for all capital 
market participants. 
A possible benefit gained unfairly from inside information cannot be 
eliminated completely, though. Such a situation could occur if there were a 
ban for certain people on the purchase or sale of an issuer’s securities; this 
would, however, curtail the freedom of enterprise and such people would 
rightly feel discriminated against.  
Another measure adopted in this area is the fact that insider trading has 
been made punishable by criminal law. This is closely related to managerial 
dealings. Yet, if obliged persons properly and in due time notify the 
competent authority of any securities transactions of the issuer, they reduce 
suspicion of insider trading. The existence of and strict adherence to legal 
regulations concerning managerial dealings is in everybody’s interests, 
whether it be capital market participants or the obliged persons that are to 
notify certain securities transactions. Currently, market abuse is regulated by 
MAR and the market abuse directive. Without any doubt we might say that 
we can hardly expect anything completely new and ground-breaking by the 
MAR implementation in the notification duty—rather, the existing 
regulation is going to be extended, specified and updated. What is new and 
very important, though, is the market abuse directive. It is concerned with 
the elements constituting market abuse and its criminalisation—the aim is 
the identical interpretation of what market abuse is, including potential 
punishment for such activities.  
I am convinced that new market abuse legislation in Europe definitely 
fulfils the requirements for the maintenance of fair access to the financial 
market and its activities there. Among other things, it represents a formal 
execution of a previously established and promoted strategy to ban strictly 
any form of market abuse with equal punishment throughout the EU. Such 
a step appears to be eminently desirable due to frequent cross-border 
activities of big financial institutions whose impact is truly international. 
Only by fixing the interpretation of what constitutes market abuse and by 
agreeing on what punishment can be meted out to the offender in member 
countries of the EU, can rules regarding the ban on market abuse be 
internationally standardised, thereby making the international financial 
market better equipped to provide equal opportunities for investors and 






The integration of financial market supervision is a relatively broad topic 
that can be approached in two ways. The first way sees supervision 
integrated into an institution or two (that is how this issue is approached in 
the Czech Republic and also in individual member countries of the EU) 
while the second way aims to harmonise and integrate supervisory 
mechanisms at the supranational level (that is the form preferred by the EU 
as a supranational organisation). Both these ways are intertwined insofar as 
they integrate supervisory mechanisms regardless of the number of 
institutions (and the level of integration) and also as they integrate 
supervision with the aim of a better and more effective execution of 
supervision, which should, ultimately, bring about more financial stability. 
While only one supervisory is not such a crucial condition, it is probably 
hardly acceptable if there are many supervisory authorities—to my mind, 
three is the maximum. 
The process of integration of supervision is rather a long-term one; whilst 
there have been various attempts (and of various intensity) at supervisory 
integration for more than twenty years, the process really speeded up after 
the financial crisis in 2007 – 2008. During that period commenced 
processes that laid a foundation for the current state of things in 
supervision. These processes are still going on and it is going to take a few 
years before they are concluded. It remains to be seen whether the 
conclusion is going to be identical to the one envisaged now, or whether we 
are in for some more changes in the area of supervision.  
The issue of financial market supervision was also discussed by the 
former Czech president Vaclav Klaus, who said that ‘the transition 
countries of central and eastern Europe face regulation and giving up 
sovereignty. When they started, the dominant slogan was “deregulate, 
liberalize, privatize”. Now the slogans have changed to: “regulate, […] listen 
to the partial interests of the NGO’s and follow them, get rid of your 
sovereignty and put it into the hands of international institutions and 
organizations” ’.424 Is it not true though that such an act of giving up one’s 
sovereignty can be the way to achieve a more stable economic situation 
both at home and abroad? I am sure it is true since it is better to enjoy a 
more stable economy with part of your sovereignty gone than to have a 
 
424 KLAUS, V. Speech delivered at the meeting of Institute of International Finance. IIF. 
Berlin. 4th June 2003. 
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completely independent and self-governing state with economic problems 
that, ultimately, cannot be solved in any other way than thanks to some 
international help, which is basically a kind of sovereignty loss as well.  
There are several reasons that support the idea of integration and the 
course of action the process of integration has taken. The state of the 
financial market and the latest development with its globalising structures 
and international interconnections demonstrated the need (to a certain 
extent continuous) for the integration of supervision over this area. 
National (member countries) supervisory models leg behind financial 
globalisation and the current state of integrated and mutually intertwined 
financial markets in Europe, where, moreover, many financial institutions 
are involved in cross-border business. There were blatant deficiencies 
regarding mutual co-operation, co-ordination, single enforcement of Union 
law, and confidence among domestic supervisory authorities.  
Financial market integration poses a real threat fully revealed during the 
financial crisis in 2008. The domino effect influenced basically all financial 
markets and it could be said that this interconnectedness (globalisation) is 
now a general risk that financial markets involve.  For instance, fluctuations 
in the value of money significantly affect securities markets; a drop in the 
value of securities in stock markets modifies the interest rates on credits, 
since the biggest investors include investment companies and banks. One 
might ask then whether supervision in an unintegrated form could possibly 
slow down this domino effect or even reduce the financial loss incurred. I 
believe that it could not, for supervision performed separately in individual 
member countries would have a minimal impact on the negative aspects of 
globalisation. 
The integration of supervision and its result—integrated supervision—is 
a general term; its final form is largely determined by the preconceived 
model of integrated supervision. A very important aspect when creating a 
model of supervision is the non-separation of active bodies that solve 
problems from bodies in charge of supervision, which is what the model 
envisaged in the de Larosière report included (it separated the national 
authority from the national responsibility for approved decisions). Such a 
separation can lead to gaps in supervision and it can ultimately result in the 
national supervisory authority’s refusal to perform supervision in a certain 
area, since the responsibility for prospective decisions would be 
disproportionately high. Authority must go hand in hand with responsibility 
because it is important to maintain the balance between domestic and 
European authorities of supervisory bodies. 
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Čihák a Podpiera425 conclude their analysis of 2006 by saying that 
integrated supervision shows better results and it is able to keep them up 
for a longer period of time. If supervision of the banking sector can show 
good quality thanks to the economic development of that particular 
country, the same does not hold true for securities where integration can 
play a positive role. Their conclusion also suggests that the position of 
supervision either inside or outside the central bank has no bearing on the 
quality of supervision and regulation. As far as costs reduction is concerned, 
there is no exact data—on the one hand, the number of employees might 
not necessarily go down as a result of new responsibilities that an integrated 
institution takes on; on the other hand, in a number of countries integration 
is a new phenomenon and it is probable that not all of them have 
undergone a slimming procedure. Lastly, they identified integration as a 
useful tool that lead to the restriction of redundant duplications and 
overlaps in supervision. 
The principal focus of this book is on the integration processes involving 
supervision at the European level, nowadays especially in the form of the 
Banking Union. As I stated in the conclusion of the Banking Union chapter, 
I am convinced that the attempts at integration are a step in the right 
direction for the EU and its member countries alike (including countries 
that are not in the Eurozone such as, of course, the Czech Republic). 
Countries that have become part of the process protect their domestic 
financial stability, which results from global financial stability. 
In my view, the most important benefit of the Banking Union is the 
second pillar, namely the resolution mechanism with the BRRD Directive 
and its bail-in instrument, which is being implemented by all member and 
many non-member countries (such as Norway, discussed in detail here, and 
other EEA countries). Non-member countries do not even have to become 
part of the Banking Union. Public interventions made during the crisis in 
2008 to save some credit institutions were instances of unprecedented 
financial support offered to public entities that deeply influenced the right 
setting of economic competition and, in addition, helped to efface, to a 
certain extent, the negative consequences of some highly hazardous 
decisions made by top executives of these institutions. Those institutions 
that behaved more responsibly did not need any help (nor did they get it, 
naturally), which created a highly unequal environment. Yet, the financial 
stability would have been in far greater danger had the credit institutions not 
 
425 ČIHÁK M., PODPIERA R.: Is one watchdog better than three? International 
experience with integrated financial sectoral supervision, Working Paper No. 57, 
International Monetary Fund 2006, p. 26-27. 
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been helped (they would, no doubt, have been forced to file for 
bankruptcy). Thus, for the sake of maintain financial stability some private-
law entities received financial support from public sources. Now that the 
bail-in instrument has been adopted, such public support is virtually 
unattainable—it remains in effect as the last resort after several unsuccessful 
attempts to get help from other (i.e. non-public) sources and on very strict 
conditions. 
The rating of credit institutions, which is an increasingly important 
criterion for measuring stability and competitiveness of financial 
institutions, got worse after the bail-in instrument had been implemented—
it basically ruled out the possibility of public support for financial (in 
particular credit) institutions. It is only logical now that credit institutions’ 
risks are not covered by public support. The risks remain, but there is no 
public safety net. 
A good example of how the BRRD Directive should work is Banco 
Espírito Santo in Portugal. In 2014, a large part of its liabilities was written 
off and EUR 5 billion was offered the Portuguese resolution fund to save 
the good assets (that is why Portugal did not make its contribution to the 
SRF). The bank was practically divided into two parts: the good bank and 
the bad bank; the former was saved by writing off some liabilities and 
transferring them into the bad bank. Investors (led by those from the hedge 
funds) initiated proceedings before the European Court of Justice so as to 
enforce compensation for the loss from the subordinated debt. The debt 
was brought about owing to the unjust creation of the ‘bad bank’ of Banco 
Espírito Santo without any possibility of acquiring more private capital. To 
put it simply, those investors whose claim/investment had been placed into 
the bad bank, and subsequently reduced or totally erased, did not like such a 
step for which they had incurred the loss. Predictably, this is something that 
is going to take place every time the BRRD Directive is applied; there are, 
nonetheless, no other options and it is vital that the risks and potential 
losses should be taken and shared by shareholders and investors, since it is 
them who are responsible for the correct operation of a specific institution, 
and they must be well aware of the fact that a particular investment entails 
some risk, possibly leading to a loss. There have been more examples, but 
the only true resolution case so far was Andelskassen J.A. K. from 2015 in 
Denmark. Here, however, is the question of whether the resolution 
mechanism should be applied to an institution with a market share of less 
than 1%. 
The next development of the transfer of finance from national resolution 
funds to the SRF is going to be very interesting. The contributions are 
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supposed to be 1/8 of the target level of finance expected there. Will the 
payment practices of the up-until-now non-paying countries improve or 
not, and what is the European Commission going to do about it? 
What remains open in the second pillar is the robust MREL. Member 
countries are supposed to implement it by 2019; however, no exact method 
or rule for its calculation has been announced yet.426 The MREL, as another 
capital buffer, will only be implemented by systemically important credit 
institutions and those institutions that will be ordered to do so by the 
national supervisory authority. Ideally, the creation of MREL should consist 
in issuing subordinated bonds, but no one can say now what their price will 
be. How much is an investor willing to pay when he knows that if the 
institution is in trouble, the resolution mechanism will be applied, thereby 
reducing his investment, or rather the value of the bond, half of which may 
be written off and the other half transferred to stock (a share in a company 
in the resolution process). Another problem with the MREL is that it entails 
capital requirements that are very similar to TLAC (Total Loss-absorbing 
Capacity) minimum standards created by the Financial Stability Board in co-
operation with the BSCS, which was laid down for global systemically 
important banks (G-SIB). Over the course of the next few years the 
problem should alleviate when global systemically important banks will 
create only TLAC, while those systemically important in Europe will create 
MREL, which will, in time, move closer and closer to TLAC. 
It is important to bear in mind that for resolution the crucial principle is 
‘no creditor should be worse off than in the case of an outright liquidation’. Articles 36 
and 74 of the BRRD the application of a resolution mechanism is preceded 
by double valuation of the institution (one of which simulates insolvency). 
If there is a difference between the two valuations to the detriment of the 
creditors, they will be compensated during the course of the resolution 
mechanism. This could cause problems in a number of countries in case the 
capital reserve is implemented according to MREL; the same holds true for 
some G-SIBs if they use TLAC. The thing is that MREL does not always 
copy the insolvency hierarchy, which means that creditors might not 
actually always get the same or more than in an insolvency proceeding. This 
potential problem was aptly solved by Sweden where the TLAC method 
was adopted mandatorily for all credit institutions. TLAC introduces a 
 
426 The only exception is the Bank of England with its "Purple Book", where the MREL 
values are actually set. In the rest of the EU, the SRB is expected to determine the MREL. 
For more see: The Bank of England. The Bank of England's approach to resolution. 





mandatory subordination of the capital reserve or debt in such a way as to 
match precisely the insolvency hierarchy. As the capital is expensive, in 
most cases bonds will be issued, thereby raising the capital reserve for 
financial institutions. There is a condition attached to these bonds though: 
in case of a resolution mechanism they can become worthless. Who is going 
to buy such bonds? I think some people will, for it is only (as usual) a 
question of the right price.  
This mandatory capital reserve for credit institutions is extremely 
expensive; in countries with a high number of deposits relative to the GDP, 
like Great Britain, Sweden or Denmark, there is no other option since a lot 
of banks have grown too big and the state cannot save them in case of a 
problem. There must, therefore, be a big capital reserve to cover the 
potential failure, possibly to such an extent that the resolution bail-in 
instrument (involving cutting off selected liabilities/creditors) will not be 
necessary.   
Unlike the first and the second pillar of the Banking Union, the third 
pillar is a single securing system with a unifying legal framework. As yet, we 
cannot speak here of a federalisation in the form of a supranational system 
or supranational bodies with centralised powers relating to this area.  
The existence of a safety system of deposit insurance brings about, in a 
way, a moral hazard in case of rational ‘economic behaviour’. In the Czech 
Republic, an example of this is the existence of credit unions that are, to a 
certain extent, unique in Europe as far as their form and methods of 
business are concerned. They offer their members high return on their 
savings and they (the members) would, of course, be rather foolish not to 
take up the offer knowing that if the credit union suffers financial problems, 
the Guarantee system of financial market (deposit insurance fund) will pay 
out deposits of up to EUR 100,000. So the investors (depositors) risk, up to 
this figure, very little and they can only reap benefits unless the credit union 
is declared insolvent. If it does declare insolvency, the investors get their 
investment back. There is a disproportion between an increase in moral 
hazard and economically rational behaviour; there is no direct 
proportionality because it does not hold true that the higher the moral 
hazard is (deposits made with a promise of high return), the higher is the 
risk of loss. Depositors do not risk at all so nothing prevents them from the 
moral hazard—which might be called the economically rational behaviour. 
At the moment, Czech credit institutions which make a profit do not want 
to contribute to the deposit insurance fund because they know it for certain 
that they will not be the ones needing the money. In all likelihood the 
money will be used by credit unions which undergo far greater risks and 
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often promise the impossible (or something possible but far from profitable 
for the credit union). It seems positive that credit unions will not be part of 
the SRM and will be liquidated in a standard way—the deposits will be paid 
out from the Guarantee system of financial market and the unions will then 
go through the insolvency proceedings and, finally, will be removed from 
the Commercial Register. It can be viewed as a positive circumstance 
because if credit unions were able to seek help from the SRM, their 
executives would behave even less responsibly. 
This is the main problem relating to safety systems and that is also the 
reason why they do not exist at the central level. The main are of opposition 
is in Germany because German banks (like Czech banks, probably) would 
predominantly contribute while Greek or Spanish banks would 
predominantly make use of it. Although it is a Banking Union pillar, one 
can hardly expect federalism here. The third pillar of the Banking Union has 
so far dealt only with harmonising rules for securing system of member 
countries, which are going to solve their problems on their own, i.e. at the 
national level. It is possible that the prevailing attitude may change over 
time, but at the moment this seems to be completely out of question.  
At the beginning of the book I constructed two main hypotheses and 
three partial hypotheses that I can now, having analysed and evaluated the 
aspects of the problem, confirm or refute.   
The main hypotheses 
c) The process of supervision integration itself supports and increases the effectiveness
of supervision over a financial market and decreases the risk of destabilising the
system.
d) The regulatory functional over a financial market has been deeply integrated into
that of supervision and has thus become, to a certain extent, a preventive
measure—primary supervision.
Most probably one cannot reach the conclusion that the very process of 
integration makes supervision more effective, because it is a process that is 
always accompanied by other process such as changes in regulation or in 
mechanisms of supervisory authorities etc. I am sure that the process of 
integration does support the effectivity of supervision as well as financial 
stability and the reduction of systemic risk. Supervision is carried out more 
flexibly and consistently and, as a result, it is perceived as a more 
transparent system, which is a big advantage for supervisory authorities and 
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supervised entities alike. If we look at the process of integration as the 
unification of supervisory practices across the international financial market, 
then integrated supervision is more predictable for individual financial 
institutions and, to a certain degree, it enables enter business in various 
countries more easily since the chief supervisory differences have been 
obliterated. All of this also affects financial stability—the main goal of all 
regulatory and supervisory mechanisms, irrespective of whether the current 
economic period is stable or whether the economy is in recession. This part 
of the main hypothesis has not been refuted, but I cannot really claim it has 
been confirmed either; although, if forced, I would rather agree with the 
latter than the former. 
The second part of the main hypothesis might seem a bold statement that 
makes supervision a kind of a set, part of which is regulation. I am certain 
that regulation was, indeed, implemented as one of supervisory functions, 
though not exclusively so. Initially, there is always regulation which is crucial 
and which delegates individual powers to supervisory authorities along with 
the rules of conduct for supervised institutions. This primary and basic 
regulation entails entrusting certain powers to supervisory authorities, one 
of which is (apart from the fundamental one, i.e. daily as well as long-term 
supervision) part of regulation in several forms. The first option is to issue 
sublegal and implementing legal norms with general applicability; another 
option is to issue statements specifying potentially ambiguous passages in 
acts, or to provide more details regarding statutory rules. Another regulatory 
power that supervisory authorities have is the provision of consulting 
activities in the preparation of regulation. In the Banking Union integration 
is in this respect even noticeable since the representatives of regulatory 
bodies sit on the Supervisory Board of the ECB within the SSM, or they 
constitute the Single Resolution Authority within the SRM. I hold the view 
that regulation is a fundamental preventive instrument of supervision—the 
experience of supervisory authorities (now even supranational ones) helps 
to adopt adequate legislation (i.e. regulation). I am thus utterly convinced 
that this hypothesis has been confirmed.  
 
Partial hypothesis no. 1 
The process of supervision integration over a financial market is from both the 
institutional and functional perspective a step towards a more concentrated set of 





This hypothesis has also been confirmed, for I have not noticed any 
indication that integration should prove to distribute supervisory powers to 
a wide range of institutions. The main task of integration, as this book has 
stressed several times, is not the unification of powers into one single body, 
but rather the unification of supervisory mechanisms at the supranational 
level, and mutual co-operation aiming to achieve this task. It logically 
follows that such integration must concentrate powers in the hands of only 
a few institutions. It is only possible to unify supervisory mechanisms if 
supervision in individual countries is performed flexibly with high quality 
and intense international co-operation among individual supervisory 
authorities—that is something that many supervisory institutions in a given 
country have not reached yet. In the EU this distribution of powers into a 
very narrow range of institutions is even perceptible thanks to the 
centralisation of powers, mainly thanks to the Banking Union. My analysis 
of the execution if supervision in individual countries (in Europe as well as 
outside it) shows that in a large majority of countries supervision is not 
executed in the sectoral way, but rather in the functional way. The latter is 
based on the area of market failures of financial institutions and is thus 
much more suitable for an integrated supervisory framework. Consequently, 
I may assert that this hypothesis has been thoroughly confirmed. 
 
Partial hypothesis no. 2 
The process of supervision integration over a financial market was initiated so as to create 
a more effective way of reacting to a rapidly and continually developing world of financial 
markets, which are due to the increasing financial globalisation no longer matters of 
national interest only. 
This hypothesis is confirmed several times in various chapters of this 
book, including the conclusion. The international integration of supervision 
and its mechanisms into one single authority (or a few authorities) can be 
seen as the result of the necessity for flexible and effective responses to 
changing financial markets and the current needs of regulation always 
aiming to maintain financial stability.   
 
Partial hypothesis no. 3 
The process of supervision integration over a financial market is influenced by the 
enormous importance of a financial market in a national economy as the basis of 




There is little doubt that the financial market is a vital strategic element of 
the national as well as the international economy. This became especially 
evident during the financial crisis in 2007-2008, when particularly financial 
market problems caused massive financial losses and a precipitous 
worldwide economic decline.  Financial stability was in peril and it 
decreased considerably. The integration of supervision is one of the possible 
ways to achieve and maintain a prosperous national economy and 
international financial stability. These are also the goals to achieve via 
various instruments—among them, the integration of supervision is of 
crucial importance. 
One of the main goals of the EU and its economic policy is the creation 
of a single market. For many years, the EU has been putting a lot of effort 
into attempts to achieve this goal; the process of integration, especially in its 
form of unifying international supervisory practices, is one of the 
instruments the EU uses to create a single market. A single market without 
unified and harmonised supervisory rules is hardly conceivable—this 
confirms the hypothesis that integration (unification) of supervision really 
does lead to a single market. Nowadays one can see it very clearly in the 
Banking Union project, which helps the most to create a single EU market. 
What has been demonstrated here decidedly confirms the hypothesis.  
A single market is needed not only in the EU but in the whole of Europe. 
The Agreement on the EEA enables it, as does the way the EU legislation is 
implemented even in non-member states such as Norway. The EU naturally 
encompasses a much wider range of areas of harmonisation and 
interconnectedness than just the economic area, like the financial market 
area. It is the financial markets that provide clear evidence that EFTA 
countries outside the EU are, thanks to the EEA Agreement, regulated and 
supervised almost identically when compared with EU member states. Its 
creation and existence are entirely logical and all the parties concerned 
benefit from it. It might appear that EFTA countries only pick from the EU 
whatever they need to achieve economic stability—this may very well be 
true, but it does not do any harm. While a single market with EU countries 
surely is very convenient for Norway, it is extremely beneficial for all EU 
countries as well; hence the need to view the idea of a single market from 
the European (rather than just the EU) perspective. 
It remains to be seen what the relations between the Banking Union and 
EFTA countries are going to be because in many areas covered by the 
Banking Union they are under a regime similar to countries outside the 
Eurozone. It is clear that the voice of the countries outside the Eurozone 
and the EFTA countries will not be negligible as far as the Banking Union 
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is concerned. They are very happy in Norway that their negotiating position 
is similar not only to that of Iceland and Lichtenstein, but also Denmark, 
Sweden or Great Britain; especially as regards the first pillar of the Banking 
Union- the Single Supervisory Mechanism. It is likely that countries from 
outside the Eurozone might come under considerable pressure to join the 
Eurozone, thereby strengthening and stabilising the position of the EU in 
relation to EFTA countries. If, however, the pressure is exerted to no avail 
and there are still many EU countries outside the Eurozone in the future (as 
there are now), it is not totally out of question that there might be another 
agreement signed in some part of the Banking Union—an agreement that is 
similar to the EEA Agreement and that involves the EU as the 
representative of the Eurozone, EU member countries outside the 
Eurozone and EFTA countries so that the objective of the Banking Union 
could be accomplished. Then we would find ourselves in a hotchpotch of 
several agreements with rather confusing procedural issues. I sincerely hope 
that this hypothetical situation will never materialise and that all the current 
and future issues and problems relating to the Banking Union (including the 
single European market above the framework of the EU) will be solved 
systematically within the EU, or within the EEA Agreement. That seems to 
be the only way of achieving real integration of financial market supervision 
and, ultimately, of creating and maintaining a single market. 
It is going to be very interesting to monitor upcoming actions connected 
with Brexit in relation to the banking union. Great Britain is not part of the 
Eurozone, so the SSM is not very relevant, but SRM is in some aspects. 
Great Britain, however, proceeds in accordance with the Single Resolution 
Authority, and the National Resolution Fund fills up in the same way as the 
other member states. Formally, Great Britain is still part of the EU, and 
individual obligations must be respected.  
The future is, however, very uncertain and still unpredictable, and it is 
also very possible that Great Britain will join the current EFTA countries 
with economic collaboration (no longer politically) with the EU. When 
Great Britain becomes one of the EFTA countries, some of the issues in 
EFTA countries under the EEA Agreement mentioned above will become 
topical for Great Britain. 
What are the other options for Great Britain from the economic point of 
view? One of them is certainly a complex group of multilateral contracts 
with EU or other countries, like Switzerland. There are some differences 
compare to the EEA Agreement, but basically, the goal is the same – easier 
cross-border economic collaboration. The costs of this way might be higher 
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(longer administration procedure including acceptance and implementation 
of the local government), but there should be greater legislative freedom. 
The other option which was recently raised is Nafta (North American 
Free Trade Agreement), but in the author’s opinion, it would not make 
sense to join the North American Agreement given that Great Britain is 
geographically somewhere else. What could the advantage of such an 
agreement be? It is hard to find any, especially in a situation where the 
reality and future of Nafta is very unstable.  
The question regarding economic collaboration between the EU and 
Great Britain is not “IF AT ALL”, but rather “HOW and WHEN”. 
However, this is unlikely to be known until the Great Britain leaving of 
the EU becomes the final fact and reality. Then, we might find the way for 
economic collaboration and the legal framework of it between the EU and 
Great Britain. It is certainly needed for both parties. Based on the author’s 
opinion, the best solution for both parties is a situation in which Great 
Britain becomes an EFTA country. 
It is very difficult to predict the development of integration of financial 
market supervision in Europe, let alone the whole world; we cannot, 
though, expect some radical changes to the chosen direction towards more 
intense interconnections, co-operation and harmonisation, including the 
unification of supervisory mechanisms. This book places particular 
emphasis on integration in Europe, as this process (and all the 
accompanying activities) is both geographically as well as politically the 
closest to the Czech Republic—the local legislation (not only in this area) is 
based on the European legislation. Integration of supervision in Europe is 
and will be affected by what is going on in the EU, which is largely 
influenced by its inner problems. At the moment, the biggest problem is the 
issue of the Greek debt—a hotly-debated problem affecting the economy of 
the EU. Three years ago Greece was provided with financial help that was 
supposed to solve the problem. The thing is that a large majority of the 
finance was immediately used to pay off state bonds, most of which were in 
the hands of French and German banks. Thus, these banks received 
financial support from public funds, thereby rescuing their unfortunate 
investment in foreign state bonds. Is that not a problem of integration in 
the EU? The fact that despite the proclaimed attempts to create a single 
market (including single supervision over it), there are states whose 
representatives in the EU defend their national interests rather than the 
interests of the whole union? 
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A very fitting comment was made by Jurgen Habermas, who said: 
‘Without a common financial and economic policy, the national economies 
of pseudo-sovereign member states will continue to drift apart in terms of 
productivity. No political community can sustain such tension in the long 
run. At the same time, by focusing on avoidance of open conflict, the EU’s 
institutions are preventing necessary political initiatives for expanding the 
currency union into a political union. Only the government leaders 
assembled in the European Council are in the position to act, but precisely 
they are the ones who are unable to act in the interest of a joint European 
community because they think mainly of their national electorate. We are 
stuck in a political trap. […] Over the course of the crisis, the European 
executive has accrued more and more authority. Key decisions are being 
taken by the council, the commission and ECB – in other words, the very 
institutions that are either insufficiently legitimated to take such decisions or 
lack any democratic basis. […] The currency union must gain the capacity to 
act at the supra-national level. In view of the chaotic political process 
triggered by the crisis in Greece we can no longer afford to ignore the limits 
of the present method of intergovernmental compromise.’ 427 
One could not agree more with this statement that extremely aptly 
describes the problems that European integration is endowed with. The 
integration of supervision is a very important part of European integration 
since it contributes to the establishment of a single market, which is one of 
the major goals of the EU economy, if not the biggest of all. There are, 
however, other areas in which integration is going on and will keep going 
on to enable the creation of something that strongly resembles a federation. 
It is desirable that activities and trends in the EU should focus on what 
Habermas mentions: in particular, the currency union must become a 
political union and individual representatives must act in the interest of 
the whole community rather than of their electors. How to achieve this 
goal is no easy question; the fundamental step seems to be the acceptance 
of the EU as a joint community, rather than something that provides a lot 
of benefits although we feel little community solidarity and we do not co-
operate to ensure benefits for all. In other words, I would like to see the 
EU as a real federation, for without a political union cannot be attained all 
the economic goals the EU has been pursuing, including a single market 
and its indispensable element: integrated financial market supervision. The 
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dominance of the EU in this book is caused not only by geographical 
proximity, but, more importantly, also by the dominant role occupied by 
the EU globally; thus, financial stability in the EU contributes greatly to 
global stability and affects it significantly. This is the reason, along with 
the fact that I am an EU citizen, why I entertain the opinion that it is first 
necessary to set and stabilise properly functional supervision at the local 
level (he level of the EU, in this case) and only then is it possible to 
analyse and determine supervision at the global level—even though there 
is quite a lot of overlap, of course.    
By way of conclusion, I would like to state that, having carried out 
considerable research, I am now utterly convinced that the integration of 
supervision is a process tried and tested to a large extent over the years, 
and it is also the right trend in supervision in view of the 
interconnectedness of international financial markets. New activities in the 
EU (the creation of the Banking Union, in particular) represent more 
concentrated efforts to integrate supervision. It is still early days yet and 
not every detail has been specified and successfully dealt with; it is going 
to take some time before the Banking Union is in its final form and fully 
operational (in a few years’ time, presumably). Before that, it would be 
unfair and unprofessional to pass judgement. 
The reasons outlined above justify the continuation of the process not 
only in the EU, but also globally; it is in our best interests to keep 
supporting and developing the integration of financial market supervision 
and to keep harmonising the practices and mechanisms of supervision. 
















This book analyses the integration of financial market supervision at the 
international level, particularly focusing on EU law and the actual processes 
taking place in this area. Currently legislative action at the EU level has a 
significant impact on legislation in the Czech Republic, with which this 
work is also of concerned together with where the integration of 
supervision takes place. Within the comparison this paper has included a 
treatise of Norway, which is not an EU member, but a member of the 
European Economic Community (EEA), however it is interest to make a 
comparison of such countries with EU regulations. 
This topic is relevant for an extended period of time, while in the past 
few years, the integration has become even more intense. The word 
integration means unification, completion, fusion, the joining process in a 
higher unity. The phrase integration of supervision also implies the 
integration of regulation, because there is no supervision without regulation 
and vice versa, respectively supervision includes regulation itself and for this 
reason, this work also addresses the integration of regulation together with 
the integration of financial market supervision. The opinion of this paper is 
even such that regulation is effectively preventive (primary) supervision. For 
that reason the supervisory authorities of the financial market are not 
“only” supervisors, but also regulators. This paper perceives integration in 
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terms of functionalal way – regulation functional significantly integrated 
into supervisory functionals (but of course not exclusively because a 
fundamental role of the regulator remains in power of legislator). 
Integration of financial market supervision can be understood in several 
ways. Either it is a unification of supervision within one or two institutions, 
as it is understood as the meaning of integration in individual EU member 
countries e.g. in the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, where 
Financial Supervision was unified (integrated) into a single institution 
(institutional integration) or it is the harmonization – unification 
(integration) of supervisory practices and transnational cooperation for this 
purpose and in this way it is understood as the process of integration at the 
international (EU) level (functionalal integration). This book deals with both 
ways of understanding of integration, but, however the view of this paper is 
that the international way is more significant in determining the meaning of 
supervision integration of the financial market.  
Integration of supervision is a process that from the international 
perspective has been in process for three decades and is still in 
development, respectively methods of integration are constantly increasing. 
There are several reasons for integration and perhaps the most important is 
the very essence of the financial market and its liberalization, the change in 
its structure, its functionaling and overall economic development. 
Furthermore, the emergence of large national and multinational groups, 
financial institutions and the related international harmonization of rules of 
business of financial institutions. 
These basic tenets are a prerequisite and also reason for financial market 
supervision. The basis of regulation itself should be sought in the individual 
financial systems of individual states and represent a high commitment to 
ensure the stability of the financial system and financial institutions. It could 
be simply said that regulation of supervision is primarily aimed at 
establishing rules of establishment and functionaling of financial 
institutions, so that the potential threat to the stability of the financial 
system will be as minimum as is possible. 
In the first part of this book the paper deals with financial markets and 
supervision in general, including theoretical foundations of approaches and 
models of supervision, classification of the financial market supervision 
within the system of financial law. This includes the scientific – theoretical 
part of the book and there is a treatise of the reasons for the regulation and 
supervision of financial market and its objectives, contents and principles. 
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A significant section of this chapter is an explanation of the systems of 
supervision and their models. In general, there are two basics models of the 
supervision, sectoralal and functionalal. The sectoralal model was previously 
used more frequently in many countries, but it has been changed in the last 
decade to a functionalal model, which has a theoretical basis, since it is 
based on the typology of market failure. 
In the second chapter there is a analyses of the integration of the 
supervision in the EU, with all current legislature and trends in this area. 
This is the key part of this book, because of its importance and effect for 
member countries and also for the international process of the integration 
especially because of the Banking Union as the newest standard of the 
integration and centralization of the powers of the supervision of the 
financial market. 
The third chapter deals with integration of the supervision in the Czech 
Republic as a member state of the EU, but not a member country of the 
monetary union and Banking union. The rules of this area are implemented 
in Czech law through the EU directives and regulations; therefore there are 
many important parts of Banking Union valid in Czech Republic, even 
though there is no membership of the Banking Union. The fourth chapter 
is about Norway and its integration of the supervision. Norway is a country 
without membership to EU, but as a part of the EEA agreement, Norway 
accepts and implements most of the rules and standards to their national 
law. This demonstrates that there is no more national financial market, but 
an international market, because/due to of the influence of national 
financial markets to each other. In this point of view harmonization and 
collaboration of the all countries is vitally necessary for the stability of the 
financial market not only because the centralization of the powers to the 
international level supervisors, especially in the EU, but mostly because of 
the supervised entities. Countries will have an increased knowledge of the 
conditions for the conduct of business in this area, because these conditions 
will be harmonized, unified and in general similar, thereby facilitating the 
ease with which to conduct similar business in other countries, or globally 
and it also facilitates international competition. 
Within the EU, there are minimum problems, which should be solved, 
thus the supervision will be well integrated and therefore support financial 
stability and also one of the aims of the economic policy of EU, which is to 
build up real single market in Europe. The problem is that only the 
government leaders assembled in the European Council are in the position 
to act, but precisely they are the ones who are unable to act in the interest 
of a joint European community because their main consideration is their 
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national electorate. Thus the result is a political trap. The view of this paper 
is that the currency union must gain the capacity to act at the supra-national 
level and the currency union should expand into a political union, such that 
the process of integration will in all ways be complete. 
Research in the context of this book, concludes that the integration of 
financial market supervision is a process that is established by years of 
practice and very well set direction of the method of supervision relative to 
interconnection of the international financial market. Harmonization of 
work and practice of supervision of the financial market together with the 
strengthening of cooperation in this area should be continuously supported 
and developed, in which, ideally, we (the Czech Republic and maybe all 
citizens of EU) should actively participate. 
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